Gérard V. La Forest

The appeal concerned whether a stay of labour board proceedings should issue pending determination of a constitutional challenge to legislation authorizing the imposition of a first collective agreement.

The Court held that a stay of proceedings and an interlocutory injunction are governed by the same framework: a serious question to be tried, irreparable harm, and balance of convenience.

In constitutional litigation, the balance of convenience must include the public interest, particularly where relief would restrain a statutory authority from performing public duties.

The Court rejected a literal presumption that legislation challenged under the Charter is presumed constitutionally valid and in full force for interlocutory purposes.

It restored the motion judge's refusal of a stay and held the appellate court erred in exercising fresh discretion on allegedly new facts that did not substantially affect the original decision.

The appellant bank issued an irrevocable letter of credit in favour of a foreign supplier at the request of the respondent.

The respondent alleged that the supplier fraudulently inflated prices and that the documents accompanying the draft did not strictly comply with the letter of credit.

The Supreme Court of Canada recognized the fraud exception to the autonomy of documentary credits, extending it to fraud in the underlying transaction, provided the fraud is clearly established to the bank's knowledge before payment.

However, the Court found the bank lacked sufficient knowledge of the fraud.

Nevertheless, the Court held the bank improperly paid the draft because the bills of lading failed to strictly comply with the prepaid freight requirement of the letter of credit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The trustees of the respondent trust elected to make discretionary capital allocations to its beneficiary.

Instead of liquidating capital assets, the trustees retained the investments and financed the allocations by borrowing funds from a bank.

The trust deducted the interest on the borrowed money.

The Minister disallowed the deductions.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the interest deduction requires tracing the use of borrowed funds to a specific eligible use.

Borrowing money for an ineligible direct purpose (capital allocation) does not entitle a taxpayer to deduct interest payments, even if it indirectly preserves income-earning property.

The appeal was allowed.

The respondent, a sole shareholder and director of a leather goods company, insured the company's assets under his own name.

A fire destroyed the assets, and the insurers refused to pay, arguing that as a shareholder, he had no legally enforceable insurable interest in the corporate assets, relying on the Macaura principle.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the insurers' appeal, overruling Macaura and adopting the factual expectancy test.

The Court held that an insured has an insurable interest if they have a moral certainty of advantage or benefit from the property's existence and prejudice from its destruction.

The applicant applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed by a panel of three judges.

The appellant was tried by judge and jury for attempted murder.

The jury returned a verdict of not guilty, and the trial judge discharged the jury and the accused.

Subsequently, the jury foreman indicated they might have found the accused guilty of a lesser included offence.

The trial judge ruled he was functus officio and could not reconvene the jury.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that once a jury is discharged in a criminal case, the court is functus officio and the jury cannot be reconvened to reconsider its verdict.

The appellant sued the Government of Ontario over a transaction involving a tourist lodge.

During discovery, the government claimed absolute Crown privilege against producing Cabinet documents based on their class.

The Supreme Court of Canada rejected the absolute protection of Cabinet documents, holding that the public interest in the proper administration of justice must be weighed against the public interest in government confidentiality.

The Court ordered the trial judge to inspect the documents to balance these competing interests, noting that the documents concerned a low-level policy matter from over a decade ago.

The respondent, a person in need receiving provincial social allowance, sought a declaration and injunction against federal cost-sharing payments to Manitoba under the Canada Assistance Plan, alleging provincial non-compliance with the Plan's conditions.

The appellants moved to strike the statement of claim for lack of standing and failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the respondent lacked a direct personal interest, he should be granted public interest standing to challenge the statutory authority for the federal payments.

The Court extended the public interest standing principles from constitutional cases to non-constitutional challenges of administrative action.

The appeal was dismissed, allowing the action to proceed.

Multiple appeals and a Crown appeal challenged Ontario's Sunday retail closing regime under division of powers and the Charter.

The Court held the legislation was intra vires provincial authority and that it had a secular common-pause-day purpose, not a religious one.

A majority held the Act infringed the freedom of religion of Saturday-observing retailers by imposing a non-trivial economic burden, but that the infringement was justified under s. 1 because the legislation pursued a pressing social objective and included a constitutionally sufficient exemption scheme.

The s. 7 challenge failed, and no answer was given on s. 15 because it was not yet in force at the relevant time.

The retailer appeals were dismissed and the Crown's appeal against the kosher retailer was allowed.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Alberta Court of Appeal that allowed the respondents' appeal from a judgment granting an application for prohibition.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, finding that no jurisdictional error had been shown.

The appellant bank extended credit to a family company, secured by personal guarantees from family members and a corporate debenture.

After the company exceeded its credit limits, the parties reached an agreement where the bank would continue financing specific projects in exchange for additional capital and guarantees.

The bank breached this agreement by dishonouring cheques, demanding immediate payment, and appointing a receiver, which forced the company into bankruptcy.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the bank's breach of the modified loan agreement materially increased the guarantors' risk and impaired their security, entitling them to a total discharge from their guarantees.

The appellant sought to recover taxes paid under the allegedly unconstitutional Gasoline Tax Act.

For claims arising before August 1974, the appellant was required to proceed by petition of right, which necessitated a fiat from the Lieutenant Governor.

The Attorney General advised the Lieutenant Governor to refuse the fiat, effectively blocking the appellant's claim.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown cannot use the executive discretion to refuse a fiat to retain monies obtained under an unconstitutional statute.

The Court issued an order in the nature of mandamus compelling the Attorney General to advise the Lieutenant Governor to grant the fiat.

The accused stabbed a pregnant woman, causing the premature birth and subsequent death of her child.

The accused was convicted of causing bodily harm to the mother and was subsequently charged with manslaughter of the child.

The trial judge denied a motion to stay the manslaughter charge based on the Kienapple principle.

The Court of Appeal granted certiorari and quashed the indictment.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the Kienapple principle does not apply because the offences contain distinct elements and relate to different victims.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which held that a Director appointed under section 253 of the Canada Business Corporations Act is entitled to bring an action for compensation on behalf of aggrieved shareholders against both the offeree corporation and its directors for failing to meet statutory disclosure requirements in a directors' circular.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The mother of a mentally retarded adult daughter applied for court authorization to consent to her daughter's sterilization for non-therapeutic purposes.

The trial judge denied the application, but the Appeal Division allowed it, authorizing a hysterectomy under the court's parens patriae jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the parens patriae jurisdiction cannot be used to authorize the non-therapeutic sterilization of a mentally incompetent person, as it can never be safely determined that such a procedure is for their benefit.

The respondents were charged with defrauding two sole proprietorships through a factoring scheme involving false invoices.

The trial judge directed a verdict of acquittal, finding that sole proprietorships are not 'persons' capable of being defrauded under the Criminal Code, and refused the Crown's motion to amend the indictment due to irreparable prejudice to the defence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittals.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge's refusal to amend should not be interfered with and that there was no evidence the registered owner of the proprietorships suffered any actual risk of prejudice to her economic interests.

The respondent mortgagor renewed two residential mortgages for five-year terms.

During the renewal term, he attempted to prepay the principal and interest, relying on section 10(1) of the Interest Act, which allows prepayment after five years from the date of the mortgage.

The mortgagee refused the tender.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while a mortgagor cannot contract out of the statutory right to prepay after five years, choosing to renew a mortgage for a further term of up to five years is a valid exercise of choice, not a waiver of the right.

The mortgagor was bound by the renewal agreements and could not prepay until the end of the renewal terms.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellant Commission claimed $67,014.99 from the respondent transit commission, representing the difference between wages paid to the respondent's employees under a collective agreement and the amounts required by the Construction Decree for renovation work done on the respondent's buildings.

The lower courts dismissed the claim, holding that the Construction Industry Labour Relations Act did not apply to mass transit employers and that the employees received a 'total wage' greater than the Decree's requirements.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Act's application depends on the nature of the work done (construction) rather than the employer's primary industry.

The Court also rejected the 'total wage' concept, ruling that the Decree is a matter of public order and its specific minimum conditions cannot be offset by other benefits provided in a collective agreement.

The appellant, a pastor of a fundamentalist church, educated his children in a schooling program operating in the church basement.

He refused to send his children to public school or seek an exemption under the Alberta School Act, arguing that seeking permission from the state would violate his religious belief that God has final authority over his children's education.

He was charged with truancy.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the requirement to apply for certification of efficient instruction did not violate his freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter, as it was a reasonable limit demonstrably justified under s. 1.

The Court also held that the requirement did not deprive him of liberty contrary to the principles of fundamental justice under s. 7.

The accused was convicted of rape at his first trial, but a new trial was ordered on appeal.

At the second trial, the Crown cross-examined the accused on inconsistent testimony he had given at his first trial to establish consciousness of guilt.

The accused was convicted again, but the Court of Appeal ordered a third trial.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that cross-examining an accused at a retrial on testimony given at a previous trial on the same charge violates the right against self-incrimination under section 13 of the Charter.

The Court further held that this violation was not justified under section 1 of the Charter.