T. W. Wakeling

The applicants brought a motion for an order abridging the time for hearing an application for leave to appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada denied the motion, stating that notice is abridged only in the most extraordinary situations, such as issues of life and death, which was not the case here.

Environmental group judicial review arising from a provincially constructed dam affecting navigable waters, fisheries, and Indigenous interests.

The Supreme Court held that the federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order was valid, mandatory subordinate legislation under s. 6 of the Department of the Environment Act, and constitutionally intra vires because it regulated the manner in which federal decision makers exercised federal powers.

The court further held that the Navigable Waters Protection Act bound the Crown in right of Alberta by necessary implication, and that the Minister of Transport was required to comply with the Guidelines Order when exercising approval powers under that Act.

However, the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans was not subject to mandamus because the Fisheries Act did not impose the requisite affirmative regulatory duty for a decision-making responsibility under the Order.

The appeal was dismissed except to remove the mandamus order against the fisheries minister, with solicitor-client costs to the respondent.

The respondents proposed to establish an interprovincial law firm in Calgary, consisting of members of the Law Society of Alberta, some of whom resided in Calgary and some in Toronto.

In response, the Law Society of Alberta enacted Rule 154, prohibiting resident members from partnering with non-resident members, and Rule 75B, prohibiting members from being partners in more than one firm.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that both rules violated the mobility rights guaranteed by s. 6(2)(b) of the Charter, as they severely restricted the ability of non-residents to gain a livelihood in Alberta.

The Court further held that the rules were not saved by s. 6(3)(a) or s. 1 of the Charter, as they discriminated primarily on the basis of residence and were disproportionate to the Law Society's objectives.