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Historic Huron treaty barred park regulation prosecutions.
Members of a Huron band were prosecuted for cutting trees, camping, and making fires in a provincial park while carrying out ancestral customs and religious rites.
The Court held that a 1760 document signed by General Murray was a treaty within s. 88 of the Indian Act, remained in force, and protected the exercise of the respondents' customs and religion on territory frequented by the Hurons in 1760, so long as the activity was not incompatible with Crown occupancy.
The Court adopted a broad and liberal approach to treaty interpretation, capacity, and extinguishment, and found that provincial park regulation could not be enforced against the respondents in these circumstances.
The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Motion to state constitutional questions granted in part; only questions challenging statutory validity were stated.
The applicants brought a motion to state four constitutional questions pursuant to Rule 32(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Court reviewed the proposed questions and the 1984 amendment to Rule 32(1), which clarified that constitutional questions under the Charter are only stated when the constitutional validity, applicability, or operability of a statute or regulation is raised.
The Court found that questions 1 and 2 met this test, but questions 3 and 4 did not.
The motion was granted in part, and time was extended to state questions 1 and 2 only.
A foetus is not a legal person and a father cannot veto an abortion.
The appellant, who was 18 weeks pregnant, decided to terminate her pregnancy after separating from the respondent.
The respondent obtained an interlocutory injunction preventing the abortion, arguing that the foetus had a right to life under the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms and the Civil Code, and that he had a right to veto the abortion as the potential father.
The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and set aside the injunction, holding that a foetus is not a 'human being' under the Quebec Charter and does not possess juridical personality under the Civil Code.
The Court also found no legal basis for a potential father's right to veto a woman's decision to have an abortion.
Appeal allowed and stay of proceedings ordered due to a flagrant denial of justice.
The appellant appealed a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal which had dismissed an appeal from a Superior Court judgment convicting the appellant under s. 25 of the Summary Convictions Act.
The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a stay of proceedings, finding a flagrant denial of justice apparent from the transcripts.
Tips received by an employer and distributed to employees constitute insurable earnings for unemployment insurance premiums.
The appellant employer received tips from customers at banquets and distributed them to its employees pursuant to a collective agreement.
The Minister of National Revenue assessed the employer for unemployment insurance premiums on these tips.
The employer appealed, arguing that the tips were paid by customers, not the employer, and thus were not remuneration under section 68 of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that section 66 of the Act requires premiums to be calculated based on 'insurable earnings', which includes tips distributed by the employer.
The appeal was dismissed.
Non-party appeal leave upheld; language comprehension claim failed on the facts.
The appellants challenged an order granting a newly formed parents' association leave to appeal and an extension of time to appeal from school-language litigation, and also argued that a judge on the New Brunswick Court of Appeal lacked sufficient French comprehension.
The Court upheld the appellate court's inherent jurisdiction under the Judicature Act to grant leave to a non-party and found no reviewable error in its discretionary decision extending time.
On the constitutional issue, the Court divided on whether s. 19(2) of the Charter itself guarantees that judges understand the language used by the parties, but all members agreed the appeal should be dismissed and that the evidentiary record did not establish disqualification of the impugned judge.
The case is a foundational authority on the distinction between constitutional language rights, natural justice, and the institutional implementation of bilingual adjudication.
Temporary validity of Manitoba's unilingual laws extended to allow for bilingual translation and re-enactment.
Following the Supreme Court's opinion declaring Manitoba's unilingual statutes constitutionally invalid, a special hearing was held to determine the minimum period necessary for their translation, re-enactment, printing, and publishing.
The Court issued a consent order giving effect to Manitoba's commitment to publish its laws in a bilingual, parallel column format.
The period of temporary validity for the laws of Manitoba was extended to December 31, 1988, for consolidated statutes, regulations, and rules of court, and to December 31, 1990, for all other laws.
Arbitrator's substitution of suspension for dismissal was not patently unreasonable and did not exceed jurisdiction.
The appellant was dismissed for accepting a trip from a client, contrary to company policy.
An arbitrator found the dismissal unjustified and substituted a four-month suspension.
The employer sought judicial review.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the arbitrator did not exceed his jurisdiction, as his interpretation of his remedial powers under the Act respecting labour standards was correct, and his decision to substitute a lesser penalty was not patently unreasonable.
The appeal was allowed and the arbitrator's award restored.
Union did not breach duty of fair representation by relying on legal counsel to refuse arbitration.
The respondent, a pilot boat captain, was transferred to a maintenance position by his employer.
The appellant union filed a grievance but refused to take it to arbitration based on a legal opinion that the transfer was not an arbitrable dismissal under the collective agreement.
The respondent sued the union for breaching its duty of fair representation.
The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the union's appeal, holding that a union has considerable discretion in deciding whether to arbitrate a grievance.
The Court found the union did not act arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith, and was justified in relying on the reasoned opinion of its legal counsel.
Acquittals for conspiracy to commit fraud upon the government upheld despite trial judge's errors of law.
The respondents were acquitted at trial on charges of conspiracy to commit frauds upon the government under s. 110 of the Criminal Code.
The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in his interpretation of 'benefit', 'consideration', and 'cooperation, assistance, exercise of influence'.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the trial judge made errors of law in interpreting the constituent elements of the offence—specifically by failing to recognize that arranging meetings could constitute cooperation or assistance—the acquittals must stand because the trial judge made findings of fact that there was no agreement for the accused to provide such services.
Quebec has no conventional power of veto over constitutional amendments affecting its legislative competence.
The Government of Quebec referred a question to the Quebec Court of Appeal asking whether its consent was constitutionally required, by convention, for the adoption of a resolution to amend the Canadian Constitution in a way that affected its legislative competence or status.
The Court of Appeal answered in the negative, and Quebec appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Quebec has no conventional power of veto over constitutional amendments.
The Court reaffirmed its previous ruling that there is no conventional rule of unanimity among the provinces, and found that Quebec failed to demonstrate that the other political actors had recognized or accepted a specific conventional veto power for Quebec.
Damages for improper expulsion from a voluntary association are contractual and subject to a thirty-year prescription.
The appellant, a real estate broker, was improperly suspended and expelled from the respondent real estate board.
He brought an action seeking reinstatement and damages for loss of income, humiliation, and suffering.
The Superior Court quashed the expulsion but dismissed the damages claim as prescribed under the two-year limitation for offences and quasi-offences.
The Court of Appeal affirmed.
The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the relationship between a voluntary association and its members is contractual.
Therefore, the damages claim for the improper expulsion is subject to a thirty-year prescription period, though damages for separate tortious acts like bomb threats remain prescribed.