Gérard V. La Forest

Following the death of their mother, two children refused to live with their father and repeatedly ran away to live with their aunt and uncle.

The aunt and uncle sought custody of the children.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while there was no serious cause to deprive the father of his parental authority under art. 654 C.C.Q., the paramount consideration under art. 30 C.C.L.C. is the child's interest.

The Court awarded custody to the aunt and uncle, finding that returning the children to their father would compromise their development, but preserved the father's parental authority and granted him visiting rights.

The appellant challenged Quebec Labour Court proceedings arising from penal complaints under the Labour Code after a hearing date was reset in Montréal without prior notice while the parties attended at the originally scheduled courthouse in Val d'Or.

The Supreme Court held that setting the date and place of trial was not a purely administrative act and that the Chief Judge's decision and the hearing conducted in the parties' absence breached the audi alteram partem rule.

The Court further held that where nothing is done at the time and place fixed for trial, the tribunal loses jurisdiction over the information.

The appeal was allowed, the Court of Appeal judgment was quashed, and the Superior Court judgment authorizing evocation was restored.

The appellant was charged with arson after a fire destroyed his clothing store.

At the close of the Crown's case, which rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, the trial judge directed a verdict of acquittal, finding the evidence gave rise only to suspicion.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge usurped the function of the jury by weighing the evidence.

Applying the Shephard test, the Court found there was admissible circumstantial evidence relating to motive, opportunity, and contradictions in the appellant's statement that, if believed by a properly instructed jury, could justify a conviction.

The appellant, a cleaner at a military base, was sexually harassed by her supervisor.

She filed a complaint against the supervisor and her employer under the Canadian Human Rights Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Act contemplates the imposition of liability on employers for all acts of their employees in the course of employment.

The Court reasoned that the Act is remedial, not punitive, and its objectives would be stultified if remedies were not available against the employer, who alone can provide a healthy work environment.

The appellants, a union and individual provincial civil servants, challenged the constitutionality of provisions in the Ontario Public Service Act that prohibited them from engaging in certain political activities, including during federal elections.

They argued the province lacked jurisdiction to legislate regarding federal elections.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the impugned provisions were intra vires the province.

The Court found the legislation was validly enacted under the province's power to amend its constitution and regulate the tenure of provincial offices, as it aimed to ensure the political impartiality of the provincial public service, a fundamental principle of responsible government.

The appellant appealed a conviction for unlawful circulation of an obscene video cassette and possession of obscene video cassettes for the purpose of circulation.

The Supreme Court held that the principles set out in Towne Cinema governed the case and that, under those principles, the appeal failed.

The conviction entered by the Manitoba Court of Appeal was affirmed.

The appellants were acquitted at trial on a directed verdict of robbery and using a firearm.

The Ontario Court of Appeal quashed the acquittal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in ruling confessions inadmissible based on language comprehension, which goes to weight rather than admissibility.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, substantially agreeing with the reasons of the Court of Appeal.

The respondent ship-owner sued the appellant insurer for general average contribution following a fire at sea.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the ship-owner had not exercised due diligence to make the ship seaworthy.

The Federal Court of Appeal reversed this decision, substituting its own findings of fact based on documentary evidence and rejecting the expert testimony relied upon by the trial judge.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judgment, holding that the Court of Appeal erred in interfering with the trial judge's findings of fact and rejecting expert testimony without having heard the witnesses.

The respondent was arrested for armed robbery and informed of his right to counsel.

He stated he would not say anything until he saw his lawyer.

Despite this, police officers continued to question him without offering him the use of an available telephone, eliciting an inculpatory statement.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police violated the respondent's rights under section 10(b) of the Charter by failing to provide a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel and by not ceasing questioning.

The Court concluded that the admission of the self-incriminatory evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute under section 24(2) and dismissed the Crown's appeal, upholding the order for a new trial.

The appellant, a civilian, was stopped by military police on a public highway just outside a military base after being observed speeding on the base.

The officers noted signs of impairment and issued a breathalyzer demand, which the appellant refused.

He was acquitted at trial on the basis that military police were not 'peace officers' under the Criminal Code with respect to civilians.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while military police do not have general peace officer status over civilians under s. 2(f)(i), they do qualify as peace officers under s. 2(f)(ii) when enforcing laws on a military base pursuant to the Defence Establishment Trespass Regulations.

The officers retained this authority when stopping the appellant immediately outside the base.

Appeal from an Ontario reference concerning the constitutional validity of legislation extending full public funding to Roman Catholic separate high schools.

The Supreme Court held the legislation was valid under the province's plenary education power in s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867, read with s. 93(3), and that the Confederation compromise respecting denominational schools could not be overridden by Charter equality or religious-freedom guarantees.

A majority also concluded the legislation could be sustained as restoring rights protected by s. 93(1).

The appeal was dismissed, the reference question was answered in the negative, and no costs were awarded.

The appellant challenged the seven-year mandatory minimum sentence for importing narcotics after pleading guilty to importing cocaine.

The Court held that s. 12 of the Charter protects against punishments that are grossly disproportionate, and that the mandatory minimum in s. 5(2) of the Narcotic Control Act was unconstitutional because it would inevitably capture reasonably foreseeable cases involving much less serious conduct and require cruel and unusual punishment.

The Court rejected reliance on prosecutorial discretion to save the provision and held that the infringement was not justified under s. 1 because the means chosen impaired the right more than necessary.

The appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted for reconsideration of sentence.

Minority shareholders and debenture stockholders challenged the sale of surplus railway lands under nineteenth-century perpetual railway leases and a related agreement transferring lands to a subsidiary of the majority shareholder.

The Court held that the lessee had acquired, under the lease and statutory framework, the power to sell surplus lands, that the debenture stock constituted an incumbrance for purposes of the 1891 statute, and that reinvestment of sale proceeds in the railway satisfied the statutory scheme.

The Court further held that approved rail line abandonments did not breach the lease, the shareholder meeting approving the later transaction was validly called, and the majority shareholder lawfully held and voted shares.

The lessor was not entitled in law or equity to recover its reversionary interest in lands sold.

Appeals were dismissed and the respondent’s cross-appeals were allowed in part.

The Canadian Human Rights Commission and Action Travail des Femmes appealed a Federal Court of Appeal decision that set aside a portion of a Human Rights Tribunal order.

The Tribunal had found that the employer engaged in systemic discrimination against women in blue-collar jobs and ordered an employment equity program, including a requirement that the employer hire one woman for every four non-traditional jobs until women constituted 13% of that workforce.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal had jurisdiction under s. 41(2)(a) of the Canadian Human Rights Act to order an employment equity program to prevent future systemic discrimination.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction to the Supreme Court of Canada based on a dissent in the Manitoba Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court quashed the appeal, finding that the dissent in the lower court was not on a question of law, and therefore no appeal as of right existed.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving after a blood sample was taken without his consent while he was in an incoherent and delirious state following an accident.

The Crown conceded that the taking of the blood sample violated the appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure under section 8 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the violation was serious, wilful, and deliberate, effectively conscripting the appellant against himself.

The Court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute under section 24(2) of the Charter, allowed the appeal, and restored the acquittal.

The Crown appealed an order granting a new trial after a sexual assault conviction.

The court held that an instruction on honest but mistaken belief in consent is not mandatory in every sexual assault case; it is only required where there is sufficient evidence giving that issue an air of reality under s. 244(4) of the Criminal Code.

On the record, the accused's theory of consent or mistaken belief lacked an evidentiary foundation.

The court also held that evidence from the complainant's roommate about a prior sexual proposition was admissible because its probative value outweighed its minimal prejudicial effect, and in any event any error would have been cured by the proviso.

The parties entered into a separation agreement, incorporated into their divorce decree, which provided that spousal maintenance would cease if the wife cohabited with another man for more than 90 days.

The wife subsequently cohabited with another man, and the husband ceased payments.

The wife, who eventually required social assistance, applied to vary the decree nisi to reinstate maintenance.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the cohabitation clause was valid and enforceable.

Applying the Pelech test, the Court found no radical change in circumstances related to a pattern of economic dependency generated by the marriage that would justify interfering with the settlement agreement.

The appellant sought spousal maintenance in the divorce proceeding notwithstanding an antecedent settlement agreement that limited support to one year.

The majority held that the same stringent approach governing variation of support orders applied where a court was asked under s. 11(1) of the Divorce Act to depart from a prior settlement agreement, requiring a radical change in circumstances tied to a marriage-related pattern of economic dependency.

On the facts, there had been no relevant change in circumstances, public assistance alone was insufficient, and concerns arising from custody of a child were properly addressed through child support rather than spousal support.

The appeal was dismissed and the escalator clause inserted by the trial judge could not stand.

The parties divorced in 1969 and entered into a maintenance agreement where the wife accepted a lump sum in full satisfaction of future claims.

The agreement was incorporated into a court order.

Years later, the wife's health deteriorated, she depleted her funds, and went on welfare, while the husband became wealthy.

She applied to vary the maintenance order under s. 11(2) of the Divorce Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that where parties have freely negotiated a valid settlement agreement, it should be respected.

The court may only intervene to vary the order if there is a radical change in circumstances that flows from an economic pattern of dependency engendered by the marriage.

Since the wife's hardship was not causally connected to the marriage, the application to vary was dismissed.