Lynne-Marie Casgrain

On an appeal from Quebec, the Court addressed whether a fatal injury suffered when a tree fell onto a vehicle was damage caused by an automobile under the provincial no-fault automobile insurance statute.

The Court reaffirmed a broad, remedial interpretation of the statute and held that a traditional fault-based causation analysis does not govern this scheme.

It concluded that use of a vehicle as a means of transportation is sufficient at minimum to engage the statutory definition of accident, even where the vehicle’s role is not active.

Because the claim fell within the statutory scheme, the civil action in damages was barred and compensation had to be sought through the public insurer.

The appellate judgment was set aside and the dismissal of the action was restored.

The appellants, Orthodox Jews, set up succahs on the balconies of their co-owned property to fulfill a religious obligation during the festival of Succot.

The respondent syndicate of co-owners requested their removal, citing a declaration of co-ownership that prohibited constructions on balconies.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the declaration infringed the appellants' freedom of religion under the Quebec Charter.

The Court established a subjective test for freedom of religion, requiring only that a claimant sincerely believe in a practice that has a nexus with religion.

The Court found that the impairment of the appellants' religious freedom was serious, while the intrusion on the respondent's property and security rights was minimal.

The Court also rejected the argument that the appellants had waived their religious rights by signing the declaration of co-ownership.

The respondent, a nursing assistant, challenged regulations requiring her to pass a French language test to obtain a professional permit, arguing they were discriminatory and contained an unauthorized subdelegation of power.

The regulations exempted candidates with three years of secondary instruction in French.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the issue was not moot despite legislative amendments, as the government had an interest in the validity of its regulations.

The Court concluded the regulations were not discriminatory under the Charter of human rights and freedoms because they did not impair the right to full equality, and the subdelegation to a testing committee was purely administrative and authorized by statute.