Mitchell R. Taylor

The appellant brought a claim under the Independent Assessment Process of the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement, alleging compensable sexual abuse under category SL1.4 when a nun touched his genitals over his clothing while he was a student at a residential school.

The Hearing Adjudicator denied the claim by erroneously importing a requirement of sexual intent not found in SL1.4.

All internal review levels upheld the denial, and the supervising judge at the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench ordered reconsideration.

The Manitoba Court of Appeal set aside that order, holding the supervising judge had exceeded his jurisdiction.

A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and reinstated the reconsideration adjudicator's compensation award, finding that supervising courts have an ongoing duty to intervene where an adjudicator makes an unauthorized modification of the IAP, and that a gap in the IRSSA justified judicial intervention to ensure the appellant received the compensation bargained for.

The appellants, representing the Metis people of Manitoba, sought declarations that Canada breached fiduciary obligations and failed to act in accordance with the honour of the Crown in implementing land grant provisions under ss. 31 and 32 of the Manitoba Act, 1870.

The majority held that while no fiduciary duty arose, s. 31 constituted a solemn constitutional obligation to the Metis as an Aboriginal people, engaging the honour of the Crown.

The Crown failed to act with diligence in implementing the land grants, exhibiting a persistent pattern of errors and inaction over more than a decade that substantially frustrated the purpose of giving Metis children a head start over incoming settlers.

The claim was not barred by limitations or laches.

Two Indian bands appealed dismissal of claims alleging that the Crown, as fiduciary, was obliged to invest oil and gas royalties held in the Consolidated Revenue Fund and had breached its obligations by paying interest under a long-term government bond formula.

The Court held that while the Crown owed fiduciary duties arising from the surrenders and trust-like relationship, the Indian Act, Financial Administration Act, and Indian Oil and Gas Act did not authorize the Crown to invest the royalties and instead required the funds to remain in the CRF subject to statutory payment mechanisms.

The Court further held that the chosen interest methodology was not imprudent, that the Crown was neither unjustly enriched nor unlawfully conflicted by the statutory arrangement, and that the money management provisions of the Indian Act did not violate s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The appeals were dismissed with costs.

The appellant, a former student at an Indian residential school operated by the Government of Canada and the United Church of Canada, sought damages for sexual abuse suffered at the school.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that both Canada and the Church were jointly vicariously liable for the sexual assaults committed by a dormitory supervisor, rejecting the application of a doctrine of charitable immunity for the Church.

The Court also found that the Indian Act did not impose a non-delegable statutory duty on Canada to ensure student safety.

The trial judge's unequal apportionment of fault (75% to Canada, 25% to the Church) and assessment of damages, which excluded prior trauma and statute-barred wrongs, were upheld.

Two Indian bands, the Wewaykum (Campbell River) and Wewaikai (Cape Mudge), claimed each other's reserve lands, alleging the federal Crown breached its fiduciary duty during the reserve creation process in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Both bands sought declarations and equitable compensation.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the Crown fulfilled its fiduciary obligations by acting with loyalty, good faith, and ordinary prudence.

The Court found that both bands had historically acknowledged the other's entitlement to their respective reserves, making equitable relief inappropriate due to laches and acquiescence.

Furthermore, the Court ruled that the bands' claims were statute-barred by the applicable limitation periods.

The Musqueam Indian Band surrendered reserve land to the Crown for leasing.

The land was subdivided, serviced, and leased to individuals for 99 years.

The leases provided for rent reviews, stating rent should be 6 percent of the 'current land value' of 'unimproved lands'.

The parties disagreed on whether 'current land value' meant fee simple value off-reserve or leasehold value on-reserve, and whether 'unimproved' meant unserviced.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that 'current land value' refers to the hypothetical fee simple value of the land on the reserve, which requires a 50 percent discount from comparable off-reserve land to account for Indian reserve features.

The Court also held that 'unimproved' means unserviced, so servicing costs must be deducted from the land value.

The Beaver Band surrendered the mineral rights on its reserve to the Crown in 1940 to lease for its benefit.

In 1945, the Band surrendered the reserve to the Crown to sell or lease.

The Crown subsequently sold the land to the Director of The Veterans' Land Act, inadvertently including the mineral rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown did not breach its fiduciary duty regarding the surrender and sale of the surface rights.

However, the Crown breached its fiduciary duty by transferring the mineral rights and failing to correct the error when it learned of it.

The action was not barred by limitation periods as the running of time was postponed until the Band discovered the facts.

The appellant received unemployment insurance benefits until he obtained employment, shortly after which he sustained a serious injury and received temporary total disability benefits from the Workers' Compensation Board.

When he was fit to return to work, his previous job no longer existed, and he requested an extension of his initial benefit period under s. 20(7)(b) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971.

The request was denied pursuant to s. 36 of the Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant was entitled to an extension of his benefit period, following its concurrent decision in Canada (Canada Employment and Immigration Commission) v. Gagnon.