Gérard V. La Forest

The appellants were convicted of rape and indecent assault after engaging in sexual acts with a prostitute.

At trial, they argued that the complainant consented or, alternatively, that they held an honest but mistaken belief in her consent.

The trial judge left the defence of mistake of fact to the jury but instructed them that the belief must be supported by reasonable grounds.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the defence was properly left to the jury due to an 'air of reality' in the evidence, the trial judge erred in law by requiring reasonable grounds for the honest belief.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant's employee forged signatures on cheques drawn on the appellant's account at the respondent bank.

The bank honoured the cheques and debited the appellant's account.

The appellant sued the bank to recover the funds.

The bank argued the appellant was precluded from setting up the forgeries because it breached a duty to examine its bank statements and maintain adequate internal controls.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that, in the absence of an express verification agreement, a customer does not owe a duty to the bank to examine bank statements with reasonable care and report discrepancies, nor does it owe a duty to maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls.

The appeal was allowed and judgment entered for the appellant.

The appellant's premises were searched by officials of the Ministère du revenu pursuant to an authorization approved by a judge of the Court of Sessions of the Peace under s. 40 of the Act respecting the Ministère du revenu.

The appellant challenged the authorization via a writ of evocation, arguing the information was too vague.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the authorizing judge exercises a judicial function and must carefully scrutinize the ministerial discretion.

Because the information did not disclose the facts underlying the informant's belief, the judge could not verify its reasonableness and failed in his duty by not requesting further information.

The search and seizure were declared null and void.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of his ex-wife.

The Crown advanced two theories: that the appellant personally killed the victim, or that he aided and abetted someone else to do so.

The trial judge instructed the jury that they could convict if they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the murder under either theory, without requiring unanimity on which specific theory occurred.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that section 21 of the Criminal Code makes the distinction between a principal and an aider/abettor legally irrelevant, and therefore jury unanimity on the exact mode of participation is not required provided all jurors are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused participated in the crime.

The appellant was charged with tax evasion and his assets were placed in receivership.

During the trial, the trial judge took eleven months to decide a motion for a directed verdict, initiating nineteen adjournments.

The appellant applied to the superior court under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The superior court granted a stay of proceedings, but the Court of Appeal reversed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the superior court had jurisdiction to hear the application since the trial judge caused the delay.

The Court found the eleven-month delay unreasonable and held that a stay of proceedings is the appropriate remedy for a violation of s. 11(b).

The appellant sought the extradition of the respondents for an aircraft hijacking alleged to have occurred in 1969.

The respondents returned to Canada in 1979, but the appellant did not request extradition until 1984.

The extradition judge granted a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, finding the delay violated the respondents' s. 7 rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that an extradition judge is not a court of competent jurisdiction under s. 24(1), the Charter does not apply to the actions of foreign governments, and the mere surrender of a fugitive pursuant to a treaty does not violate the principles of fundamental justice.

The Republic of Argentina appealed a decision discharging the respondent from extradition proceedings due to a 17-month delay.

The extradition judge had found the delay violated the respondent's right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 11(b) does not apply to extradition hearings, which are not trials but proceedings to determine if there is sufficient evidence to surrender a fugitive.

The Court also found no abuse of process or violation of s. 7 of the Charter, noting the delay was largely due to the foreign authorities and not attributable to Canadian officials.

Furthermore, the Court held that an extradition judge is not a court of competent jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies.

The appellant, a Canadian citizen, fled to Canada after being acquitted of a federal kidnapping charge in the United States.

She faced extradition to Ohio on a state charge of child stealing arising from the same incident.

She argued that extradition would violate her rights against double jeopardy under sections 7 and 11(h) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, ruling that section 11(h) does not apply to extradition hearings because the Charter cannot govern foreign criminal proceedings.

While section 7 applies to the Canadian executive's decision to surrender a fugitive, the surrender in this case did not violate the principles of fundamental justice because the federal and state offences contained different elements.

The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed by the Court.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the burden of proof for an alibi and the requirement for a unanimous verdict.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the dissenting appellate judge that the trial judge erred in law on both issues.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso under s. 613(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code due to the cumulative effect of the errors.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

Following unsuccessful contract talks, dairy workers served strike notices and employers responded with lock-out notices.

The Saskatchewan legislature enacted back-to-work legislation temporarily prohibiting strikes and lock-outs and imposing compulsory arbitration.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the legislation infringed the workers' freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter by prohibiting strikes, the infringement was justified under s. 1 due to the severe economic harm a work stoppage would cause to dairy farmers.

The appellant union challenged the federal Public Sector Compensation Restraint Act, which extended collective agreements and fixed wage increases for public sector employees, arguing it violated freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter and equality before the law under s. 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal.

The majority held that the guarantee of freedom of association does not include a constitutional guarantee of the right to bargain collectively and the right to strike.

The Court also found no violation of the Canadian Bill of Rights, as the legislation was directed at a valid federal objective of dampening inflationary expectations.

Appeal from an Alberta labour reference concerning whether statutory prohibitions on strikes and lockouts, coupled with compulsory arbitration for public servants, hospital employees, firefighters, and police officers, infringed freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The majority held that s. 2(d) protects the freedom to associate but does not constitutionalize collective bargaining or the right to strike, and therefore the impugned provisions were not inconsistent with the Constitution Act, 1982.

The dissent would have held that s. 2(d) protected collective bargaining and strike activity, subject to s. 1, and that the impugned schemes were not justified except potentially for truly essential services.

The appeal was dismissed, with the constitutional questions answered against the appellants except that the final abstract exclusion question was not answered.

The appellant was convicted of fraudulently undertaking to tell fortunes for a consideration under s. 323(b) of the Criminal Code.

She appealed, arguing she honestly believed she had special powers to predict the future.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the defence of honest belief was not open on the facts because the trial judge had explicitly found that the appellant knew she had no basis for her claim to be able to predict the future.

The appellant's apartment was searched by police under the authority of a writ of assistance, resulting in the seizure of illicit drugs.

At trial, the judge found writs of assistance to be unconstitutional, excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, and acquitted the appellant.

The Court of Appeal quashed the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that although the search was unreasonable, the police acted in good faith reliance on a writ of assistance that had not yet been challenged under the Charter.

Applying the Collins framework, the Court concluded that the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant's apartment was searched by police under a writ of assistance, resulting in the seizure of illicit drugs and cash.

The appellant argued the search violated section 8 of the Charter and sought to exclude the evidence under section 24(2).

Assuming the search was unreasonable because writs of assistance were constitutionally inadequate, the Supreme Court of Canada applied the principles from R. v. Collins.

The Court concluded that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, as the officers acted in good faith under a statute not yet declared unconstitutional and had reasonable grounds for the search.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was seized by the throat by a police officer in a pub and found to be in possession of a balloon containing heroin.

The trial judge found the search unreasonable under s 8 of the Charter because the Crown failed to establish the officer's reasonable grounds, but admitted the evidence under s 24(2).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute given the seriousness of the Charter violation and the lack of established grounds for the violent search.

The accused was charged with obstructing justice and committed after refusing to testify at the preliminary hearing of another accused.

The accused applied for certiorari to set aside the committal, which was dismissed by the Superior Court but allowed by the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the Superior Court's judgment, noting that the judge did not exercise the powers of committal conferred by section 472 of the Criminal Code, rendering the questions raised in the Court of Appeal moot.

The appellant, a qualified plasterer, was charged with working in the construction industry without a classification certificate contrary to Regulation No. 5.

He argued the regulation was ultra vires and adversely affected his vested rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, upholding the Court of Appeal's finding that the regulation was valid and that the vested rights argument failed given the statutory duty imposed on the Office de la construction du Québec to adopt hiring standards.

The appellant occupied land on the shoreline of a lake, which the Crown claimed belonged to it as part of a three-chain reserve.

The appellant's predecessor acquired the land between 1884 and 1919, during which time the relevant statute stated the reserve was 'for fishing purposes'.

A 1919 amendment changed this to 'in full ownership by the Crown'.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the 1919 amendment was declaratory and retroactive, meaning the Crown had always retained full ownership of the three-chain reserve, not merely a fishing servitude.

The appeal was dismissed, confirming the Crown's right to eject the appellant.