Gérard V. La Forest

The appellant was investigated for a hit and run accident at his home.

Police informed him of his right to counsel at the outset of the investigation.

Ten minutes later, police made a breathalyzer demand, which the appellant refused.

He was convicted of failing to comply with a breathalyzer demand.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the breathalyzer demand constituted a detention under s. 10 of the Charter.

However, the Court found that the Charter warning given at the beginning of the interview was sufficiently connected to the subsequent detention to satisfy s. 10(b).

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, minority language parents in Edmonton, sought declarations that their rights under s. 23 of the Charter entitled them to management and control of a minority-language school.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 23 guarantees a sliding scale of rights, which includes a measure of management and control where numbers warrant.

The Court found that the numbers of minority language students in Edmonton warranted minority representation on the existing school board with exclusive authority over aspects of education pertaining to minority language and culture.

The Court also held that Regulation 490/82, requiring 300 minutes of English instruction per week, infringed s. 23 and was not saved by s. 1.

The appellant employer was found by a three-member panel of the Ontario Labour Relations Board to have failed to bargain in good faith by not disclosing an impending plant closure.

Before the decision was finalized, the panel discussed the policy implications of the case at a full board meeting.

The appellant challenged the decision, arguing the full board meeting violated the rules of natural justice, specifically the principles of 'he who decides must hear' and 'audi alteram partem'.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that institutional consultation processes like full board meetings do not violate natural justice provided they are limited to policy discussions, facts are taken as given, no votes are taken, and parties are given an opportunity to respond if new grounds are raised.

The appellants appealed a decision striking out their statement of claim, which sought a declaration that various federal and provincial statutes were unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the test for striking out a statement of claim was not met, as the outcome was not 'plain and obvious' or 'beyond doubt'.

The Court found that the issues regarding the interpretation of the Manitoba Act, 1870 and the Constitution Act, 1871 were better determined at trial with a proper factual base, and that the subject matter was justiciable.

The appellant appealed a decision refusing his plea of autrefois acquit.

The Crown had withdrawn two informations after the appellant pleaded not guilty but before any evidence was adduced, and immediately issued a new consolidated information.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the withdrawal was purely technical, did not represent a decision on legal or factual grounds, and occurred before any evidence was adduced, thus not constituting an acquittal.

The appellants appealed a decision finding them solely liable in negligence for damages to a roof.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower courts that the damages resulted solely from the appellants' negligence and that there was no finding of negligence against the contractor, although the contractor was liable in contract to the owners.

The appellant was charged with criminal negligence causing death after driving through a red light and striking another vehicle, resulting in a fatality.

The appellant had been drinking but showed little sign of impairment.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant, finding the conduct was not a marked departure from the norm, but made comments suggesting consequences and intention were irrelevant.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial based on these comments.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the trial judge's finding of reasonable doubt was supported by the facts and the comments did not affect the outcome.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing the jury's guilty verdict was unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal that the verdict was supported by the evidence.

The Attorney General of Quebec appealed decisions acquitting the respondents of taking part in an illegal strike.

The respondents challenged the constitutionality of the Act respecting remuneration in the public sector and the Act respecting the conditions of employment in the public sector, arguing that sessional papers forming the essence of the legislation were tabled in French only.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, adopting the reasons of the Quebec Court of Appeal and holding that the legislation was unconstitutional as it violated the bilingual enactment requirements of s. 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The appellant was arrested for aggravated assault and detained for 18 hours before being formally charged, primarily to allow the police to conduct an identification parade.

At trial, the judge found the arrest unlawful and arbitrary under s. 9 of the Charter, ordering a stay of proceedings.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the police had subjective and objective reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest under s. 450(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court further held that the 18-hour detention was not unreasonable and did not violate s. 9 of the Charter, as the identification parade was the fairest and most practical means of identification.

The appellant, an RCMP officer, was acquitted in the United States of bribery charges related to disclosing confidential information.

He was subsequently charged in Canada with breach of trust under the Criminal Code based on the same events.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Canadian prosecution was not barred by the principles of double jeopardy, autrefois acquit, issue estoppel, the Kienapple principle, or s. 11(h) of the Charter.

The Court found that the Canadian and American offences were different in nature, as they involved different elements and were based on distinct duties owed to different sovereigns.

The appellants, A, B, and C, sought an order of certiorari to quash a subpoena compelling A to testify in a criminal trial, or alternatively, a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to perceived threats to their security.

B and C were living outside Canada.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, holding that a Charter remedy was not available to persons outside Canada.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Superior Court erred in failing to consider the safety of the appellants and in finding that remedies were unavailable to persons outside the country in these special circumstances.

A new hearing was directed.

The respondent farmer defaulted on a loan from the appellant bank, which was secured by a swather under the federal Bank Act.

The bank seized the swather without giving the notice required by Saskatchewan's Limitation of Civil Rights Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the federal Bank Act provisions creating and enforcing the security interest were intra vires Parliament's banking power.

The Court further held that the provincial legislation conflicted with the federal legislation, as the provincial Act required judicial approval for seizure while the federal Act granted an immediate right of seizure.

Under the doctrine of paramountcy, the provincial provisions were rendered inoperative in respect of Bank Act security interests.

The appellant was arrested for murder and informed of his right to counsel.

During questioning, he asked about Legal Aid and expressed concern that he could not afford a lawyer.

The police officer did not inform him of the availability of Legal Aid or duty counsel at that time, and the appellant subsequently made incriminating statements.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police have a duty under s. 10(b) of the Charter to inform a detainee of the existence and availability of Legal Aid and duty counsel, especially when the detainee expresses concern about affordability.

The Court found that the appellant's rights were violated, he did not validly waive his right to counsel, and the statements must be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The acquittal was restored.

The respondent was stopped for a traffic violation and subsequently arrested on an outstanding warrant for unpaid fines.

The arresting officers conducted a brief frisk search before placing him in the police cruiser.

The respondent filed informations against the officers for common assault, arguing the search was unlawful.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that at common law, police have the power to conduct a frisk search incident to a lawful arrest without needing reasonable and probable grounds, provided the search is for a valid objective and not conducted in an abusive manner.

The officers' actions were justified, and the acquittals were restored.

The appellant appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, which had set aside his acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The case involved constitutional issues regarding fundamental justice, self-incrimination, and the right to remain silent under the Charter of Rights.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and directed a new trial, adopting the reasons given by the Court of Appeal.

The appeal concerned whether the Family Law Act, 1986 displaced the remedial constructive trust in matrimonial property disputes between married spouses.

The majority held that the Act does not abolish constructive trust, but incorporates it into the first stage of ownership determination before equalization of net family property.

On the facts, the respondent's substantial labour and business contributions supported a beneficial half-interest in certain farm properties, allowing participation in post-separation appreciation.

The appeal was dismissed, with a dissent concluding that the statutory equalization scheme provided an adequate remedy and made constructive trust unnecessary.

The plaintiffs applied for a rehearing of an appeal regarding amendments to pleadings in an aboriginal claim.

The Supreme Court of Canada had previously dismissed the appeal, allowing the amended pleadings to stand because they were not clearly invalid.

The plaintiffs sought a pronouncement on further issues considered by the Court of Appeal, such as the nature of the action and the necessity to establish the continued existence of the Indian nations.

The Supreme Court dismissed the application, finding it premature to pronounce on these questions without evidence at this early stage of the action.

The appellant was convicted of conspiring to import a narcotic after a police informer recorded their conversations using a body pack without judicial authorization.

The appellant appealed, arguing the electronic surveillance violated his right against unreasonable search and seizure under section 8 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while participant electronic surveillance without prior judicial authorization infringes section 8, the admission of the recordings in this case would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was charged with conspiracy to import a narcotic after his conversations with an undercover police officer and an informer were surreptitiously recorded without judicial authorization, but with the consent of the officer and informer.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Criminal Code exception for participant surveillance is not unconstitutional per se, the state's use of participant surveillance without prior judicial authorization violates the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure under section 8 of the Charter.

However, the Court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) because the police acted in good faith based on the law as it was understood at the time, and its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.