Gérard V. La Forest

The appellant union filed a complaint with the Canadian Human Rights Commission alleging wage discrimination between predominantly male and female job classifications.

An investigator evaluated the jobs using the Aiken Plan and recommended dismissing the complaint as unsubstantiated.

The Commission adopted the report and dismissed the complaint without a formal hearing.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Commission's decision under s. 36(3) of the Canadian Human Rights Act was administrative, not judicial or quasi-judicial, and therefore not reviewable under s. 28 of the Federal Court Act.

The Court further found that the Commission had met its duty of procedural fairness by providing the investigator's report and allowing written submissions.

The Practice Review Board of the Alberta Association of Architects conducted a hearing into the practices of a bankrupt architectural firm.

The Board issued a report with findings of unprofessional conduct, fines, and suspensions, which were later quashed as ultra vires because the Board lacked disciplinary powers.

The Board then sought to continue the original hearing to consider making recommendations.

The appellants sought an order of prohibition, arguing the Board was functus officio.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that because the Board's initial disposition was a nullity, it had not exhausted its jurisdiction and was not functus officio.

The Board was permitted to continue the proceedings to dispose of the matter in accordance with its statutory mandate.

A provincial Royal Commission of Inquiry was established to investigate the wrongful conviction of Donald Marshall, Jr. The Commission sought to compel the attendance of the justices of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal who had heard the Reference that quashed the conviction, in order to question them about the composition of the panel and the record relied upon.

The justices successfully applied for a declaration of judicial immunity.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Commission's appeal, holding that the fundamental principle of judicial independence provides judges with absolute immunity from being compelled to testify about their adjudicative decisions and qualified immunity regarding administrative decisions such as panel composition.

The appellant, who was wrongfully convicted of murder and served eleven years in prison, sought judicial review of a ruling by a Royal Commission established to inquire into his prosecution.

The Commission ruled that while it would hear evidence on the general nature of cabinet discussions regarding the case, it would not permit questions about the views of individual cabinet members, deeming them irrelevant.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Order in Council establishing the Commission gave it the exclusive discretion to determine what 'other related matters' were relevant to its inquiry.

The Court found that the Commission reasonably exercised its jurisdiction in balancing cabinet secrecy with the administration of justice.

The respondent claimed under a surety bond but gave notice of the claim 28 days after the expiry of the 120-day period stipulated in the bond.

The chambers judge granted relief from forfeiture under s. 109 of The Saskatchewan Insurance Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the ruling that the court had authority to grant relief.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 109 extends to contractual conditions as well as statutory conditions, and that failure to give timely notice constitutes imperfect compliance rather than non-compliance, allowing the court to grant relief from forfeiture.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the calculation of an award for future care.

The sole issue was whether the court could take the impact of taxation into account when calculating the amount of the award.

Following the reasoning in Watkins v. Olafson, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the impact of taxation may be considered.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Supreme Court of British Columbia to determine the amount to be added for taxation.

The appellant was rendered a quadriplegic in a motor vehicle accident and was awarded a lump sum for future care and lost earning capacity at trial.

The Court of Appeal substituted the lump sum for future care with periodic monthly payments and reduced the awards for future care and lost earning capacity.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, holding that courts cannot order periodic payments in the absence of enabling legislation or consent.

The Court also held that an allowance for the impact of taxation (gross-up) should be made in calculating the cost of future care where supported by evidence.

The trial judge's awards for future care and lost earning capacity were largely restored.

The respondent stevedore sued the appellant shipping agent for an unpaid stevedoring contract.

The appellant defended on the basis that it acted solely as an agent for an unnamed principal, having signed the contract 'as Managing Operators only'.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that Canadian maritime law, which incorporates common law principles of contract and agency, governed the dispute.

Under these principles, an agent who clearly indicates they are contracting solely as an agent is not personally liable, even if the principal is unnamed.

The appeal was allowed and the action against the agent was dismissed.

The appellant, a young offender charged with first degree murder, appealed a Court of Appeal decision ordering his transfer to ordinary court under section 16 of the Young Offenders Act.

The Youth Court had initially dismissed the Crown's transfer application, which was upheld by the Court of Queen's Bench but reversed by the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal correctly applied the burden of proof, properly understood its independent review function, and appropriately weighed the statutory factors, including the heinous nature of the offence.

The appellant, a young offender just under 18 years of age, was charged with first degree murder.

The Crown applied to transfer him to ordinary court under s. 16 of the Young Offenders Act.

The Youth Court judge dismissed the application, finding a heavy onus on the Crown.

The Court of Queen's Bench affirmed, but the Court of Appeal reversed, ordering the transfer.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the party seeking transfer bears a burden of persuasion, it is not a 'heavy' onus.

Furthermore, provincial reviewing courts have an independent discretion under s. 16(9) and (10) to evaluate whether a transfer should be made, based on the facts found by the Youth Court judge.

The Court of Appeal properly applied the relevant factors in ordering the transfer.

The respondent was employed by the appellant bank as its chief foreign currency trader.

He carried out unauthorized transactions using the bank's funds for his own benefit and made secret arrangements with clients to share trading profits.

The bank dismissed him and sued to recover the profits, though it suffered no direct financial loss.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the employee breached his obligation of good faith and loyalty.

Applying principles from the Civil Code of Lower Canada, the Court found the employee was acting in a representative capacity and must disgorge the secret profits to the employer.

The appellant was arrested for robbery and informed of his right to counsel.

At the police station, he declined to call his lawyer because it was late, stating he would call in the morning.

The police subsequently questioned him, and he made an 'off the record' statement.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant's s. 10(b) Charter rights were not violated because he was not reasonably diligent in exercising his right to counsel when given the opportunity.

The appeal was dismissed and the statement was admitted.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the Manitoba Elections Finances Act, arguing that public funding of political parties infringed their freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter by forcing taxpayers to support views they opposed.

The appellants presented no evidence to support their claim, relying instead on unsupported hypotheses.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that Charter decisions cannot be made in a factual vacuum and that the legislation did not prohibit expression but rather fostered the dissemination of diverse views.

The appellant, while intoxicated, forced two police officers from his mother's home with a shotgun.

He was acquitted at trial of possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, as the trial judge found no appreciable gap between the possession and the confrontation.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and entered a conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, finding that while the trial judge erred in law regarding the elements of the offence, the Court of Appeal erred in entering a conviction instead of ordering a new trial, as the trial judge had not fully considered the appellant's intoxication defence.

The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers applied to the Canada Labour Relations Board for certification as the bargaining agent for employees of Alberta Government Telephones (AGT).

The Board assumed jurisdiction, finding AGT to be a federal undertaking and not immune from the Canada Labour Code.

The Federal Court of Appeal upheld this decision.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held that while AGT is an interprovincial undertaking within federal jurisdiction under s. 92(10)(a) of the Constitution Act, 1867, it is a provincial Crown agent and therefore immune from the Canada Labour Code.

The Court found no clear Parliamentary intention to bind the provincial Crown in the Code, and AGT did not waive its immunity by its conduct.

The appellant provincial telephone utility appealed a decision holding that, although it was a federal undertaking, it was not immune from federal telecommunications regulation.

The Court held that the utility's participation in an integrated national telecommunications network, together with its interprovincial transmission activities and organizational arrangements, made it an interprovincial undertaking under s. 92(10)(a) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The majority nevertheless concluded that, as an agent of the provincial Crown, it was protected by s. 16 of the Interpretation Act because the Railway Act did not clearly bind the Crown and the utility had not waived immunity through its conduct.

The appeal was allowed, with one judge dissenting on waiver.

The appellant was charged with the murder of four infants and discharged at the preliminary inquiry.

She sued the Crown, the Attorney General, and police officers for malicious prosecution.

The respondents moved to strike the claim on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Crown itself enjoys absolute immunity under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act, the Attorney General and Crown Attorneys do not enjoy absolute immunity at common law from suits for malicious prosecution.

The Court found that public policy does not justify absolute immunity where a prosecutor acts maliciously in fraud of their duties.

Appeal involving failed arm's length negotiations between mining companies over possible joint development of gold properties in the Hemlo area.

The respondent disclosed confidential geological information and its acquisition plans for an adjacent patented property during negotiations; the appellant then used that information to acquire the property for itself.

A majority held that the appellant breached a duty of confidence, and the Court upheld the constructive trust remedy requiring transfer of the property, subject to compensation for improvements.

The decision contains major reasons on the distinction between breach of confidence and fiduciary duty, and on the availability of constructive trust as a restitutionary remedy.

The applicants brought a motion for a rehearing of their appeal, arguing that the Supreme Court of Canada's previous decision dismissing their appeal was rendered per incuriam.

They contended that the Court's findings on the state of the law in force at Confederation regarding school curriculum were based on historical facts reached without reference to the historical record.

The Court dismissed the motion, holding that disagreement with the Court's findings and an assertion that the decision was unreasonable based on the record are not grounds for a rehearing.

The appellant was arrested for attempted murder and briefly consulted a lawyer.

Two hours later, the victim died, and the charge was upgraded to first degree murder.

The appellant requested to speak to her lawyer again but could not reach him due to the late hour.

The police subsequently questioned her, and she provided an inculpatory statement and later led them to the murder weapon.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the change in the charge triggered a renewed right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The police breached this right by failing to provide a reasonable opportunity for her to consult counsel and by eliciting a statement.

The Court excluded the statement and the appellant's conduct in locating the knife under s. 24(2), restoring her manslaughter conviction.