Gérard V. La Forest

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder as a party to the offence under the constructive murder provisions of the Criminal Code, after his brother beat a homeowner to death during a break and enter.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the constructive murder provision violated the Charter.

Applying its concurrent decision in R. v. Vaillancourt, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the constructive murder provision was inoperative as it violated the Charter.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant and an accomplice committed an armed robbery during which the accomplice shot and killed a client.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder under the constructive murder provisions of s. 213(d) of the Criminal Code, despite testifying he believed the gun was unloaded.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 213(d) violates sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter because it allows for a murder conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt of at least objective foreseeability of death.

The provision was not saved by section 1, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants, police officers, sought to quash a provincial Order in Council establishing a commission of inquiry into the alleged assault of a prisoner while in police custody.

They argued the inquiry was ultra vires the province as it intruded into federal jurisdiction over criminal law and procedure.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the province has the constitutional authority under s. 92(14) and s. 92(6) of the Constitution Act, 1867 to establish an inquiry to investigate and report on alleged wrongdoings by members of a provincial police force.

The inquiry's purpose was not to determine criminal responsibility but to investigate police misconduct that undermined the administration of justice.

The appellant, a police officer, was charged with major service offences and appeared before the Deputy Chief of Police for trial.

He argued that the proceedings violated his right to an independent and impartial tribunal under section 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that section 11 does not apply to police disciplinary proceedings because they are neither criminal in nature nor involve true penal consequences, such as imprisonment.

The appellants, two police constables, were charged with discreditable conduct under the Code of Offences.

They challenged the disciplinary proceedings, arguing that the police tribunal lacked independence and impartiality, thereby violating section 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that section 11 of the Charter does not apply to police disciplinary proceedings because they are neither criminal in nature nor involve true penal consequences, such as imprisonment.

The appellant police officer was charged with major offences under the Code of Offences under the Police Act.

He objected that the presiding officer did not constitute an independent and impartial tribunal as required by section 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, applying its concurrent decision in R. v. Wigglesworth to hold that section 11 of the Charter does not apply to police disciplinary proceedings because they are neither criminal in nature nor involve true penal consequences.

The appellant, an RCMP officer, assaulted a prisoner and was convicted of a major service offence under the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act.

He was subsequently charged with common assault under the Criminal Code for the same incident.

The appellant argued that the criminal charge violated his right under section 11(h) of the Charter not to be tried and punished twice for the same offence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while section 11 applies to proceedings involving true penal consequences, the appellant was not being tried for the same offence.

The service offence was an internal disciplinary matter, whereas the criminal charge was a public offence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of gross indecency, found to be a dangerous offender, and sentenced to indeterminate detention prior to the enactment of the Charter.

Subsequently, gross indecency was removed from the definition of 'serious personal injury offence' in the Criminal Code.

The appellant sought habeas corpus and Charter relief, arguing his continued detention was unlawful because his offence no longer qualified for indeterminate detention.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the change in the law did not alter his status as a dangerous offender and his continued detention did not violate the Charter.

The appellant appealed the temporary assignment of a co-worker to a newly created but unclassified supervisory position, arguing it was an appointment not based on merit under the Public Service Employment Act.

The Federal Court of Appeal had ruled that without a clear intent to create a position and make an appointment, no appointment occurred.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the objective facts, not the Department's intent, determine if an appointment occurred.

The Court found that the prolonged temporary assignment to new functions constituted an appointment to a position, triggering the merit principle and the right of appeal.

The appellants, customs inspectors, challenged the selection of other inspectors for a newly created 'dog handler' function, arguing it constituted an appointment to a new position under the Public Service Employment Act requiring selection according to merit.

The appeal board agreed and revoked the appointments, but the Federal Court of Appeal set aside that decision, holding that a new position requires a formal administrative decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that a significant change in functions requiring special qualifications amounts to the creation of a new position, and thus the appointments were subject to the merit principle and the right of appeal.

The respondent indecently assaulted a seven-year-old boy and, two minutes later, murdered him to prevent the child from telling his mother.

The jury convicted the respondent of first degree murder under s. 214(5)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal substituted a conviction for second degree murder, finding the murder did not occur 'while committing' the assault.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the first degree murder conviction, holding that 'while committing' does not require exact simultaneity, but rather that the underlying offence and the murder form part of one continuous sequence of events forming a single transaction.

The appellant appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada from a judgment of the Alberta Court of Appeal that allowed the Crown's appeal from his acquittal on a robbery charge.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the majority judgment of the Court of Appeal and confirming that the lower court had jurisdiction to entertain the Crown's appeal.

The appellant appealed as of right from a judgment of the Yukon Court of Appeal that allowed a Crown appeal from his acquittal on a charge of breaking and entering.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law in the application of s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms based on subsequent jurisprudence.

The matter was returned for retrial.

The appellants leased farm equipment from the respondent and subsequently defaulted on their payments.

The respondent seized and sold the equipment, then sued for damages for breach of the leases.

The trial judge assessed damages using general contract principles, awarding the respondent the deficiency owed to its financing agent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the damages flowing from the breach of a chattel lease should be calculated in accordance with general contract principles, extending the rule previously applied to land leases.

The Court also found that the appellants failed to prove that the respondent had not reasonably mitigated its damages.

The accused was charged with impaired driving.

After being informed of his right to counsel, he called his wife to contact a lawyer.

Immediately after the call, police demanded a breath sample, which he provided.

The trial judge convicted the accused, finding no Charter violation.

The District Court allowed the appeal, finding a violation.

The Court of Appeal restored the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the accused's right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter was violated by the police's failure to afford him a reasonable opportunity to contact a lawyer, the breathalyzer evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The police's hastiness was provoked by the accused's actively obstructive and stalling behaviour, meaning the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The respondents were charged with conspiracy to commit robbery.

At trial, they sought to introduce the results of a polygraph examination to support their credibility and deny participation in the conspiracy.

The trial judge refused to admit the evidence, and they were convicted.

The Court of Appeal allowed their appeal and ordered the trial reopened to consider the polygraph evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that polygraph evidence is inadmissible in criminal proceedings because it offends the rules against oath-helping, past consistent statements, and character evidence, and because assessing credibility is the exclusive province of the trier of fact.

The appellant pleaded guilty to several offences including breaking and entering and using a weapon in a sexual assault.

Following the guilty pleas, the Crown applied to have the appellant declared a dangerous offender under Part XXI of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found the appellant to be a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the dangerous offender provisions violated sections 7, 9, 11, and 12 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the provisions do not violate the principles of fundamental justice, do not constitute arbitrary detention or cruel and unusual punishment, and that the offender is not entitled to a jury determination of dangerousness.

The appellants appealed from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal that allowed the Crown's appeal, set aside their acquittals, and ordered new trials on charges of conspiracy to traffic in narcotics.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's decision.

The Crown appealed a decision holding it liable in nuisance for damage caused to the respondents' orchards by the use of road salt as a de-icing agent on an adjoining highway.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing entirely with the trial judge's conclusions and reasons, which had been affirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondents on a solicitor and client basis.

The appellant, a non-custodial father, brought an action against his former wife and her new husband, alleging they deliberately frustrated his court-ordered access to his children.

He claimed damages for conspiracy, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that no tort action exists for interference with access rights, as the legislature has provided a comprehensive statutory scheme for custody and access.

The Court also declined to recognize a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty in this context, finding that such litigation would not be in the best interests of the children.