Gérard V. La Forest

The appellants, RCMP officers, were the subject of a complaint to the Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission alleging arbitrary arrest and detention contrary to section 7 of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code.

A Board of Inquiry was established to investigate.

The appellants sought an order of prohibition, arguing the Board lacked jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that section 7 of the Code is inoperative in relation to arrest or detention under the criminal law, as it encroaches on the federal government's exclusive jurisdiction over criminal law and procedure.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellants sued the respondent in the Federal Court, Trial Division for a declaration that they had the status of Indians and that a piece of land in Newfoundland was an Indian reserve.

The respondent successfully moved to strike out the portion of the statement of claim relating to the reserve declaration, which was upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the Federal Court lacks jurisdiction under s. 17 of the Federal Court Act to grant relief affecting the property rights of a province.

The appellant agreed to purchase a property from the respondent.

Prior to closing, the building was destroyed by fire.

The agreement provided that the purchaser could either take the insurance proceeds and complete the purchase, or cancel the agreement.

The purchaser registered a statutory declaration stating he would only complete the purchase if the premises were restored or if sufficient insurance proceeds were guaranteed to restore them.

The vendor treated this as a repudiation of the agreement and refused a later tender.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the purchaser's declaration dictated terms beyond the agreement, amounting to a repudiation that the vendor was entitled to accept.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed from an order setting aside a rape conviction and directing a new trial after the trial judge admitted similar fact evidence of an earlier rape.

The accused admitted sexual intercourse but asserted actual consent or an honest belief in consent.

The Supreme Court held that the absence of consent by a previous complainant was irrelevant to the present complainant's lack of consent, and that prior misconduct evidence was inadmissible where its only value was to show the accused was the sort of person capable of disregarding non-consent.

The prior incident did not involve a similar claim of mistaken belief in consent, so the evidence could not properly rebut that defence.

The appeal was dismissed and the new trial order was upheld.

The appellant challenged a municipal by-law that set a permit fee for soil removal based on the volume of soil removed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the enabling statute, which authorized the municipality to 'fix a fee for the permit', only permitted a flat fee and did not authorize a variable fee based on the measure of activities conducted.

The appeal was allowed and the by-law was quashed.

The parties lived together in a common law relationship for forty-two years on a farm owned by the respondent.

The appellant performed all domestic labour, raised their six children, and worked extensively on the farm without remuneration.

After the relationship deteriorated, the appellant sought an interest in the farm.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondent was unjustly enriched by the appellant's unpaid labour, which preserved and maintained the farm.

The Court expanded the doctrine of constructive trust, holding that a contribution need not be directed to the acquisition of property, but can also relate to its preservation, maintenance, or improvement.

The appeal was allowed and the trial judge's order granting the appellant a portion of the farm and a lump sum payment was reinstated.

The appellant was charged with conspiracy to import cocaine.

At trial, wiretap evidence was excluded because the police failed to disclose to the authorizing judge that a concurrent income tax investigation was ongoing and that information would be shared with tax authorities.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant, but the Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the existence of the tax investigation was irrelevant to the validity of the wiretap authorizations for the drug investigation.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis of inadequate jury instructions regarding identification evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada found that while the trial judge instructed the jury to exercise caution with identification evidence, he failed to relate that need to the specific facts of the case, particularly the identification procedures used at the detention centre.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed a decision denying them deferred benefits under a multi-employer pension plan established by an international union, after a new plan was established for members of the local union.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower courts that the benefits under the original plan had not yet vested and that the respondents had complied with the requirements of the plan.

The Court noted that neither the federal nor provincial pension legislation was designed to deal with the specific circumstances of the case.

The accused was charged with several sexual offences nearly three years after the alleged incidents, primarily due to the police's inability to locate the complainant.

A Provincial Court judge stayed the proceedings, finding the pre-charge delay violated the accused's right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, holding that the time frame for assessing a section 11(b) claim generally runs only from the moment a person is charged, and pre-charge delay is irrelevant to this analysis.

The appellant sought a stay of proceedings on the basis of alleged unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, raising foundational questions about which criminal courts may grant remedies under s. 24(1).

The Supreme Court held, by majority, that a preliminary inquiry judge is not a court of competent jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies because that tribunal's authority is confined by the Criminal Code and does not include the remedial powers sought.

The Court further held that Charter remedies in criminal matters must generally fit within the existing procedural structure of the criminal process, with superior courts retaining jurisdiction in appropriate circumstances and appeals remaining governed by statutory routes.

The appeal was dismissed, although strong dissents would have found a s. 11(b) breach and stayed the proceedings.

The accused was charged with rape.

The only issue at trial was the identification of the accused by the complainant.

The trial judge directed a verdict of acquittal, finding the identification evidence unreliable due to difficult observation conditions and improper police identification procedures.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, holding that a trial judge cannot withdraw a case from the jury where there is admissible evidence which could, if believed, result in a conviction.

The frailties of the identification evidence should have been left to the jury with a proper caution.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the sentencing for the use of a firearm during the commission of an offence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that there is no ambiguity in section 83 of the Criminal Code and agreeing with the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in R. v. MacLean that penalties imposed under this section must be served consecutively.

In 1970, the Crown expropriated immovables under the Code of Civil Procedure, which allowed unilateral discontinuance.

In 1973, a new Expropriation Act required the Expropriation Tribunal's authorization to discontinue.

In 1979, the Crown attempted to unilaterally discontinue the 1970 expropriations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the new Act applied immediately to the Crown and did not constitute retroactive legislation.

The Crown had no vested right to unilaterally discontinue, as it was merely an unexercised option.

The appeal was dismissed, meaning the Crown required the Tribunal's authorization to discontinue.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted robbery and use of a firearm.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the verdicts of guilt were not unreasonable and were supported by the evidence.

The Court concluded that no error of law was committed at trial and there was no miscarriage of justice.

The appellant employer received tips from customers at banquets and distributed them to its employees pursuant to a collective agreement.

The Minister of National Revenue assessed the employer for unemployment insurance premiums on these tips.

The employer appealed, arguing that the tips were paid by customers, not the employer, and thus were not remuneration under section 68 of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that section 66 of the Act requires premiums to be calculated based on 'insurable earnings', which includes tips distributed by the employer.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding the interpretation of the phrase 'any subsequent purchaser' in s. 792 of the Charter of the City of Montreal.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the Court of Appeal that the phrase includes a purchaser in a judicial sale, as the Charter makes no distinction in respect of the latter.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The original applicant was charged with narcotics offences and had monies seized.

He applied for restoration but died before trial.

His innocent administrator pursued the restoration.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that since no conviction was entered and the monies were no longer required as evidence, the innocent representative was entitled to restoration.

The public policy rule preventing a person from profiting from a crime requires a conviction or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which was absent here.

The appellant was dismissed by the respondent and his dismissal grievance, filed by his union, was dismissed at arbitration.

The appellant alleged the union failed in its duty of representation and obtained authorization from the Labour Court under s. 47.5 of the Labour Code to submit his claim to a new arbitrator.

The respondent successfully applied for a writ of evocation, arguing the Labour Court exceeded its jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 47.5 does not empower the Labour Court to order a second arbitration when a grievance has already been arbitrated and disposed of, as this would conflict with the finality of arbitration awards under s. 101.

The appellant, while highly intoxicated, was charged with her husband's murder and informed of her right to counsel.

She stated there was 'no point' in having counsel and was interrogated by police despite her aunt's requests to wait for a lawyer.

The trial judge excluded her inculpatory statements because she lacked the capacity to understand the consequences of making them, leading to an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, applying the 'operating mind' test.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that a valid waiver of the section 10(b) Charter right to counsel requires a true appreciation of the consequences.

The police's deliberate exploitation of the appellant's intoxicated state violated her rights, and the evidence was excluded under section 24(2).