Gérard V. La Forest

Following a collision between two Canadian National Railway trains in Quebec, an inspector from the provincial Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail initiated an investigation under the provincial Act respecting occupational health and safety.

The railway company challenged the investigation, arguing the provincial statute could not constitutionally apply to a federal undertaking.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provincial occupational health and safety legislation, because of its preventive nature, directly regulates the working conditions and management of the undertaking.

Consequently, the investigative powers under the Act are wholly inapplicable to an interprovincial railway undertaking.

The appellants purchased subdivided lots and registered their titles.

The registrar failed to note the subdivision on the index of the original lots.

The respondent, a creditor of the original owner, subsequently registered a judgment and sale against the original lots.

The respondent sought to be declared the absolute owner of the lots, arguing his registrations had priority.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that subdivision is a cadastral operation, not a real right, and is effective upon deposit of the plan.

The registrar's failure to note the subdivision did not invalidate it.

Therefore, the respondent's registrations against the non-existent original lots were invalid, and the appellants' titles to the subdivided lots prevailed.

The appellant was acquitted of unlawfully practising medicine.

The respondent appealed the acquittal by way of trial de novo under section 75 of the Summary Convictions Act.

The appellant argued that this procedure violated his right against double jeopardy under section 11(h) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that an appeal by way of trial de novo by a prosecutor from an acquittal is essentially a new trial and violates section 11(h).

The appeal was allowed and the acquittal restored.

The appellant was convicted under the New Brunswick Motor Vehicle Act for failing to yield the right-of-way while driving on an Indian reserve.

He appealed, arguing that he could only be charged under the federal Indian Reserve Traffic Regulations.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that provincial motor vehicle laws of general application apply ex proprio vigore on Indian reserves in the absence of conflicting federal legislation.

The Court found no conflict between the provincial Act and the federal regulations, as the federal regulations merely incorporated provincial laws by reference without demonstrating an intent to exclusively cover the field.

The appellant's mandatary took possession of the debtor's immovable property before the debtor made an assignment in bankruptcy.

The property was sold, and the respondent registered a privilege under provincial law.

The Court of Appeal applied provincial law to rank the respondent ahead of the appellant.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that once bankruptcy occurs, the federal Bankruptcy Act determines the priority of claims, even if the secured creditor realizes its security outside the bankruptcy proceedings.

The appellants appealed their convictions for income tax evasion, arguing that evidence obtained prior to the enactment of the Charter under a provision of the Income Tax Act later found to be unconstitutional should be excluded.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Ontario Court of Appeal that the Charter does not apply retrospectively to searches and seizures conducted before it came into force.

The accused were convicted at trial of conspiracy to import narcotics and bribery of an officer.

The Court of Appeal allowed their appeals and ordered a stay of proceedings based on the rule against multiple convictions.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court allowed the appeal and restored the trial convictions, holding that the principles expressed in R. v. Prince regarding the rule against multiple convictions were conclusive.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that set aside a stay of proceedings entered by the trial judge and ordered a new trial.

The stay had been entered based on allegations that the Crown's conduct at trial infringed the appellants' rights to fundamental justice.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's exercise of its jurisdiction to review the trial judge's decision.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal which found its operations constituted a scheme of pyramid selling under the Combines Investigation Act and issued a prohibition order.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the Federal Court of Appeal.

The appellant's first two trials on a charge of criminal negligence causing death ended with hung juries.

The trial judge stayed a third trial on the grounds that it would constitute an abuse of process and a violation of section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while prosecutorial misconduct is not an essential element of abuse of process, a third trial in these circumstances does not violate the community's sense of fair play and decency.

The appellant was stopped by a police officer who detected an odour of alcohol and demanded a breath sample for a roadside screening device.

The appellant refused and was charged with failing to comply with a roadside demand.

He argued his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a roadside breath demand constitutes a detention under s. 10 of the Charter, triggering the right to counsel.

However, the Court concluded that the limitation on the right to counsel implied by the requirement to provide a sample 'forthwith' is a reasonable limit prescribed by law and demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter, given the importance of deterring impaired driving.

The appellant was stopped at random by a police officer during a spot check.

The officer demanded a breath sample after detecting alcohol, which the appellant refused.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the random stop and the demand for his licence and insurance.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the random stop constituted arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Charter, it was a reasonable limit demonstrably justified under section 1 due to the pressing need to combat impaired driving.

The Court also found that the demand for documents did not violate section 8 as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in such documents.

The appellant appealed a conviction for conspiracy to possess a narcotic for the purpose of trafficking, challenging the validity of a wiretap authorization.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the authorization adequately described the manner of interception in accordance with the Criminal Code, as established in the Wiretap Reference and Lyons v. The Queen.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal that set aside convictions for indecency and sexual assault and entered an acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada quashed the appeal, finding that the Crown was unable to demonstrate that the dissent in the Court of Appeal was based on a question of law.

The appellant was laid off due to a strike by another local of his union at his place of employment.

He applied for unemployment insurance benefits but was denied on the basis that he was 'financing' the strike under s. 44(2)(a) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, because a portion of his mandatory union dues was diverted to the International Union's strike fund.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that 'financing' requires active and voluntary involvement by the claimant.

The mandatory payment of union dues did not constitute financing the labour dispute, and the appellant was therefore entitled to benefits.

The appellant appealed his murder conviction to the Court of Appeal and applied to adduce fresh evidence consisting of traffic offence notices.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to admit the evidence but subsequently dismissed the appeal, applying the curative proviso and concluding the evidence could not have affected the verdict.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that once fresh evidence is admitted on the basis that it might reasonably affect the verdict, the court cannot later conclude it had no such effect without usurping the jury's function.

The curative proviso cannot be applied where no error at trial is shown and the issue is solely the admission of fresh evidence.

The appellant was charged with failing to comply with a roadside breath demand under s. 234.1 of the Criminal Code.

He argued the provision was inoperative because it had not been proclaimed in force in all provinces, allegedly violating equality before the law under the Canadian Bill of Rights and s. 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the non-universal application was justified by a valid federal objective related to provincial law enforcement priorities and resources.

The Court also held that s. 7 of the Charter could not be used to bypass the delayed implementation of equality rights under s. 15.

The respondent dumped woodwaste in provincial marine waters during logging operations and was charged under section 4(1) of the Ocean Dumping Control Act, which prohibits dumping at sea without a permit.

The lower courts held the provision ultra vires Parliament.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the control of marine pollution by dumping is a single, indivisible matter of national concern that falls within the federal peace, order and good government power.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal that varied the trial judge's disposition regarding the valuation of shares, related compensation, and interest.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's disposition of these issues.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal was set aside and the trial judgment restored.

The appellant sought an advance payment of special damages for rehabilitation purposes from the respondents.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal against the Canadian National Railway Company, granting the advance payment of $200,000 based on the dissenting reasons of Rice J.A. in the Court of Appeal.

The appeal against VIA Rail Canada Inc. was dismissed without costs.

The appellant's claim for interest on the advanced moneys was dismissed, and costs were awarded on a party and party basis.