Gérard V. La Forest

The Auditor General of Canada sought access to Cabinet documents and Crown corporation records relating to Petro-Canada's acquisition of Petrofina, relying on section 13(1) of the Auditor General Act.

The government denied access, citing Cabinet confidentiality and the limits of the Auditor General's mandate.

The Auditor General applied to the courts for a declaration of his right to access the information.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the dispute was not justiciable.

The Court found that the Auditor General's exclusive remedy for a denial of access to information is the political remedy provided in section 7(1)(b) of the Act, which requires him to report the denial to the House of Commons.

The appellant challenged a Court of Appeal order that, after allowing his appeal from an incest conviction, directed that a conviction be entered on a sexual assault count that had been disposed of at trial under the rule against multiple convictions.

The court held that, although s. 613(3) did not authorize substitution of the lesser conviction because the appeal on the incest count was allowed rather than dismissed, the appellate court retained broad supplementary authority under s. 613(8).

In the Kienapple context, the usual rule that an acquittal cannot be disturbed absent a Crown appeal yields to an exception because the counts are inextricably linked by the same delict.

The court further held that conditional stays, rather than acquittals, are the preferable mechanism for counts barred by the rule against multiple convictions.

The appeal was dismissed and the matter remitted to the trial judge for entry of conviction on the sexual assault charge and sentencing.

The Province of British Columbia appealed a decision holding that a statutory trust created by the Social Service Tax Act for collected but unremitted sales tax did not give the Province priority over other creditors under the Bankruptcy Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory trust is not a trust within the meaning of s. 47(a) of the Bankruptcy Act once the funds are commingled and cannot be traced.

Instead, it is merely a Crown claim under s. 107(1)(j) of the Bankruptcy Act, which ranks lower in priority.

The appellant sought to appeal a decision dismissing his application to set aside wiretap authorizations (a Wilson application).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that there is no right of appeal from a Wilson application and that the Charter does not guarantee such a right, for the reasons given concurrently in R. v. Meltzer.

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to traffic in narcotics.

At trial, wiretap evidence was excluded under s. 178.16(2) of the Criminal Code, resulting in acquittals.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

Before the new trial, the appellants applied to set aside the wiretap authorizations (a Wilson application).

The application was dismissed, and the Court of Appeal held it had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from that dismissal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that there is no right of appeal from a Wilson application, the Charter does not guarantee such an appeal, and the issue of post-arrest wiretaps must be dealt with at trial.

The appellant sought to set aside the renewal of an authorization to intercept private communications (a 'Wilson' application) to prevent the admission of wiretap evidence.

The petition was dismissed, and the Court of Appeal declined to hear an appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a review of an authorization is a criminal matter, that there is no need to reconsider Wilson v. The Queen, and that the Charter does not create a right to an interlocutory appeal where none exists in law.

The CRTC granted Bell Canada an interim rate increase in 1984, subject to review.

In 1986, after a final hearing, the CRTC determined that the interim rates had yielded excess revenues of $206 million and ordered Bell Canada to distribute this amount to customers via a one-time credit.

The Federal Court of Appeal quashed the order.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the CRTC's appeal, holding that the power to make interim orders under the Railway Act and National Transportation Act necessarily implies the power to review those rates retrospectively and to make remedial orders, such as a one-time credit, if the interim rates are found to be unjust or unreasonable.

The appellant was charged with murder and underwent two trials, the first resulting in a conviction that was overturned on appeal, and the second ending in a mistrial.

A third trial was scheduled five years after the initial charge.

The appellant sought a stay of proceedings, arguing that the Crown's refusal to accept a manslaughter plea and its objection to a judge-alone trial constituted an abuse of process, and that the five-year delay violated his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no prosecutorial misconduct to justify an abuse of process.

The Court also held that the s. 11(b) right was not infringed, as the overall delay was largely attributable to the appellant's own tactical decisions, particularly his delays in retaining counsel, and the inherent time requirements of appellate and retrial proceedings.

The appellant sought a patent for a new soybean variety developed through artificial cross-breeding.

The Commissioner of Patents and the Federal Court of Appeal rejected the application.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court held that the appellant failed to meet the disclosure requirements under s. 36(1) of the Patent Act.

The specification did not adequately describe the steps involved in the cross-breeding process to allow a person skilled in the art to reproduce the invention.

The Court further held that merely depositing a sample of the seeds did not satisfy the statutory disclosure requirement.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were arrested without warrants and released the same day.

Eight months later, they were formally charged with theft and conspiracy.

At trial, the judge quashed the indictment due to unreasonable pre-charge delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal vacated the order, holding that pre-charge delay is not considered under s. 11(b).

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, ruling that a person is 'charged with an offence' within the meaning of s. 11(b) only when an information is sworn or an indictment is laid, meaning pre-charge delay is irrelevant to the s. 11(b) analysis.

The appellant appealed a judgment dismissing his application for certiorari regarding the jurisdiction, independence, and impartiality of a Justice of the Peace.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, noting that the appellant did not challenge the constitutionality of the relevant Criminal Code provisions and failed to provide evidence that the Justice of the Peace infringed his rights under section 7 of the Charter.

The appellant challenged the issuance of a summons by a justice of the peace, arguing that the justice's revocable appointment violated section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, noting that the relevant provisions of the Courts of Justice Act were not challenged under section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Court held there was no evidence that the justice of the peace violated any of the appellant's section 7 rights in the exercise of her duties.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of obstructing a peace officer in the execution of his duties.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the special constables of the C.T.C.U.M. did not have the statutory authority to make an arrest without a warrant in the circumstances of the case.

The Crown appealed as of right from a judgment of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal that allowed an appeal from a conviction for uttering threats.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's charge to the jury.

The acquittal was set aside and the conviction restored.

Air Canada's aircraft was destroyed by fire following an explosion in a fuel pump at its Dorval maintenance base.

Air Canada sued the aircraft vendor and pump manufacturer in Quebec for failing to warn of defects.

The defendants, based in the US, brought motions for declinatory exception arguing the Quebec Superior Court lacked jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the action was quasi-delictual and the failure to warn occurred where the warning should have been received (Dorval).

Thus, the whole cause of action arose in Quebec, giving the Superior Court jurisdiction under art. 68(2) C.C.P.

The YMHA participated in a federal job creation programme to renovate its premises, engaging unemployed workers whose wages were subsidized by unemployment insurance benefits and topped up by the YMHA.

The workers contested their classification as cleaners, arguing they performed construction work entitling them to higher wages under provincial legislation.

The Manitoba Labour Board agreed, but the Court of Appeal quashed the order, finding provincial wage laws inapplicable to the federal programme.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the workers were employees of the YMHA under provincial law and that the federal spending power used to establish the programme did not oust provincial jurisdiction over labour relations.

The appellant was convicted of possession of stolen property after selling tires and rims to an undercover police officer.

During the transaction, the appellant admitted that his friend had 'ripped them off' and that he knew they were 'hot'.

The appellant appealed, arguing that his admission was based on hearsay and therefore inadmissible to prove the goods were actually stolen.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a party making an admission may adopt a hearsay statement as their own, and such an admission is admissible as evidence of the truth of its contents, with its weight to be determined by the trier of fact.

The appellant sought extradition of two Canadian citizens to the United States for transnational heroin offences, although the respondents' personal acts occurred in Canada and could have been prosecuted domestically.

The Court held that extradition prima facie infringes s. 6(1) of the Charter, but that the infringement is justified under s. 1 because extradition serves pressing objectives of international crime suppression and bringing fugitives to justice.

Applying the Oakes framework flexibly, the majority concluded extradition was rationally connected to those objectives and impaired the right as little as reasonably possible in the context of transnational crime.

The appeals were allowed, the Court of Appeal judgments were reversed, and the extradition committals were restored.

The appellants' home was damaged by a fire deliberately set by their 15-year-old son.

The respondent insurer denied the appellants' claim on the basis of an exclusion clause for loss caused by a criminal or wilful act of the 'Insured'.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the son fell within the clear and unambiguous definition of 'Insured' in the policy, which included relatives under 21 living in the household.

The Court found that the exclusion clause barred recovery by the innocent parents, as the son's insurable interest was inseparably connected to the family home.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, after consuming alcohol, drove his vehicle into a hayride, killing four people and injuring a fifth.

At trial, he was acquitted of criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm, but convicted of dangerous driving, after the trial judge instructed the jury that criminal negligence required a subjective 'deliberate and wilful assumption of the risk'.

The Crown successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal, which ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appellant's appeal, holding that the trial judge's instruction placed too high an onus on the Crown, though the Court split on whether the proper test for criminal negligence is purely objective or requires a minimal subjective intent.