Gérard V. La Forest

The respondents, parents of a diabetic child, withheld his prescribed insulin due to their religious belief in faith healing, resulting in the child's death.

They were convicted of manslaughter by criminal negligence.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial due to errors in the jury charge regarding the burden of proof.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, affirming the order for a new trial.

The Court split on the appropriate test for criminal negligence under s. 202 of the Criminal Code, with half favouring an objective standard and half favouring a subjective standard requiring advertence to the risk.

The appellant appealed a conviction for first degree murder from the Alberta Court of Appeal.

During the course of the trial, the appellant's initial counsel withdrew, and the trial judge denied an adjournment to obtain new counsel.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial, holding that under the particular circumstances of the case, the interests of justice would best be served by ordering a new trial.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal regarding the admission of breathalyzer evidence where the accused was too impaired to understand his right to counsel.

Assuming without deciding that there was a violation of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute under s. 24(2).

The appeal was allowed and the conviction was restored.

The appellant and a co-accused were originally tried jointly and convicted of first degree murder.

A new trial was ordered, but prior to the second trial, the co-accused pleaded guilty to second degree murder and accepted a statement of facts indicating his footprints were at the scene.

At the appellant's second trial, the defence intended to call a footprint expert who had testified at the first trial that the footprints were not the co-accused's.

The trial judge permitted the Crown to cross-examine the defence expert on whether the co-accused's guilty plea and admission would change his opinion.

The defence consequently did not call the expert, and the appellant was convicted.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that an expert cannot be cross-examined on facts that are not and will become part of the admissible evidence.

The parties divorced after nine years of marriage.

The trial judge awarded the wife a 25 per cent interest in the family assets, which included the husband's business property due to her indirect contribution.

The Court of Appeal reduced her share, holding that the trial judge erred by not comparing each spouse's contribution to each individual asset.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge's decision, finding that the Court of Appeal erred in interfering with the trial judge's discretion under section 51 of the Family Relations Act, as there was no misdirection or injustice in the trial judgment.

The appellants, charged with murder in Ontario, sought to waive their right to a jury trial and be tried by a judge alone.

The Criminal Code required a jury trial for murder in all provinces except Alberta.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while an accused can waive the benefit of a jury trial under s. 11(f) of the Charter, this does not create a constitutional right to a non-jury trial that overrides the Criminal Code.

The Court also held that the geographic distinction allowing non-jury trials only in Alberta did not violate s. 15 of the Charter, as persons accused of murder outside Alberta do not constitute a disadvantaged group subject to discrimination.

The appellants, two waitresses, were subjected to severe sexual harassment by a cook at the restaurant where they worked.

The employer failed to take action when informed, leading to the termination of their employment.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that sexual harassment in the workplace constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex under the Manitoba Human Rights Act.

The Court also held that the corporate employer was liable for the discriminatory acts of its employee committed in the course of employment, and restored the original damages awarded by the adjudicator.

The appellants, pregnant employees of the respondent, were denied weekly benefits under the respondent's group insurance plan during a seventeen-week disentitlement period surrounding their expected dates of confinement.

They filed complaints alleging sex discrimination under the Manitoba Human Rights Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the plan discriminated against pregnant employees by singling out pregnancy for disadvantageous treatment compared to other health-related reasons for absence.

Overruling its previous decision in Bliss, the Court established that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex, as the capacity to become pregnant is unique to women.

The airlines sought to recover gasoline taxes paid to British Columbia between 1974 and 1976 under a statute that was ultra vires because it imposed an indirect tax.

The province amended the statute in 1976 to make it a valid direct tax, and in 1981 enacted retroactive legislation to impose the valid tax for the 1974-1976 period and confiscate the invalidly collected taxes.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the 1976 and 1981 amendments were constitutionally valid.

The Court also held that, as a general rule, taxes paid under an unconstitutional statute are not recoverable, rejecting the application of restitutionary principles in this context due to public policy concerns about fiscal chaos.

The appellant airlines challenged the application of British Columbia's Social Service Tax Act to their aircraft and parts, as well as to in-flight sales of alcoholic beverages.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Act, properly construed, did not apply to aircraft and parts brought into the province temporarily for interprovincial flights.

The Court also held that in-flight liquor sales lacked sufficient presence in the province to attract the tax.

Furthermore, the Court ruled that Air Canada could recover the taxes unlawfully collected on its aircraft and parts, despite being paid under a mistake of law, but could not recover the taxes collected from passengers for liquor sales, as it acted merely as a tax collector.

The appellant employer dismissed the respondent employee.

An adjudicator found the dismissal unjust and ordered the employer to provide a letter of recommendation with specified factual content and to answer any reference inquiries exclusively by sending that letter.

The employer appealed, arguing the orders infringed its freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Charter applies to administrative adjudicators.

The Court found that both the positive order to write the letter and the negative order restricting further comments infringed s. 2(b) but were saved under s. 1 as reasonable limits designed to counteract the consequences of the unjust dismissal.

The appellant appealed her conviction for possession of a narcotic for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the search was unreasonable and the seized drugs should be excluded.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that even assuming the search was unreasonable, the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute under the Collins test.

The Law Society of Saskatchewan sought to discipline the respondent, a sitting judge, for alleged professional misconduct committed while he was a practising lawyer.

The respondent successfully applied to the Court of Appeal for an order prohibiting the disciplinary hearing.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court held that the Law Society lacked jurisdiction because its disciplinary powers extend only to members.

Under the Legal Profession Act and the Judges Act, a judge is not a member of the Law Society.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent, a tenured professor, entered into an agreement with the appellant University to resolve ongoing disputes.

The agreement stipulated that the respondent would be assigned academic duties for a year, after which his performance would be assessed by two deans.

If his work met the standard of a full professor, the University would waive a requirement for his early retirement.

The deans assessed his work as below standard, and the University notified him of his retirement.

The respondent sued for wrongful dismissal.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the University breached the agreement by failing to assign the respondent sufficient duties, particularly teaching duties, to allow for a proper assessment of his performance as a full professor.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the matter was remitted to the trial court for an assessment of damages.

The appellant appealed a conviction for trafficking in a narcotic.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that an error had been made and it could not be concluded that the result would necessarily have been the same without the error.

However, as there was remaining evidence upon which a trier of fact could reasonably convict, a new trial was ordered rather than an acquittal.

The appellant challenged the constitutional validity of sections 32 and 34 of the Newfoundland Workers' Compensation Act, 1983, which replace a worker's right to sue in tort with a statutory right to compensation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that this statutory bar does not constitute discrimination under section 15(1) of the Charter.

Applying the test from Andrews, the Court found that the situation of workers and dependents is not analogous to the enumerated grounds in section 15(1).

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought authorization to institute a class action on behalf of buyers who purchased lots from the respondent, arguing that the Act to preserve agricultural land prevented the respondent from conveying ownership.

The Superior Court dismissed the motion, finding the facts did not justify the conclusions sought, and the Court of Appeal affirmed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, applying its concurrent decision in Venne v. Quebec, and held that the facts alleged did seem to justify the conclusions sought, referring the matter back to the Superior Court to assess the remaining criteria for a class action.

The respondent purchased two subdivided lots from a developer under a contract where the developer retained ownership until the purchase price was paid in full.

Before the price was fully paid and ownership transferred, the Act to preserve agricultural land came into effect, prohibiting the alienation of the lots without authorization.

The developer subsequently transferred ownership to the respondent without authorization.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the contract created an obligation with a term, not a suspensive conditional obligation, and therefore the transfer of ownership was not retroactive to the date of the contract.

The Court also found that the respondent did not have an acquired right to the transfer under the Act.

The appeal was allowed and the deeds of sale were declared voidable.

The appellant purchased land to develop a residential subdivision and completed some infrastructure work before the Act to preserve agricultural land came into effect.

A portion of the land was subsequently zoned agricultural.

The appellant sought a declaration that he had acquired rights to proceed with the development on the agricultural portion, arguing that his subdivision plan approval constituted a permit authorizing use and that his development work constituted use for a purpose other than agriculture.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant did not have acquired rights under s. 101 of the Act.

The Court found that the land in the agricultural zone was not actually being used for non-agricultural purposes when the Act came into force, and that a subdivision plan approval does not constitute a permit authorizing use.

The appellants claimed acquired rights under s. 101 of the Act to preserve agricultural land to build a house on a lot without authorization from the Commission.

The lot contained the stone foundations and wood flooring of a residence demolished in 1976, which were not covered by vegetation when the Act became applicable in 1980.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellants did not have acquired rights, as s. 101 requires actual use of the land for a purpose other than agriculture at the time the Act became applicable.

The abandoned foundations did not constitute an effective use of the lot, and the absence of vegetation alone did not preserve an acquired right.