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Human Rights Commission's dismissal of a complaint is an administrative decision requiring procedural fairness, not a judicial hearing.
The appellant union filed a complaint with the Canadian Human Rights Commission alleging wage discrimination between predominantly male and female job classifications.
An investigator evaluated the jobs using the Aiken Plan and recommended dismissing the complaint as unsubstantiated.
The Commission adopted the report and dismissed the complaint without a formal hearing.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Commission's decision under s. 36(3) of the Canadian Human Rights Act was administrative, not judicial or quasi-judicial, and therefore not reviewable under s. 28 of the Federal Court Act.
The Court further found that the Commission had met its duty of procedural fairness by providing the investigator's report and allowing written submissions.
Children's advertising ban infringed expression but survived Charter scrutiny.
The appeal concerned a constitutional challenge to Quebec consumer protection legislation prohibiting commercial advertising directed at children under thirteen.
The Court held that the provisions were intra vires provincial jurisdiction, infringed freedom of expression under both the Canadian and Quebec Charters, but were justified as reasonable limits under s. 1 and s. 9.1.
The Court also held that the override provision had expired and that a corporation could not invoke s. 7 of the Canadian Charter.
The decision established a foundational framework for identifying protected expression and determining whether government purpose or effect limits expression.
Labour board remedies set aside as punitive and violative of freedom of expression.
The appellant bank closed a unionized branch and merged it with a non-unionized branch.
The Canada Labour Relations Board found this constituted a sale of a business and an unfair labour practice, ordering the bank to create a $144,000 trust fund and send a Board-authored letter to all employees.
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Board's finding on the sale of a business, but set aside the trust fund and letter remedies, holding that they were punitive, lacked a rational connection to the unfair practice, and violated freedom of expression by compelling the bank to express opinions it did not hold.
Quebec has no conventional power of veto over constitutional amendments affecting its legislative competence.
The Government of Quebec referred a question to the Quebec Court of Appeal asking whether its consent was constitutionally required, by convention, for the adoption of a resolution to amend the Canadian Constitution in a way that affected its legislative competence or status.
The Court of Appeal answered in the negative, and Quebec appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Quebec has no conventional power of veto over constitutional amendments.
The Court reaffirmed its previous ruling that there is no conventional rule of unanimity among the provinces, and found that Quebec failed to demonstrate that the other political actors had recognized or accepted a specific conventional veto power for Quebec.
