Gérard V. La Forest

The respondent lost her job shortly after turning 65 and was denied regular unemployment insurance benefits due to the age restriction in s. 31 of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971.

She appealed to a Board of Referees, arguing the provision violated s. 15 of the Charter, but the Board upheld the denial without deciding the constitutional issue.

The Federal Court of Appeal directly reviewed the decision and found the provision unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Board of Referees lacked the statutory mandate to decide Charter questions, and thus the Federal Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to make a final determination on the issue.

However, addressing the substantive issue, the Court found that s. 31 violated s. 15(1) of the Charter by discriminating on the basis of age and could not be justified under s. 1, as it did not minimally impair the respondent's rights.

The appellant sought to hold a municipality liable in extra-contract for its loss.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal in a brief oral judgment, holding that its recent decision in Laurentide Motels governed the matter.

Adopting the dissenting reasons in the Quebec Court of Appeal, the Court ordered judgment for the appellant in the amount of $29,000, with interest, additional indemnity, and costs throughout.

A bank appealed a Quebec Court of Appeal decision that had curtailed its recovery after enforcing Bank Act security against a manufacturer's inventory.

The Supreme Court held the debtor was in default on demand loans, the bank was justified in calling the loans, and the debtor had consented to delivery of the secured inventory for realization.

The Court further held that contractual clauses authorizing possession and sale were valid and not contrary to public policy or the Bank Act where the debtor did not object.

The Court restored the trial judgment, rejected the higher inventory valuation advanced on appeal, and dismissed the cross-appeal and new damages claims.

The respondent, a school teacher, was convicted of sexually assaulting seven male pupils.

The Court of Appeal overturned the convictions, finding the trial judge erred in considering the cumulative effect of the evidence and that there was insufficient proof of sexual motivation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Court of Appeal erred in its interpretation of sexual assault by requiring specific sexual intent, contrary to established jurisprudence.

Furthermore, the Court held that when an appellate court finds an error of law regarding the admission of evidence, it cannot substitute its own opinion on the sufficiency of the remaining evidence to convict, but must order a new trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding whether a trustee appointed under the Special Corporate Powers Act is required to notify the Minister before realizing on security, pursuant to s. 14 of the Act respecting the Ministère du Revenu.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Quebec Court of Appeal that such a trustee is not one of the persons provided for in s. 14 as it was worded at the time of the notice of assessment.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that allowed the Crown's appeal from a stay of proceedings.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that no ground had been established that would warrant the disclosure of the identity of the police informer.

The appellant challenged both the common law rule allowing the Crown to raise insanity over an accused’s objection and the Criminal Code provision requiring automatic detention of an insanity acquittee pending the pleasure of the Lieutenant Governor.

The Court held that the common law rule violated s. 7 because it impermissibly deprived an accused of control over the conduct of the defence, and it reformulated the rule so that the Crown may generally raise insanity only after the trier of fact has otherwise concluded the accused is guilty, or where the accused has put mental capacity in issue.

The Court further held that s. 542(2) was intra vires Parliament’s criminal law power, but violated ss. 7 and 9 of the Charter because it mandated automatic, arbitrary, and indeterminate detention without a hearing and without standards.

The appeal was allowed, a judicial stay of proceedings was entered, and the declaration of invalidity was suspended for six months with interim detention limits.

The Crown appealed from an acquittal entered after the court below held that an employee masseuse at a massage parlour could not be convicted of keeping a common bawdy-house absent evidence of care and management of the premises.

The Supreme Court majority held that, although the statutory definition of "keeper" is broad, the indictable offence in s. 210(1) requires both some degree of control over the care and management of the premises and participation in the illicit activities of the bawdy-house.

The accused's participation in the operation of the premises did not satisfy the required management element on the facts.

The appeal was dismissed and the acquittal upheld, with a dissent that would have adopted a broader active-participation test.

The appeal concerned whether claims arising from a fertilizer supply agreement involving ocean carriage, demurrage, discharge obligations, excess cargo, and shore crane rental fell within the Federal Court's maritime jurisdiction.

Applying the integrally connected test from the maritime jurisdiction jurisprudence, the majority held that the claims were rooted in the buyer's obligation to discharge cargo under the carriage aspects of the agreement and were therefore legitimate matters of Canadian maritime law.

The majority rejected the characterization of the dispute as merely one for the sale of goods under provincial law.

The appeal was allowed, the cross-appeal dismissed, and the trial judgment restored, with a dissent concluding the matter was in pith and substance a provincial sale of goods dispute.

The United States sought the extradition of the respondents for a plane hijacking allegedly committed in 1969.

At the time, hijacking was not a crime under Canadian law nor an extradition crime under the existing treaties, but it was later added to the Criminal Code and the 1976 extradition treaty.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the treaty applies to crimes committed before it came into force, a fugitive may only be extradited if the act was a crime recognized in Canada at the time it was committed.

The appeal was dismissed.

The self-represented appellant was convicted of assault and his appeal to the Superior Court was dismissed.

He then appealed to the Court of Appeal without seeking leave, erroneously relying on section 762(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal on the Crown's motion.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the further appeal, finding that section 771(1) requires leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal and that the appellant's failure to seek leave was due to his own error, not from being misled by a court clerk.

The appellant shot and killed a man after a drunken altercation.

He was arrested for a 'shooting incident' and advised of his right to counsel, which he waived, giving a statement to the police.

The police did not inform him that the victim had died until after the statement was taken.

The appellant argued his statement should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter because his s. 10(a) right to be informed of the reasons for his arrest was violated, vitiating his s. 10(b) waiver.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while s. 10(a) was violated, the appellant had sufficient awareness of his jeopardy to validly waive his right to counsel, as he must have known he likely killed the victim.

The Court also found the statement's admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, a journalist, sought access to audio and video tapes that had been admitted as exhibits in a criminal trial resulting in a murder conviction.

The conviction was later overturned on appeal because the tapes were found to have been obtained in violation of the accused's Charter rights and were ruled inadmissible.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the privacy interests of the acquitted person outweighed the public right of access to exhibits judicially determined to be inadmissible against him.

The appellant appealed his convictions for rape and indecent assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in excluding evidence of the complainant's prior sexual conduct under section 142(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that there was no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion.

The appellant union sought a declaration that teachers working in a federal penitentiary through a private contractor were government employees and members of the existing bargaining unit for collective bargaining purposes.

The majority held that, applying the pragmatic and functional approach, Parliament did not intend to confer jurisdiction on the labour board to determine that persons not appointed within the statutory public service scheme were employees of the Public Service.

The statutory regime created distinct labour relations structures for public servants and other federal workers, leaving no room for a de facto category of public servant.

The board therefore committed reviewable jurisdictional error, and the appeal was dismissed.

A dissent would have held the issue fell within the board's labour relations expertise and that its decision was not patently unreasonable.

The respondent's late sister consulted the appellant doctor about a breast lump.

The doctor performed a biopsy, found cancer, but failed to inform the patient or arrange follow-up care.

Years later, the patient died of generalized cancer.

The Supreme Court of Canada rejected the application of the 'loss of chance' theory to medical malpractice in Quebec civil law, holding that traditional rules of causation apply.

However, the Court found the doctor liable for the patient's psychological suffering and diminished quality of life caused by the failure to inform and follow up, awarding $17,500 in damages.

Two midwives were charged with criminal negligence causing death and criminal negligence causing bodily harm after a child died in the birth canal during a home birth.

At trial, they were convicted of causing death but acquitted of causing bodily harm.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction, finding a foetus is not a 'person' under the Criminal Code, but substituted a conviction for causing bodily harm despite the Crown not appealing the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the acquittal for causing death, confirming a foetus is not a 'person' under the Code, and overturned the substituted conviction, ruling the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to substitute a conviction without a Crown appeal.

The appellant sought to quash municipal loan by-laws and recover special taxes paid on the basis that affected owners had not received legally sufficient notices convening electors.

The Court held that the notices were indeed insufficient and that the resulting illegality was serious enough to support a direct action in nullity under art. 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

However, the remedy remained discretionary, and except in cases of total absence of jurisdiction, such proceedings must be brought within a reasonable time notwithstanding the thirty-year prescription period.

Given the appellant's knowledge of the taxes, repeated payment without protest, and lengthy unexplained delay after the work was completed and bonds issued, the Superior Court properly dismissed the action.

The appellant was approached by an undercover police officer in a 'buy-and-bust' operation in an area known for drug trafficking.

The officer had no reasonable suspicion that the appellant was engaged in criminal activity but persisted until the appellant agreed to sell a small amount of cannabis resin.

The trial judge found entrapment through random virtue-testing and stayed the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the officer was engaged in a bona fide inquiry directed at a specific location where drug-related crimes were reasonably suspected, and thus did not engage in random virtue-testing.

The Court also held it lacked jurisdiction to enter convictions in place of a new trial absent a cross-appeal by the Crown.

The appellant insurance company appealed a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal regarding a fire loss claim.

Coverage had been denied on the basis that the respondent insured failed to disclose the cancellation of an earlier policy for non-payment of premium and serious insurance fraud.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting reasons at the Court of Appeal, and restored the trial judgment dismissing the insured's action.