Gérard V. La Forest

The respondent, a nursing assistant, challenged regulations requiring her to pass a French language test to obtain a professional permit, arguing they were discriminatory and contained an unauthorized subdelegation of power.

The regulations exempted candidates with three years of secondary instruction in French.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the issue was not moot despite legislative amendments, as the government had an interest in the validity of its regulations.

The Court concluded the regulations were not discriminatory under the Charter of human rights and freedoms because they did not impair the right to full equality, and the subdelegation to a testing committee was purely administrative and authorized by statute.

The appellant was convicted of break, enter and theft after police found recently stolen goods in his bedroom.

The appellant offered no explanation for his possession of the goods.

The trial judge convicted him based solely on the doctrine of recent possession, and the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court held that unexplained recent possession of stolen property permits, but does not mandate, an inference of guilt for theft or offences incidental thereto, such as break and enter.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant received unemployment insurance benefits until he obtained employment, shortly after which he sustained a serious injury and received temporary total disability benefits from the Workers' Compensation Board.

When he was fit to return to work, his previous job no longer existed, and he requested an extension of his initial benefit period under s. 20(7)(b) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971.

The request was denied pursuant to s. 36 of the Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant was entitled to an extension of his benefit period, following its concurrent decision in Canada (Canada Employment and Immigration Commission) v. Gagnon.

The appellant received unemployment insurance benefits until he was hospitalized for a work-related injury during his extended benefit period.

He received temporary total workmen's compensation payments, suspending his unemployment benefits.

After recovering, he applied for an extension of his benefit period under s. 20(7)(b) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971.

The application was dismissed on the basis that s. 36 disentitled him to extended benefits because he was not capable of and available for work.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 20(7) is intended to apply to an extension of a benefit period in respect of extended benefit, and the claimant is entitled to an extension despite being disentitled under s. 36 during his incapacity.

The accused was found impaired and slumped over the steering wheel of his parked vehicle with the keys in the ignition.

He was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

At trial, he argued that the statutory presumption in s. 237(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, which deems a person in the driver's seat to have care or control unless they establish they did not enter the vehicle to set it in motion, violated the presumption of innocence under s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the reverse onus provision does infringe s. 11(d) by requiring a conviction even if a reasonable doubt exists, it is saved under s. 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit demonstrably justified to protect the public against drunk drivers.

The appellant suffered a neck injury and was rendered a quadriplegic after participating in a dangerous tubing competition at the respondent's ski resort while visibly intoxicated.

The appellant had signed an entry and waiver form without reading it.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the resort, as the promoter of a dangerous sport, owed a duty of care to take all reasonable steps to prevent a visibly intoxicated person from participating.

The resort failed to discharge this duty.

The Court also found that the appellant did not voluntarily assume the legal risk, and the waiver did not relieve the resort of liability because it was not drawn to his attention.

The trial judge's finding of 25% contributory negligence was upheld.

The appellant was convicted of having sexual intercourse with a female under fourteen years of age, contrary to s. 146(1) of the Criminal Code.

The conduct occurred before the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into force, but the trial took place after.

The appellant argued that the statutory denial of a defence of mistake of age violated s. 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that applying s. 7 to the substantive elements of an offence committed before the Charter came into force would constitute an impermissible retrospective application of the Charter.

The respondent was charged with possession of stolen property, but the information lacked an essential averment.

The trial judge quashed the defective counts after the respondent pleaded not guilty.

The Crown subsequently swore a new information containing the missing words.

The respondent pleaded autrefois acquit, which was refused by the second trial judge, leading to a conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal from conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge's decision to quash the original information under section 529 of the Criminal Code, rather than amending it, was tantamount to an acquittal, thereby making the plea of autrefois acquit available to the accused.

The appellants signed an offer to lease with a lessee who undertook to carry out substantial construction work at its own expense.

The lessee hired the respondent to do the work.

When the respondent was not paid, it registered privileges against the appellants' immovable property.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the agreement between the owner and the lessee did not constitute a construction contract, as there was no claim between them that could be interpreted as an undertaking by the owner to pay the price of construction.

Therefore, the respondent could not claim a privilege on the appellants' immovable.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder.

He alleged serious misconduct by the Crown and police, including failing to disclose that a Crown witness perjured himself regarding promises of a pardon, and a police officer recording testimony to give to the witness despite an exclusion order.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Court of Appeal erred in refusing to allow the appellant to complete his evidence on these issues and in applying the curative proviso.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a judgment regarding the interpretation of a contract for the provision of hydro-electric energy.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as moot in light of its concurrent judgment in Newfoundland (Attorney General) v. Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corp.

The Attorney General of Newfoundland appealed a decision regarding the interpretation of Clause 2(e) of Part I of a statutory lease executed pursuant to the Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation Limited (Lease) Act, 1961.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that both the Trial Division and the Court of Appeal had arrived at the correct construction of the clause, albeit by different routes.

The appellant appealed an order setting aside his acquittal.

He argued that evidence should be excluded under s. 24 of the Charter because he was not informed of his right to retain and instruct counsel upon his initial detention, breaching s. 10(b).

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that although there was a breach upon initial detention, the evidence was obtained voluntarily after he was informed of his right to counsel.

Therefore, the evidence was not obtained in a manner that infringed a Charter right and should not be excluded.

A constitutional appeal concerning whether Quebec occupational health and safety provisions governing protective re-assignment of a pregnant worker applied to a federal telecommunications undertaking.

The Court held that the provincial scheme, though aimed at worker health and safety, in pith and substance regulated working conditions, labour relations, and the management and operation of undertakings.

As applied to federal undertakings, those matters fell within Parliament's exclusive jurisdiction, rendering the provincial provisions constitutionally inapplicable.

The Court rejected reliance on the double aspect theory and held it unnecessary to decide the operational conflict issue.

Criminal appeal addressing whether cross-examination of an accused on prior convictions under s. 12(1) of the Canada Evidence Act infringes the right to a fair hearing under s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The majority held the provision is constitutionally valid because prior convictions are admissible on credibility, do not reverse the burden of proof, and can be controlled by limiting instructions, while also recognizing a judicial discretion to exclude such evidence in unusual cases where fairness would be undermined.

On the facts, the majority found no unfairness in admitting the accused's prior non-capital murder conviction given the centrality of credibility and the defence attack on the criminal records of Crown witnesses.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, with a dissent concluding the prior murder conviction should have been excluded and a new trial ordered.

The respondent sought a writ of mandamus to compel the municipal assessor to amend the 1980 real estate assessment roll to reflect the median proportion introduced by the new Act respecting municipal taxation.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, but the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the assessor had an automatic duty to amend the roll.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, concluding that the new Act did not require the assessor to take the median proportion into account when preparing the roll, but only to indicate it on the roll once prepared.

As the assessor did not fail to perform a statutory duty, mandamus was not available.

The respondent's trial was discontinued due to exceptional publicity from statements made in the National Assembly regarding the defence and a witness's credibility.

Before a new trial date was set, the respondent successfully moved for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter, which was upheld by the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that a stay of proceedings was premature as the possibility of selecting an impartial jury could only be determined at the jury selection stage.

The appellant, a Canadian citizen, was extradited from Brazil to Canada to face fraud charges under an arrangement that prohibited his prosecution for other offences committed prior to the extradition request.

After serving his sentence for the initial charges, the appellant remained in Canada and was subsequently charged with additional offences committed before his extradition.

He argued that the extradition arrangement provided perpetual immunity from prosecution for those prior offences.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the immunity under the Rule of Specialty and the extradition arrangement only lasts until the fugitive has had a reasonable opportunity to return to the requested state.

The appellant was charged with unlawful possession of house-breaking instruments contrary to s. 309(1) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge quashed the indictment, finding the section violated the presumption of innocence in s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal set aside the order.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 309(1) does not create a reverse onus and does not violate s. 11(d) of the Charter, as the Crown must prove all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant, an interprovincial trucking company and federal undertaking, was ordered by a provincial Workers' Compensation Board officer to comply with provincial industrial health and safety regulations regarding safety footwear and safety committees.

The appellant challenged the orders, arguing the provincial regulations were constitutionally inapplicable to a federal undertaking.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provincial occupational health and safety regulations relate to working conditions, labour relations, and the management of the undertaking, and therefore cannot constitutionally apply to a federal undertaking.

The appeal was allowed and the provincial regulations were declared inapplicable.