Gérard V. La Forest

The respondent composed a song and registered it with a performing rights society.

The appellant television broadcaster broadcasted performances of the song using a prerecorded tape without obtaining the respondent's permission to make the recording, although it paid the required performing rights fees.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the right to broadcast a performance under the Copyright Act does not include the incidental right to make an ephemeral recording to facilitate the broadcast.

The Court found that the right to perform and the right to record are distinct statutory rights, and the broadcaster's performing rights licence did not imply consent to make the prerecording.

The appellant mortgagee sought to enforce a personal covenant against an individual who had assumed a mortgage from a corporate mortgagor.

The corporate mortgagor had waived the protection of the Limitation of Civil Rights Act, which generally restricts a mortgagee's recovery to the land itself.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the individual was not bound by the corporate waiver as a 'successor or assign' under the Act.

The Court further found that the assumption agreement did not effect a novation, but the individual was nonetheless protected from personal liability by the statute.

The appellant Institute was the bargaining agent for nurses employed by the federal government in the Northwest Territories.

When the nurses became employees of the territorial government, they became eligible for membership in the respondent Association, which had a statutory monopoly to bargain collectively.

The Institute sought incorporation under the Public Service Act to represent its former members, but the territorial government declined to enact the required legislation.

The Institute applied for a declaration that the incorporation requirement violated freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory monopoly and the requirement of incorporation did not infringe s. 2(d), as the activity of collective bargaining is not constitutionally protected.

The appellants sought to quash search warrants issued ex parte under section 231.3 of the Income Tax Act.

The issuing judge reviewed the warrants but dismissed the application.

The Court of Appeal held it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that sections 231.3 and 239 of the Income Tax Act are criminal in nature, deriving their constitutional validity from the federal criminal law power.

Consequently, any right of appeal must be found in federal statute, and since neither the Income Tax Act nor the Criminal Code provides for an appeal from the issuance of a search warrant, no appeal lies.

The appellant ophthalmologist performed cataract surgery on the respondent.

During the administration of local anaesthetic, a retrobulbar hemorrhage occurred.

The appellant noticed a small bleed but proceeded with the operation.

The respondent subsequently lost sight in her right eye due to optic nerve atrophy.

The trial judge found the appellant negligent for continuing the operation and, relying on McGhee, shifted the burden of proof of causation to the appellant.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the legal burden of proof remains with the plaintiff, causation need not be determined with scientific precision.

A robust and pragmatic approach allows the trier of fact to draw an inference of causation where the defendant's negligence makes it impossible to prove causation positively, absent evidence to the contrary.

The young offender appellant challenged the constitutionality of Ontario's alternative measures programme, arguing that its admission criteria infringed sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, relying on its concurrent judgment in R. v. S. (G.), which held that section 4 of the Young Offenders Act does not oblige provinces to implement such a programme and that the admission criteria do not infringe the Charter.

The appellant, a young offender, challenged the constitutionality of Ontario's alternative measures programme, arguing that its admission criteria infringed sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, relying on its concurrent judgment in R. v. S. (G.), which held that section 4 of the Young Offenders Act does not oblige provinces to implement such a programme and that the admission criteria do not infringe the Charter.

The youth appellant was charged with property offences.

The youth court judge stayed the proceedings, finding that Ontario's alternative measures program under the Young Offenders Act violated sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal overturned the stay.

Relying on its concurrent decision in R. v. S.(G.), the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the program's admission criteria do not infringe the Charter.

The appellant, a young offender, challenged the constitutionality of Ontario's alternative measures program, arguing its admission criteria violated sections 15(1) and 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as moot, relying on a concurrent judgment which held that section 4 of the Young Offenders Act does not oblige provinces to implement such programs.

The appellant conceded that if the programs are a matter of provincial option, no remedy is available.

The respondent, a young offender, was charged with possession of stolen goods in Ontario.

He argued that Ontario's failure to implement alternative measures programs under section 4 of the Young Offenders Act violated his equality rights under section 15(1) of the Charter, as such programs were available in other provinces.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that section 4 is valid federal criminal law that grants provinces the discretion, but not the obligation, to establish alternative measures programs.

The Court further held that the differential application of the law based on province of residence did not violate section 15(1) of the Charter, as province of residence in this context is not a personal characteristic and differential application is a legitimate feature of the federal system.

The respondent dentists participated in an advertising campaign and were charged with professional misconduct under a regulation restricting dental advertising.

They challenged the constitutionality of the regulation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the regulation infringed the guarantee of freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, as it prohibited legitimate forms of commercial expression and purposefully limited content.

The Court further held that the infringement could not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter because the absolute prohibition on all advertising, subject only to narrow exceptions, was overly broad and disproportionate to the objective of maintaining professionalism and preventing misleading advertising.

The appeal was dismissed and the regulation was struck down.

The appellants, Ministers of the Crown, were found guilty of contempt of court by the Federal Court of Appeal for failing to comply with an order to produce a file.

The order was served on their solicitor, but there was no evidence the Ministers had actual personal knowledge of it.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that contempt of court requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of actual knowledge of the order.

The Court found that service on a solicitor under the Federal Court Rules does not create a presumption of actual knowledge for the purposes of a quasi-criminal contempt proceeding, nor does vicarious liability apply to hold the Ministers responsible for the actions of their officials.

The respondent held a registered copyright in two operating system programs for its computers.

The appellants copied the programs, which were embedded in silicon chips, and sold clone computers.

The appellants admitted the written assembly language versions were copyrightable but argued the silicon chips were not.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the programs embedded in the silicon chip are a reproduction of the programs in assembly language and are protected by copyright under s. 3(1) of the Copyright Act.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was arrested for robbery, consulted counsel, and stated he did not wish to make a statement to the police.

He was then placed in a cell with an undercover police officer who engaged him in conversation and elicited incriminating statements.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the accused's right to remain silent under section 7 of the Charter was violated by the police trickery.

The Court concluded that the admission of the conscripted statements would render the trial unfair and bring the administration of justice into disrepute, excluding the evidence under section 24(2) and restoring the acquittal.

The appellants, who negotiated a tax rebate from the Government of Manitoba on behalf of several Indian bands, sought to garnish the settlement funds before judgment to secure their contingency fees.

The respondent bands argued the funds were protected from attachment under sections 89(1) and 90(1)(b) of the Indian Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the funds could not be garnished.

While the Court split on whether 'Her Majesty' in section 90(1)(b) includes the provincial Crown, the majority concluded that either the funds were protected by the Indian Act or the provincial Garnishment Act did not apply to the Crown in these circumstances.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in his charge to the jury regarding unsavoury witnesses, the theory of the defence, and in responding to a jury request for transcripts.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions complied with the Vetrovec requirements, adequately set forth the defence theory, and properly handled the jury's request for transcripts by inviting them to return if they needed further assistance after commencing deliberations.

On a constitutional reference concerning prostitution-related Criminal Code provisions, the Court considered whether the bawdy-house offence and the public communication offence infringed freedom of expression and the principles of fundamental justice.

The majority held that the public communication offence engaged s. 2(b) because it prohibited public communication for the purpose of prostitution, but found the infringement justified under s. 1 in light of Parliament’s objective of addressing the social nuisance associated with street solicitation.

The majority further held that neither provision was impermissibly vague and that s. 7 did not protect the asserted economic liberty to pursue prostitution as a profession.

The appeal was dismissed, with two judges dissenting on the basis that the communication provision unjustifiably infringed both ss. 2(b) and 7.

The appellant, a young person, was charged with offences under the Criminal Code and appeared before a provincial magistrate's court judge sitting as a youth court judge, who declined jurisdiction.

The Nova Scotia Supreme Court, Trial Division, found the provincial court judge had jurisdiction and issued mandamus, which was upheld by the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that provincially appointed judges can preside over youth courts without offending s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The appellant, a young person, was convicted by a family court judge sitting as a youth court judge.

The appellant challenged the jurisdiction of the youth court judge, arguing that the jurisdiction fell within the purview of section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and was reserved for superior court judges.

The Supreme Court of Canada, relying on its concurrent decision in Reference re Young Offenders Act (P.E.I.), held that provincially appointed judges can preside over youth courts without offending section 96, and that the establishment of youth courts is within provincial legislative competence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was stopped by a police officer while driving away from a hotel shortly after closing time.

The officer noted signs of impairment, and the appellant subsequently failed a breathalyzer test.

The appellant challenged his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the stop was unauthorized and violated his right against arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the stop was authorized by section 119 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Court found the stop was not arbitrary as the officer had an articulable cause, and even if it were considered a random stop, it would be justified under section 1 of the Charter.