Gérard V. La Forest

The appellant sought to appeal his murder conviction as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada, relying on a dissent in the Court of Appeal.

The Crown brought an application to quash the appeal.

The Supreme Court granted the application, finding that the dissenting judge's disagreement concerned the adequacy of the facts selected by the trial judge in instructing the jury, rather than a question of law.

As there was no dissent on a question of law, the appeal as of right under s. 691(1)(a) of the Criminal Code was quashed.

The appellant was charged with trafficking in a narcotic.

During his trial, defence counsel sought to cross-examine a police officer in a manner that would reveal the identity of a police informer.

The Crown objected and stayed the proceedings under s. 508 of the Criminal Code to protect the informer's identity, subsequently recommencing the proceedings.

The appellant argued this constituted an abuse of process and that the second trial judge's refusal to allow the cross-examination, issue a material witness warrant, or reopen the case to hear a witness on entrapment denied him the right to make full answer and defence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Crown acted properly to protect the informer's identity and that the trial judge made no errors in her discretionary rulings.

The appellants, leaders of a white nationalist political organization, were convicted of wilfully promoting hatred against an identifiable group under s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code for publishing a magazine promoting white supremacy and anti-Semitism.

They challenged the constitutionality of s. 319(2) and the reverse onus in the defence of truth under s. 319(3)(a).

The Supreme Court of Canada, relying on its concurrent decision in R. v. Keegstra, held that while both provisions infringe the Charter (s. 2(b) and s. 11(d) respectively), they are justified under s. 1 as reasonable limits in a free and democratic society.

The accused was convicted of failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

A new trial was ordered on appeal.

At the second trial, the Crown cross-examined the accused on inconsistencies between his current testimony and his testimony at the first trial to impeach his credibility.

The accused was convicted again, but the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction, holding that the cross-examination violated s. 13 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that using a prior inconsistent statement from a former proceeding solely to impugn the credibility of an accused does not incriminate that person and therefore does not violate s. 13.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted an application to hold a special hearing to determine constitutional questions regarding the translation and temporary validity of Manitoba laws under section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870.

The Court ordered that the temporary validity of the laws in question be continued until the hearing is held and judgment is rendered.

The appellant union sought a successorship declaration after a unionized construction company set up a parallel non-unionized company to bid on non-union projects, a practice known as double breasting.

The Labour Relations Board granted the declaration, finding a disposition of business had occurred.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Board's decision was patently unreasonable because there was no evidence of a transfer or disposition of assets, work, or expertise from the unionized company to the non-unionized company.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the quashing of the Board's order.

The appellants appealed judgments declaring unconstitutional a hospital regulation requiring medical staff retirement at age 65 unless an exception was granted.

The principal issue was whether the hospital, in adopting and administering the regulation, was subject to the Charter under s. 32.

The majority held the hospital was not part of government and its internal management regulation therefore fell outside the Charter's ambit.

Assuming the Charter applied, the majority further held the regulation and its application were discriminatory under s. 15(1) but justified under s. 1 because they were rationally connected to maintaining excellence in a major acute care teaching hospital and minimally impairing in a resource-allocation context.

A group of university professors and a librarian challenged mandatory retirement policies at age 65 and the exclusion of those over 65 from employment discrimination protection under provincial human rights legislation.

The majority held that universities were not part of government for Charter purposes under s. 32, so their retirement policies were not directly subject to Charter review.

The Court further held that the statutory exclusion of workers aged 65 and over from protection against age discrimination infringed s. 15(1), but was justified under s. 1 in light of the legislature's cautious approach to complex labour market, pension, and workplace-organization concerns.

The appeal was dismissed, with dissenting judges finding the Charter applicable to universities and rejecting the statutory justification.

The appellant college and respondent faculty association were parties to a collective agreement containing a mandatory retirement clause at age 65.

Two faculty members filed a grievance challenging the clause under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The arbitrator held in a preliminary award that the college was a Crown agency subject to the Charter and that the collective agreement constituted 'law'.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the college's appeal, holding that the college is a Crown agency performing acts of government, making its actions subject to the Charter.

The Court further held that an arbitration board has jurisdiction under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 to determine Charter issues arising in the course of exercising its statutory mandate.

The respondents were retired at age 65 pursuant to the university's mandatory retirement policy.

They sought declarations that the policy violated s. 15(1) of the Charter and that the definition of 'age' in the provincial Human Rights Act, which restricted protection to those under 65, also violated s. 15(1).

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Charter does not apply to the university as it is not 'government' under s. 32.

The Court further held that while the age restriction in the Human Rights Act violates s. 15(1), it is saved under s. 1 as a reasonable limit.

Appeal concerning whether Quebec's municipal court system, which permitted part-time municipal judges to continue practising law subject to statutory safeguards, infringed the right to a hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal.

The Court held that the challenge was properly characterized as one of institutional impartiality rather than traditional judicial independence from government.

Applying the reasonable apprehension of bias standard, the Court found that while practising law is per se incompatible with judicial functions absent safeguards, the oath of office, judicial immunity, ethics code, recusation obligations, and statutory conflict rules sufficiently minimized the risk.

The impugned provisions did not violate s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter or s. 23 of the Quebec Charter.

The appellant bank recalled a loan and liquidated the assets of the respondents' family company within three hours, knowing the respondents were negotiating a sale of their shares.

The respondents subsequently sold their shares at a significantly reduced price and sued the bank for the difference.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the bank had a contractual right to recall the loan, the sudden liquidation without reasonable notice constituted an abuse of contractual rights.

Although the respondents could not sue under the contract or by lifting the corporate veil, the bank's actions constituted an independent fault under article 1053 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada, making it delictually liable to the shareholders for their direct financial loss.

The appellant and a companion broke into a house.

The companion sexually assaulted and suffocated the elderly occupant.

The appellant was present but did not participate in the assault or suffocation, and told his companion to stop choking the victim.

The companion was convicted of first degree murder, while the appellant was acquitted.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial for the appellant on manslaughter, applying the 'single transaction' principle.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the single transaction principle applies only to the classification of murder under s. 214(5) of the Criminal Code, not to manslaughter.

The Court also found that the trial judge had adequately instructed the jury on party liability and the possibility of a manslaughter verdict.

The police installed a video camera without prior judicial authorization to monitor activities in a hotel room registered to the appellant, suspecting it was being used as a common gaming house.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant, finding the video surveillance violated s. 8 of the Charter and excluding the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, holding s. 8 was not violated.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the warrantless video surveillance violated the appellant's reasonable expectation of privacy under s. 8 of the Charter and was not justified under s. 1.

However, the Court concluded that the admission of the videotape evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute under s. 24(2), as the police acted in good faith based on a reasonable misunderstanding of the law prior to the Charter's full development in this area.

The appeal was dismissed.

The police conducted a warrantless perimeter search of the appellant's residence based on suspicion of marijuana cultivation.

During the search, they detected the odour of marijuana and heard electrical humming, which provided the grounds to obtain a search warrant.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the warrantless perimeter search was a trespass and violated the appellant's rights under section 8 of the Charter.

The Court further held that the evidence obtained from the subsequent warranted search must be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, as the police conduct was a flagrant violation of constitutional rights and its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The respondent was convicted of trafficking in narcotics based partly on intercepted private communications.

At trial, the judge denied the respondent's motion to examine the affidavits filed in support of the wiretap authorizations.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that an accused should be granted access to the sealed packet upon request.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, affirming that the accused is entitled to access the sealed packet to make full answer and defence, subject to editing and special concerns for the administration of justice.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault based in part on wiretap evidence.

The trial judge admitted the evidence without opening the sealed packet.

The Court of Appeal opened and edited the packet but denied the appellant the right to cross-examine the affiant.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the appellant had established a basis to cross-examine the affiant because the affidavit was misleading regarding the use of a police informant, which bore directly on whether other investigative procedures were unlikely to succeed.

The appellant was convicted of conspiring to import a narcotic based largely on intercepted private communications.

The trial judge refused to open the sealed packets containing the affidavits supporting the wiretap authorizations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that an accused is entitled to access the sealed packet, subject to editing to protect informants, to make full answer and defence.

The Court established that a trial judge may review the authorization to determine if it complies with s. 8 of the Charter, and if unlawful, the evidence must be excluded under s. 178.16 of the Criminal Code.

The Court also held that the accused may cross-examine the affiant with leave of the trial judge if necessary to make full answer and defence.

A new trial was ordered because the appellant was denied the right to cross-examine.

The respondent, declared a criminal sexual psychopath in 1953, served almost 37 years in prison under an indeterminate sentence.

Despite numerous psychiatric recommendations for his supervised release and the unavailability of necessary treatment, the National Parole Board repeatedly denied him parole based on minor infractions.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the dangerous offender provisions are constitutional, the Parole Board erred in applying the statutory criteria for release.

The inordinate length of the respondent's incarceration had become grossly disproportionate to his circumstances, violating his right against cruel and unusual punishment under section 12 of the Charter.

The appeal was dismissed, confirming his release.

The appellants sought judicial review of a decision by the Canadian Import Tribunal, which found that the subsidization of U.S. grain corn caused material injury to Canadian producers.

The Tribunal interpreted the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA) in light of the GATT Subsidies Code, considering potential imports as well as actual imports.

The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the applications for judicial review.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the Tribunal's interpretation of its constitutive legislation was not patently unreasonable and that it was appropriate for the Tribunal to consult the GATT in interpreting SIMA.