Claude Provost

The accused, a chronic alcoholic, sexually assaulted a 65-year-old woman who was confined to a wheelchair.

At trial, he argued that he was in a state of extreme intoxication akin to automatism and lacked the minimal intent required for the general intent offence of sexual assault.

The trial judge acquitted him, but the Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal based on the Leary rule, which precluded intoxication as a defence to general intent offences.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the strict application of the Leary rule violates sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The Court established that evidence of extreme intoxication akin to automatism or insanity can be considered to negate the minimal intent required for general intent offences, though the burden of proof rests on the accused on a balance of probabilities.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted due to unreasonable delay.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the accused's consents to several adjournments constituted waiver or were attributable to him.

Applying the Morin framework and noting the absence of evidence of prejudice, the Court concluded the delay was not unreasonable.

The stay was quashed and the matter returned for trial.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered by the Court of Appeal on a charge of arson.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that there was no evidence of a fire retardant.

The Court held that this total lack of evidence made the trial judge's conclusion that the accused had the exclusive opportunity to set the fire unreasonable.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that had entered an acquittal on a charge related to a prohibited weapon.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the conviction for the reasons given by the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal, finding that a knife with a blade opening automatically through centrifugal force is a prohibited weapon.

The appellant Crown authority appealed a decision quashing a search warrant executed at a broadcaster's premises for videotapes of a labour-related vandalism incident that had already been aired.

The majority held that a search warrant for media premises may issue where the statutory requirements are met and the issuing justice balances law-enforcement needs against the media's privacy and news-gathering role, but disclosure of alternative sources, while ordinarily desirable, is not a constitutional precondition.

On the facts, the prior broadcast of the footage, the absence of interference with broadcasting operations, and the reasonableness of the search justified the warrant.

The dissent would have held that searches of press premises infringe freedom of the press and require proof of necessity, proportionality, and minimal impairment under s. 1.

The Superintendent of Bankruptcy initiated an investigation into the appellants and the RCMP obtained a search warrant under s. 443 of the Criminal Code.

The appellants applied to quash the warrant, arguing that the search should have been conducted under s. 6(2) of the Bankruptcy Act instead.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the 1985 amendment to s. 443 of the Criminal Code made it applicable to all federal statutes, regardless of whether they contain their own search and seizure provisions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent's trial was discontinued due to exceptional publicity from statements made in the National Assembly regarding the defence and a witness's credibility.

Before a new trial date was set, the respondent successfully moved for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter, which was upheld by the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that a stay of proceedings was premature as the possibility of selecting an impartial jury could only be determined at the jury selection stage.

The appellant was charged with conspiring in Canada to cause persons to enter the United States unlawfully.

At the preliminary inquiry, the judge quashed the information on the basis that it did not allege an offence known to Canadian law.

The Superior Court issued a writ of mandamus directing the judge to proceed, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that conspiracy to effect unlawful entry is an offence in both Canada and the United States, and under s. 423(3) of the Criminal Code, the conspirators are deemed to have conspired to commit the offence in Canada.

The Court also held that the information was valid and that mandamus was the appropriate remedy for a fundamental error of law amounting to a refusal to exercise jurisdiction.