Gérard V. La Forest

A municipal fire and water services appeal arising from a hotel fire in Quebec where hydrants were snowed in, frozen, broken, or unusable, and firefighters allegedly committed operational faults while fighting the blaze.

The Court held that public law governs when private law applies to municipalities, but once a municipality moves from policy to operational implementation, liability is determined under Quebec civil law, including arts. 1053 et seq.

C.C.L.C. The city was liable for negligent maintenance of hydrants and for firefighting faults that causally contributed to additional fire damage.

The Court restored the trial judgment subject to a deduction of $77,000 for incidental reopening expenses and corrected the calculation of the additional indemnity under art. 1056c.

The respondent brought an action in the Federal Court alleging the appellants formed an agreement violating the Combines Investigation Act and claiming damages under both the Act and the Civil Code of Lower Canada.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the provisions creating a private cause of action and conferring jurisdiction on the Federal Court, as well as the court's competence to hear the provincial law claim.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the impugned provisions of the Combines Investigation Act are intra vires Parliament under the trade and commerce power.

The Court further held that the Federal Court has jurisdiction to hear the claim under the federal Act, but lacks jurisdiction to hear the claim based on the Civil Code.

The respondent sued the appellant for price discrimination under s. 31.1 of the Combines Investigation Act, which creates a civil cause of action for certain infractions of the Act.

The appellant challenged the constitutional validity of s. 31.1, arguing it fell under provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Combines Investigation Act is valid federal legislation under the general trade and commerce power (s. 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867).

The Court further held that s. 31.1 is intra vires Parliament because it is functionally related to the general objective of the legislation and is an integral part of the regulatory scheme.

The respondents proposed to establish an interprovincial law firm in Calgary, consisting of members of the Law Society of Alberta, some of whom resided in Calgary and some in Toronto.

In response, the Law Society of Alberta enacted Rule 154, prohibiting resident members from partnering with non-resident members, and Rule 75B, prohibiting members from being partners in more than one firm.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that both rules violated the mobility rights guaranteed by s. 6(2)(b) of the Charter, as they severely restricted the ability of non-residents to gain a livelihood in Alberta.

The Court further held that the rules were not saved by s. 6(3)(a) or s. 1 of the Charter, as they discriminated primarily on the basis of residence and were disproportionate to the Law Society's objectives.

The appellant, an inmate, applied for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his detention in segregation.

The court of first instance dismissed the application without a hearing.

The Court of Appeal found the application disclosed an arguable case but, rather than remitting the matter, heard the merits with the appellant's participation and dismissed it.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to hear the merits under the Criminal Code, and that remitting the matter would be a triumph of form over substance.

The appellant was deported from Canada and re-entered without the Minister's consent.

During an immigration inquiry, the appellant applied for a Minister's permit to remain in Canada and requested an adjournment of the inquiry until the application was considered.

The adjudicator refused the adjournment and issued a deportation order.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that an adjudicator is not required to adjourn an inquiry to allow a subject to pursue a ministerial permit application, as the adjudicator retains discretion over adjournments to ensure a full and proper inquiry.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after the trial judge admitted the preliminary inquiry testimony of an alleged accomplice who refused to testify at trial, pursuant to s. 643(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 643(1) does not violate ss. 7 or 11(d) of the Charter, provided the accused had a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary inquiry.

However, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial because the trial judge failed to recognize his statutory discretion to exclude the evidence to ensure a fair trial, and erred by instructing the jury to treat the transcript exactly like live testimony without warning them of the dangers of accepting such evidence.

Appeals arising from commercial contracts for the supply of industrial gearboxes used in an oil sands operation.

The Court held that the supplier-designer remained liable for design defects and for breach of the implied fitness warranty under s. 15(1) of the Ontario Sale of Goods Act because the contractual warranty did not clearly exclude the statutory protection.

The Court also held that the separate supplier's exclusion clause barred liability, rejecting use of fundamental breach to override clearly negotiated allocation of risk between sophisticated commercial parties, subject to unconscionability.

On the trust dispute, the majority allowed the cross-appeal and held the fund belonged to the respondent purchaser, rejecting the constructive trust claim for lack of unjust enrichment.

The appellant appealed as of right from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal that had allowed an appeal from his acquittal for second degree murder and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, substantially for the reasons given by the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal regarding the trial judge's charge to the jury on self-defence and excessive force.

The appellant appealed a conviction for the unlawful use of a credit card.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Quebec Court of Appeal that even if the initial possession of the credit card was innocent, the appellant subsequently chose to keep it wrongfully, making his possession unlawful prior to its use to obtain goods.

The Government of Quebec adopted regulations establishing a uniform curriculum for all non-denominational subjects in all schools, while making special allowance for moral and religious instruction in Catholic and Protestant schools.

The appellant Protestant school boards sought a declaration that the regulations were ultra vires the province as violating their rights under s. 93(1) and (2) of the Constitution Act, 1867 to manage and control their own schools and regulate the course of study.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the regulations were intra vires, as the province has exclusive jurisdiction over education and the regulations did not prejudicially affect the constitutionally protected denominational aspects of the schools or the non-denominational aspects necessary to give effect to denominational guarantees.

The applicants, whose murder convictions were upheld on appeal, sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Counsel for one of the applicants argued that under section 45 of the Supreme Court Act, the Court did not have jurisdiction to decide the application without an oral hearing.

The Court held that it had jurisdiction to determine the application on the basis of written materials without an oral hearing, as section 45 was intended to establish a uniform procedure of general application for leave applications.

The appellant challenged the validity of the abortion provisions in section 251 of the Criminal Code, arguing they violated the Charter rights of the foetus.

Before the appeal reached the Supreme Court of Canada, section 251 was struck down in its entirety in a separate decision.

The Court held that the appeal was moot because the underlying legislation no longer existed, eliminating the concrete legal dispute.

The Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot case, citing judicial economy and the need to respect its adjudicative role.

Furthermore, the Court found the appellant had lost his standing to pursue the appeal since the legislative context for his original public interest standing had disappeared.

The appellant solicitor prepared a prospectus for a company that later went bankrupt.

The Alberta Securities Commission investigated and subsequently issued a notice of hearing under the new Securities Act to determine if the appellant should be subject to a cease trading order.

The appellant argued that the Commission's overlapping investigatory and adjudicatory functions created a reasonable apprehension of bias, and that the new Act could not be applied retrospectively to his past conduct.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Commission's overlapping functions were statutorily authorized and did not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Furthermore, the Court held that the presumption against retrospectivity did not apply because the new statutory provisions were protective of the public rather than penal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder, challenging the identification evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, finding that the majority of the Court of Appeal did not err in their application of section 613(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal that had allowed an appeal from a judgment dismissing an application to strike out third party notices in a professional negligence action.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, set aside the Court of Appeal's order, and reinstated the trial judge's order dismissing the application to strike out the third party notices.

The appellant appealed a Court of Appeal decision finding her children in need of protection.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the children were in need of protection under s. 17(b)(i) of The Child and Family Services Act, although it disagreed with the test applied by the majority.

However, noting that the Court of Appeal failed to adequately consider the alternatives under s. 38 of the Act and that new evidence indicated a possible change in circumstances, the Court allowed the appeal in part.

The matter was referred back to the trial judge to determine the appropriate order under s. 38, with the children remaining temporary wards in the interim.

The appellant employee was dismissed without just cause after ten years of service.

He complained to the Director of Labour Standards, who ordered reinstatement and lost wages under s. 67A of the Labour Standards Code.

The Labour Standards Tribunal upheld this decision.

The employer successfully appealed to the Appeal Division, which held that the provisions conferring this power on the Tribunal violated s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court applied the Residential Tenancies test and held that while the Tribunal exercises a judicial function broadly conformable to that of s. 96 courts at Confederation, it does so as a necessarily incidental aspect of the broader policy goal of providing minimum standards of protection for non-unionized employees.

The appeal was allowed and the legislation was upheld as intra vires the province.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal regarding the role of interveners before the Competition Tribunal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, with Lamer J. dissenting.

The majority adopted the reasons of the Federal Court of Appeal, holding that interveners may participate fully in the proceedings.

The appellant gave false evidence at a preliminary inquiry and was charged with perjury and obstructing justice.

At trial, he admitted to deliberately lying but claimed he had no intent to mislead the court, asserting he lied under compulsion due to death threats.

The trial judge acquitted him based on the defence of compulsion under s. 17 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal reversed the perjury acquittal, finding s. 17 inapplicable as the threats were not concomitant with the offence, and entered a conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed that s. 17 did not apply but found that the trial judge had not allowed the accused to complete his evidence regarding his lack of intent to mislead.

The appeals were allowed and a new trial was ordered on both counts.