Gérard V. La Forest

The appellants, masters of two Spanish fishing vessels, were acquitted at trial of illegally entering and fishing in Canadian fisheries waters, and one appellant was acquitted of obstructing a fisheries protection officer.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and entered convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittals, holding that under s. 605(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, the Court of Appeal only had jurisdiction to interfere if the trial judge erred on a question of law alone.

The trial judge's reasonable doubt and findings of fact regarding intent to obstruct were not errors of law alone.

The plaintiff brought a negligence action in the Ontario Small Claims Court for damages to a fishing net caused by the defendant's unmarked gas well in Lake Erie.

The defendant challenged the court's jurisdiction, arguing the matter fell under federal admiralty law.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a provincial legislature has the power under s. 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867 to grant jurisdiction to an inferior court to hear matters falling within federal legislative jurisdiction, including admiralty, absent explicit federal legislation to the contrary.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Small Claims Court.

The respondent, a British subject permanently resident in Canada, met all requirements for admission to the British Columbia bar except Canadian citizenship.

He challenged the citizenship requirement under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the citizenship requirement infringed s. 15(1) because it discriminated against non-citizens, an analogous group, and was not justified under s. 1.

The Court established the foundational approach to s. 15(1), rejecting the 'similarly situated' test in favour of an approach focusing on enumerated and analogous grounds.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal, which affirmed an Umpire's decision under the Labour Adjustment Benefits Act regarding the deductibility of pension benefits paid into an R.R.S.P. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower court that neither the Board of referees nor the Umpire had jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on charges of break, enter and theft.

The trial judge found that the respondents were arbitrarily detained contrary to s. 9 of the Charter and excluded the resulting evidence (statements, stolen goods, fingerprints) under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the exclusion.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that absent an error of law or unreasonable finding, it should not substitute its opinion for that of the courts below on a s. 24(2) application.

The police obtained a defective warrant to search the appellant's house for drugs.

They executed the search using excessive force, breaking down the door with a battering ram without prior warning.

No drugs were found, but weapons were seized.

The trial judge excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter and acquitted the appellant.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the search violated s. 8 of the Charter and that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to the serious defects in the warrant and the excessive force used.

The appellants were arrested in the middle of the night for break and enter and advised of their right to counsel.

After unsuccessfully attempting to reach their lawyers by phone, they were placed in a police line-up where they were identified by witnesses.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police violated the appellants' rights under s. 10(b) of the Charter by failing to provide a reasonable opportunity to retain counsel and by failing to refrain from eliciting evidence before they had done so.

The Court concluded that the line-up evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed the Charter and its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, rendering it inadmissible under s. 24(2).

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder based in part on the testimony of an accomplice.

On appeal, the appellant argued that gaps in the trial transcript, including a portion of the judge's charge to the jury, constituted a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant also argued that the trial judge failed to give a clear and sharp warning regarding the dangers of accepting the uncorroborated testimony of the accomplice.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the missing transcript portions did not create a serious possibility of error and that the trial judge's warning regarding the accomplice's testimony was sufficient under the circumstances.

The Crown commenced a civil action for forfeiture against the respondent corporation under the Customs Act for making false declarations.

The Crown sought to examine an officer of the respondent for discovery.

The respondent argued it was protected from discovery by common law privilege and section 11(c) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the common law privilege against self-incrimination in forfeiture actions was abrogated by the Canada Evidence Act and modern discovery rules.

Furthermore, the Court ruled that a corporation cannot be a 'witness' and therefore cannot claim the protection of section 11(c) of the Charter.

The Crown's appeal was allowed and the corporation was ordered to produce an officer for discovery.

Appeal concerning whether bargaining rights and obligations under Quebec labour legislation transferred when janitorial service contracts for school cleaning were terminated and re-awarded to a new contractor having no legal relationship with the prior contractors.

The Court held that the labour commissioner’s interpretation of ss. 45 and 46 was jurisdictional and subject to judicial review, and replaced the preliminary-question formalism with a pragmatic and functional analysis focused on legislative intent, expertise, and statutory purpose.

It further held that s. 45 requires continuity of the undertaking and a voluntary legal relation between successive employers involving the same undertaking or part of it.

Because the competing contractors were separate undertakings and no legal relation existed between them, no transfer of rights and obligations occurred.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal that set aside his acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, applying the rule adopted in Mezzo v. The Queen regarding directed verdicts and the sufficiency of identification evidence.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding the delegation of federal powers to a provincial minister to set fishing quotas.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, substantially adopting the reasons of the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The Court clarified that while provinces cannot regulate commercial fishing through general legislation, they do have jurisdiction to regulate provincially-owned fisheries as an aspect of administering public property, subject to overriding federal legislation.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of second degree murder after raising the defence of insanity at trial.

The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal, holding that it could not substitute a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity under s. 613(1)(d) of the Criminal Code because there was evidence to support the jury's rejection of the defence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, confirming that s. 613(1)(a) governs the determination of insanity issues on appeal and that an appellate court should not interfere with a jury's verdict unless it is unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence.

The appellant, an agent of the Crown in right of Quebec, purchased over 10 per cent of the shares of a company governed by the Canada Business Corporations Act, becoming an insider.

It refused to submit an insider report, claiming Crown immunity under s. 16 of the federal Interpretation Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the insider reporting provisions applied to the appellant.

By purchasing shares, the appellant implicitly accepted the benefits of the statutory regime and could not accept the benefit of the law without also incurring its burdens.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was arrested in his apartment during the execution of a search warrant for narcotics.

Upon arrest, he was read his rights but was prevented from telephoning his lawyer until the police had secured the premises, which took approximately forty minutes.

During the search, police found marijuana and related paraphernalia.

The trial judge excluded the evidence due to a violation of the right to counsel and acquitted the appellant.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the appellant's right to counsel was violated, there is no strict causal requirement under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed the Charter, but its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute given the good faith of the officers and the nature of the real evidence.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking after persistently refusing the approaches of a police informer over six months.

He eventually sold drugs to the informer due to persistent requests, threats, and a large monetary inducement.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and entered a stay of proceedings, holding that entrapment is not a substantive defence but an aspect of abuse of process to be decided by the trial judge.

The Court established an objective test for entrapment, finding that the police conduct in this case went beyond merely providing an opportunity and amounted to an abuse of process.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking after selling marijuana to an undercover police officer.

The meeting was arranged by a friend of the appellant who was acting as a police informant in exchange for consideration on his own pending charges.

The appellant argued he was entrapped into committing the offence due to persistent phone calls and pressure from his friend.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the police acted on reasonable suspicion and merely provided an opportunity to commit the offence, without employing tactics that would induce an average person to commit the crime.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm.

He admitted to forcing the complainant to have sexual intercourse but claimed his drunkenness caused the attack.

The trial judge instructed the jury that drunkenness is no defence to the charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that sexual assault causing bodily harm is an offence of general intent.

The Court affirmed the rule in Leary, holding that evidence of self-induced intoxication cannot be considered by the trier of fact to negate the minimal intent required for general intent offences, and that this rule does not violate sections 7 or 11(d) of the Charter.

The appellant broke into the complainant's apartment and assaulted her while heavily intoxicated.

He was acquitted at trial on the basis that his self-induced intoxication raised a reasonable doubt as to his intent.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal, holding that breaking and entering and committing an assault is an offence of general intent to which the defence of drunkenness does not apply.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, affirming that the offence is one of general intent and the rule in Leary applies.

The appellant appealed a decision awarding the respondent an investment counselling fee following a serious personal injury.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a defendant must take the plaintiff as they find them, including their level of intelligence.

A management or investment counselling fee should be awarded if the plaintiff lacks the ability or acumen to manage their affairs or invest funds for future care.

The Court upheld the Court of Appeal's award of $40,000 for investment advice.