Gérard V. La Forest

The parties were involved in a labour dispute during which the employer dismissed 24 striking employees for alleged misconduct.

The issue of the dismissals was referred to a consensual arbitrator, who found that the employer had no power to impose discipline during a legal strike and ordered the employees reinstated.

The employer successfully applied for judicial review, and the Court of Appeal upheld the decision to set aside the award.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the union's appeal, holding that even if the arbitrator erred in law, the error was not jurisdictional in nature and therefore the award was not subject to judicial review.

The appellant was stopped and searched at a border crossing by customs officials acting on a tip from the RCMP that he was attempting to import narcotics.

He was directed to an interview room, frisked, and arrested after cocaine was found on his person, but was not informed of his right to counsel until after the initial search and arrest.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant was detained within the meaning of s. 10(b) of the Charter when he was ushered into the interview room and his right to counsel was violated.

However, applying the Collins framework, the Court concluded that the evidence of the narcotics should not be excluded under s. 24(2) because it was real evidence, the officers acted in good faith relying on a prior appellate decision, and the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was subjected to a strip search by customs officers upon entering Canada, which revealed concealed cannabis resin.

She was not informed of her right to counsel prior to the search.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a strip search at customs constitutes a detention under s. 10(b) of the Charter, meaning the appellant's right to counsel was violated.

However, the Court found that the search provisions of the Customs Act do not violate s. 8 of the Charter due to the lower expectation of privacy at international borders.

Despite the s. 10(b) violation, the Court admitted the evidence under s. 24(2), reasoning that it was pre-existing real evidence and the officers acted in good faith pursuant to statutory authority.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of unlawful possession of restricted weapons after police found unregistered handguns in his home.

He challenged the constitutionality of section 106.7(1) of the Criminal Code, which placed the onus on the accused to prove they held a valid registration certificate, arguing it violated the presumption of innocence under section 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the provision did not impose an impermissible reverse onus because the production of a certificate resolves all doubts in favour of the accused and provides an absolute defence.

Alternatively, the Court found that any infringement would be justified under section 1 of the Charter.

The respondent was involved in a motor vehicle accident and taken to a hospital.

While he was unconscious, a doctor took a free-flowing blood sample for medical purposes.

The doctor later handed the sample to a police officer without the respondent's consent or a warrant.

The sample was analyzed and used to convict the respondent of impaired driving.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police officer's taking of the blood sample from the doctor constituted an unreasonable seizure under section 8 of the Charter, as it violated the respondent's reasonable expectation of privacy in his bodily substances.

The Court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute under section 24(2) of the Charter, and dismissed the Crown's appeal.

The respondents were charged with indictable offences and required to appear for fingerprinting under the Identification of Criminals Act prior to conviction.

They challenged the requirement as a violation of section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while mandatory fingerprinting deprives a person of liberty and security of the person, it does not violate the principles of fundamental justice.

The Court found that fingerprinting is a minimally intrusive, reliable, and necessary tool for law enforcement that is less serious than the arrest itself.

The appellant sought compensation from the Law Society of Alberta's compensation fund after being defrauded by a lawyer.

The Law Society denied the claim, and the appellant successfully obtained an order of mandamus at first instance, which was overturned by the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, restoring the order of mandamus and holding that the Law Society does not have the discretion to deny a claim in toto when statutory prerequisites are met.

The accused appealed from a Court of Appeal order setting aside his jury acquittal for first degree murder and directing a new trial.

The Supreme Court held that the trial judge seriously misdirected the jury by inviting application of the reasonable doubt standard to individual pieces of evidence rather than to the ultimate issues on the whole of the evidence, while recognizing a limited exception in credibility instructions.

The Court further held that psychiatric evidence elicited from a defence expert, tending only to place the accused within an abnormal group capable of the offence, was not admissible on identity because it lacked sufficiently distinctive traits and its prejudicial propensity effect predominated.

Although the Court found the Court of Appeal erred on the psychiatric evidence issue, it concluded the Crown met the stringent burden applicable on an appeal from acquittal by showing the verdict would not necessarily have been the same absent the misdirection.

The appeal was therefore dismissed and the order for a new trial stood.

The town of Brossard adopted an anti-nepotism hiring policy disqualifying members of the immediate families of full-time employees and town councillors from taking up employment with the town.

The mis en cause's application for summer employment as a lifeguard was rejected because her mother worked as a full-time typist at the municipal police station.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the hiring policy constituted discrimination based on civil status under s. 10 of the Quebec Charter.

The Court further held that the policy was not justified under s. 20 of the Charter, as the blanket exclusion was disproportionately stringent and not a bona fide occupational qualification, nor was the municipality a non-profit institution of a political nature.

The applicant filed a motion in the Supreme Court of Canada seeking an extension of time to bring an application for leave to appeal from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal.

The Court identified a jurisdictional gap in the statutory framework regarding which court has the authority to extend the time for such applications.

The Court concluded that the combined operation of the Federal Court Act and the Supreme Court Act dictates that the authority to extend the sixty-day period rests exclusively with a judge of the Federal Court of Appeal, not the Supreme Court.

Consequently, the motion was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

During a legal strike, the appellant union picketed a court-house.

A union member and court employee crossed the picket line to work, prompting the union to initiate internal disciplinary proceedings against him.

The respondents successfully obtained an injunction restraining the union from proceeding with the discipline.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the union's appeal, holding that picketing a court-house constitutes criminal contempt of court because it impedes access to justice.

Consequently, the union had no lawful right to discipline a member for refusing to respect an unlawful picket line.

The appellant mining company sought to claim an investment tax credit for its 1974 taxation year under the Corporations Tax Act, 1972.

Because the credit could only be carried forward if the taxpayer had incurred a 'net loss' in previous years, the appellant attempted to amend its 1971 and 1972 tax returns to create such a loss by claiming capital cost allowance.

The federal authorities accepted the amendments, but the provincial Minister of Revenue refused.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the appellant met the qualifying provisions for the tax credit, the Minister was not obliged by statute or regulation to accept the amended returns, despite the federal administrative practice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by the negligence of her husband, who was driving a car owned by her father.

At the time of the accident, the Married Woman's Property Act barred spouses from suing each other in tort, and the Insurance Act excluded insurer liability for bodily injury to a spouse.

These provisions were repealed by the Family Law Reform Act, 1975 before the action was commenced.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the repeals affected substantive rights, not merely procedural rules, and therefore did not operate retrospectively.

The appeal by the insurance company was allowed, and the actions against the husband and the insurer were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a judgment affirming the issuance of a writ of certiorari.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that even if the magistrate erred, the error was made within the scope of his jurisdiction and therefore could not be the basis for a writ of certiorari.

The writ was quashed and the magistrate's decision restored.

During a lawful strike, the appellant union picketed all law courts in British Columbia, issuing passes to those it deemed permitted to cross the picket line.

The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of British Columbia issued an ex parte injunction on his own motion to restrain the picketing, finding it constituted criminal contempt by impeding access to the courts.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the injunction, ruling that while peaceful picketing is protected under section 2(b) of the Charter, the injunction was a justified limit under section 1 to ensure unimpeded access to the courts and maintain the rule of law.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder.

The trial judge had applied a lesser standard of intent in the jury charge, which was delivered before the principle restricting the requisite mens rea for attempted murder to the intent to kill was enunciated.

The Court of Appeal found the jury had no alternative but to find the requisite intent to kill.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal regarding the allocation of losses between beneficiaries after a trustee made unauthorized disbursements from a mingled bank account.

The appellants argued that the 'first-in, first-out' rule in Clayton's Case should apply to determine how the remaining insufficient funds were distributed.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the rule should not apply and adopting the reasons of the lower court.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal regarding whether s. 664(4)(d) of the Criminal Code allows a court to impose a consecutive sentence upon the revocation of a probation order.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, adopting the reasons of Rothman J.A. in the court below.

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to defraud the government.

The Crown's case relied on wiretap evidence obtained from listening devices installed in the appellants' motor vehicles.

The trial judge excluded the evidence, finding that the motor vehicles should have been specifically described in the judicial authorizations since they were known targets.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that the trial judge's ruling was an impermissible collateral attack on the authorization.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, confirming that a motor vehicle is a 'place' under the Criminal Code and that the general description in the authorization was sufficient.

The Court also agreed that challenging the lack of specific description constituted a collateral attack.

The respondent newspaper challenged the constitutionality of s. 442(3) of the Criminal Code, which mandated a publication ban on the identity of a complainant in a sexual assault case upon request.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the mandatory ban infringed the freedom of the press under s. 2(b) of the Charter, it was a reasonable limit justified under s. 1.

The Court found that the objective of encouraging victims of sexual offences to come forward by protecting them from the trauma of publication was of pressing and substantial concern, and that a discretionary ban would not achieve this objective as it would deprive victims of certainty.

The Court also held that the provision did not infringe the accused's right to a public hearing under s. 11(d).