Gérard V. La Forest

The appellant received strike pay from his union equivalent to his normal net take-home pay while on strike.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the strike pay did not fall within the definition of 'income from a source' under section 3 of the Income Tax Act.

The Court applied the principle that in cases of doubt, the benefit must go to the taxpayer.

The appellant was convicted of conspiring to import cocaine.

At trial, he claimed he only pretended to participate in the conspiracy to regain the affections of his former mistress.

During cross-examination, the Crown questioned the appellant on why he had not disclosed this defence to authorities upon his arrest.

The trial judge failed to instruct the jury to ignore these questions and answers, despite an undertaking to do so.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the cross-examination violated the appellant's right to silence under section 7 of the Charter.

The failure to instruct the jury caused irreparable prejudice that could not be cured by the proviso in section 613(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The parties separated after a marriage under the regime of separation of property.

The husband went bankrupt and was discharged before the wife filed for divorce and claimed a compensatory allowance and lump sum support.

The trial judge awarded the wife $40,000.

The Court of Appeal set aside the award, finding the husband's bankruptcy barred the compensatory allowance and the wife had waived her alimentary claim.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the bankruptcy discharge did not bar the compensatory allowance claim, as it was not a provable claim in bankruptcy, and the trial judge properly found an alimentary claim was before him.

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to commit extortion and related offences.

Following their committal, their trial was delayed for almost two years, primarily due to institutional problems and a lack of resources in the judicial district.

The appellants moved for a stay of proceedings, arguing their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter had been infringed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the delay was clearly excessive and unreasonable, establishing a framework for assessing s. 11(b) claims that considers the length of delay, explanation for delay, waiver, and prejudice to the accused.

The appeal was allowed and a stay of proceedings was directed.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their action to recover the proceeds of a life insurance policy.

The insured signed an application and paid a deposit, but the initial premium was not fully paid until a month later, after the insured's health had deteriorated and he was hospitalized for what was later diagnosed as lung cancer.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that under art. 2516 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada, the insurance never came into effect because the insurability of the risk had changed before the initial premium was paid.

The Court also found no evidence that the insurer waived the application of art. 2516.

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to import marijuana based on private communications intercepted under three judicial authorizations.

The authorizations included a 'resort to' clause permitting interception at any place in British Columbia resorted to by the named persons, which the police used to tap public pay telephones and surreptitiously enter residential premises.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the 'resort to' clauses were lawful under the Criminal Code, the failure to include minimizing conditions for public pay telephones and the surreptitious entry into private dwellings without specific authorization violated section 8 of the Charter.

However, the Court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) because the police acted in good faith based on the law as it was understood at the time, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that reversed a trial judgment ordering the respondent to pay the balance of an account for goods sold and delivered.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judgment, with Stevenson J. dissenting.

The appellant appealed a decision setting aside a stay of proceedings that had been granted on the basis that his Charter right to a fair trial was infringed due to his inability to communicate with the court and understand the charge.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the trial judge was not the appropriate forum for the application.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the trial judge misdirected the jury on premeditation.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, disagreeing with the dissenting judge in the Quebec Court of Appeal.

The appellants, hypothecary creditors, sought to recover under a fire insurance policy containing a standard mortgage clause after the insured property was destroyed by arson.

The insurers refused to pay, arguing the policy was void ab initio due to misrepresentations by the hypothecary debtor when purchasing the policy.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the standard mortgage clause creates a separate and distinct contract between the insurers and the hypothecary creditors.

This independent contract cannot be invalidated by any act, neglect, omission, or misrepresentation of the hypothecary debtor, whether occurring at the inception of the policy or subsequently.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision requiring it to indemnify the respondent hypothecary creditor after the insured property was intentionally burned by the hypothecary debtor.

The insurer argued that under the Civil Code of Lower Canada, it was not liable for prejudice arising from the insured's intentional fault.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the standard hypothecary clause creates a separate insurance contract between the insurer and the hypothecary creditor.

Because the creditor, not the debtor, is the insured under this second contract, the debtor's intentional fault is treated as the act of a third party and cannot be invoked against the creditor.

The plaintiff brought an action alleging he contracted mesothelioma from asbestos exposure and claimed the defendants conspired to withhold information about the dangers of asbestos.

The defendants applied to strike out the conspiracy claims as disclosing no reasonable claim.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a statement of claim should only be struck out if it is 'plain and obvious' that it discloses no reasonable claim.

The Court found it was not plain and obvious that the conspiracy claim would fail, and the action was allowed to proceed.

The appellants were charged with having sexual intercourse with a female under the age of 14, contrary to s. 146(1) of the Criminal Code.

They challenged the constitutionality of the provision, arguing it violated ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 146(1) violated s. 7 because it created an absolute liability offence punishable by imprisonment, denying the accused a defence of honest mistake of fact regarding the complainant's age.

The Court found this infringement was not justified under s. 1.

However, the Court held that the provision did not violate the equality rights under s. 15, as the biological realities of the offence meant it could only be committed by males.

The appeals were allowed, the offending words were struck down, and new trials were ordered.

The appellant was found intoxicated in the driver's seat of a stolen vehicle and charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

At trial, he was acquitted on the basis that he was too intoxicated to form the requisite intent.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the offence of having care or control while impaired is a general intent offence for which voluntary intoxication is not a defence.

The Court further held that the unavailability of the intoxication defence for this offence does not violate sections 7 or 11(d) of the Charter, or alternatively, any such violation is justified under section 1.

The parties separated after a 25-year marriage.

The respondent had retired from the armed forces and was receiving monthly pension payments.

The trial judge included the pension as a matrimonial asset and ordered the respondent to pay the appellant half of the future monthly payments.

The Court of Appeal reversed this, finding the pension was income, not a matrimonial asset.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that pensions are matrimonial assets subject to equal division under the Nova Scotia Matrimonial Property Act.

The Court found no operational conflict between the provincial property legislation and the federal Canadian Forces Superannuation Act's prohibition against alienation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm against a minor.

The central issue was the admissibility of a note written by the complainant 45 minutes after the incident and whether there was sufficient confirmatory evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal for the reasons given by the majority of the Court of Appeal, affirming the conviction.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada regarding his right to use the French language in criminal proceedings before the Alberta courts under s. 110 of The North-West Territories Act.

The Court held that s. 110 is in force in Alberta for federal criminal proceedings.

However, relying on its recent decision in R. v. Mercure, the Court dismissed the appeal regarding the appellant's claim that the judge and Crown must understand and address the accused in French without an interpreter.

The Superintendent of Bankruptcy initiated an investigation into the appellants and the RCMP obtained a search warrant under s. 443 of the Criminal Code.

The appellants applied to quash the warrant, arguing that the search should have been conducted under s. 6(2) of the Bankruptcy Act instead.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the 1985 amendment to s. 443 of the Criminal Code made it applicable to all federal statutes, regardless of whether they contain their own search and seizure provisions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant insurer sought to annul a comprehensive general liability policy issued to the respondent asbestos manufacturer, alleging the respondent failed to disclose material facts regarding the health risks of asbestos exposure (specifically, the Selikoff reports).

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the insured was not obliged to disclose these facts because the insurer was presumed to know them by virtue of their public character and notoriety.

The Court established that the standard for notoriety is that of a reasonably competent underwriter insuring similar risks in the industry, and that such an underwriter ought to have known of the serious asbestos-related health risks widely reported in North American media.

The complainant, a member of the World Wide Church of God, requested unpaid leave for Easter Monday to observe a holy day.

The employer refused due to busy Monday operations and terminated the complainant when he failed to report to work.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the employer's attendance rule had an adverse discriminatory effect on the basis of religion.

The Court distinguished between direct and adverse effect discrimination, ruling that for the latter, the employer must accommodate the employee up to the point of undue hardship.

The employer failed to prove that accommodating the complainant's single absence would cause undue hardship, and the appeal was allowed.