A.G. (Que.) v. Expropriation Tribunal, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 732

Attorney General of the Province of Quebec Appellant;

and

Expropriation Tribunal, Judge Léon Nichols and Laurent Cantin Respondents;

and

Alfred Francoeur and Robert Bernier Mis en cause.

File No.: 18359.

1986: February 4; 1986: June 12.

Present: Beetz, Chouinard, Lamer, Le Dain and La Forest JJ.

on appeal from the court of appeal for quebec

Expropriation ‑‑ Crown ‑‑ Discontinuance ‑‑ Temporal application of the law ‑‑ Discontinuance pursuant to rules of Code of Civil Procedure though Expropriation Act had come into effect ‑‑ Whether new Expropriation Act applicable to expropriation by Crown before it came into effect ‑‑ No vested right in unilateral discontinuance ‑‑ Expropriation Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. E‑24, s. 55 (formerly Expropriation Act, 1973 (Que.), c. 38, s. 54) ‑‑ Code of Civil Procedure, art. 797.

In 1970 the Government of Quebec expropriated certain immovables pursuant to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure then in effect. Three years later, the rules of the Code on expropriation were replaced by a new system applicable to all expropriations authorized by the statutes of Quebec. After the Expropriation Act came into effect, the government unilaterally discontinued in reliance on art. 797 C.C.P. Under s. 55 of the Expropriation Act the expropriating party can always discontinue, but it can do so only with the authorization of the Expropriation Tribunal. Appellant was invited to appear with the expropriated parties before the Expropriation Tribunal to determine the expropriation indemnities and raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, alleging that, as the Minister had discontinued, strictly speaking there was no longer any expropriation. The Tribunal held that s. 55 was applicable and dismissed the objection. Appellant then applied to the Superior Court for a writ of evocation against this decision. The Superior Court allowed the application but its judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeal. The appeal at bar was to determine whether the government could in 1979 file a unilateral discontinuance in the registry office in respect of the expropriations made in 1970, or whether to do so it had to obtain the Expropriation Tribunal's authorization.

Held: The appeal should be dismissed.

Section 55 of the Expropriation Act applies to an expropriation begun by the Crown before the new statute came into effect. Though s. 55 does not expressly mention the Crown, such a reference was not necessary despite s. 42 of the Interpretation Act since, in view of s. 88 of the Expropriation Act of 1973, the Act was clearly applicable as a whole to expropriations by the Crown. Section 88 provided that the new statute replaced arts. 773 to 797 C.C.P. At the time, arts. 791 to 797 C.C.P. governed expropriations by the Crown. Thus, the Crown in right of the province itself undertook to comply with the provisions of the new statute.

The right which the Crown had to unilaterally discontinue, and which it did not exercise at the time the new statute came into effect, is not a vested right. A vested right is one which exists and produces effects. That does not include a right which could have been exercised but was not, and which is no longer available under the law.

Finally, the case at bar is not one of retroactive legislation but one in which the statute applies immediately. The application of s. 55 to expropriations made before it came into effect does not give it retroactive effect. Section 55 is only intended to remove for the future the right to file a unilateral discontinuance previously enjoyed by appellant. That section has no effect on the right in so far as it was exercised before s. 55 came into effect.

Cases Cited

Gustavson Drilling (1964) Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, 1975 SCC 4, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 271; Acme Village School District (Board of Trustees of) v. Steele‑Smith, 1932 SCC 40, [1933] S.C.R. 47; Bellechasse Hospital v. Pilotte, 1974 SCC 176, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 454, applied; Procureur général du Québec v. Archambault, C.S. Bedford, No. 455‑05‑000105‑78, June 13, 1978, referred to.

Statutes and Regulations Cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1965 (Que.), c. 80, arts. 791 to 797 [rep. 1973 (Que.), c. 38].

Expropriation Act, 1973 (Que.), c. 38, ss. 34, 54, 88, 148 [repl. 1973 (Que.), c. 39, s. 5].

Expropriation Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. E‑24, s. 55 [formerly s. 54 of the Expropriation Act, 1973 (Que.), c. 38].

Interpretation Act, R.S.Q., c. I‑16, ss. 41, 42, 49, 50.

Authors Cited

Baudouin, L. Les aspects généraux du droit public dans la province de Québec, Paris, Dalloz, 1965.

Côté, P. A. The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, Cowansville, Yvon Blais Inc., 1984.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal, 1983 QCCA 2701, [1983] R.D.J. 432, reversing a judgment of the Superior Court authorizing a writ of evocation to be issued. Appeal dismissed.

Marcus Spivock, for the appellant.

Marcel Cinq‑Mars, Q.C., and André Durocher, for the respondents.

English version of the judgment of the Court was delivered by

[1] Chouinard J.‑‑This appeal raises a question of temporal application of the law.

[2] It concerns two judgments of the Court of Appeal relating to the mis en cause expropriated parties.

[3] In 1973 the legislature adopted new expropriation rules applicable to all expropriations authorized by the statutes of Quebec: the Expropriation Act, 1973 (Que.), c. 38.

[4] However, the expropriation of the immovables of the mis en cause dates back to 1970. It was done pursuant to arts. 791 to 797 C.C.P., 1965 (Que.), c. 80, which established special rules for expropriations by the Crown. Under art. 792, depositing a plan and description of the property to be expropriated with the registry office made the government owner of the right "subject only to the obligation of paying the indemnity awarded", and possession of the property vested immediately in the Minister.

[5] Further, art. 797 provided:

797. At any time before the payment of the indemnity, the Minister may declare in writing that the expropriated immoveable is no longer required in whole or in part, and from the deposit of such declaration at the registry office, the immoveable which is not required reverts to the expropriated party, and the indemnity for the expropriation must be fixed or revised accordingly.

[6] In 1979 the Minister in fact deposited such a declaration in respect of the immovables of each of the mis en cause.

[7] Under the new Act the expropriating party can always discontinue. However, it must do so before paying the provisional indemnity required in order to take possession, and it can do so only with the authorization of the Expropriation Tribunal. Section 55 of the Expropriation Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. E‑24, in effect at the time in question, read as follows:

55. The expropriating party may, with the authorization of the tribunal, totally or partially discontinue his suit at any time before payment of the provisional indemnity of expropriation. The order of the tribunal to that effect must be registered by deposit in the registry office where the notice of expropriation had been registered. Subject to the registration of that order, the discontinuance is retroactive from the date of registration of the notice of expropriation.

In the case of partial discontinuance, the tribunal shall fix the amount of the indemnity to which the expropriated party is entitled by taking the discontinuance into account and grant damages, if need be, for the portion of which the expropriating party has discontinued his suit.

[8] The specific question raised by this appeal is whether the government could, as it did in 1979, file a unilateral discontinuance in the registry office in respect of the expropriations made in 1970, or whether to do so it had to obtain the Tribunal's authorization.

[9] Appellant, who was invited to appear with the expropriated parties before the Expropriation Tribunal to determine the indemnities, raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The latter concluded that s. 55 was applicable, dismissed the objection and set a date to hear the matter on the merits.

[10] Appellant then applied to the Superior Court for a writ of evocation.

[11] Essentially, appellant alleged that the Expropriation Tribunal had no jurisdiction to determine the expropriation indemnity because, as the Minister had discontinued, strictly speaking there was no longer any expropriation. Appellant further alleged that the Tribunal erred in deciding that the deed of reconveyance was void; in not taking into account the fact that the replacement of the statute, unlike a repeal, was intended to preserve the rights of the parties; in ignoring the presumption that statutes do not have retroactive effect; in disregarding the fact that this was a question of law, not a question of procedure; and finally, in not following a judgment of the Superior Court, Procureur général du Québec v. Archambault, C.S. (District of Bedford), No. 455‑05‑000105‑78, June 13, 1978, in which Fortin J. held that, like any other statute, the Expropriation Act did not have retroactive effect.

[12] The Superior Court judge found in favour of appellant and authorized a writ of evocation to be issued. He based this finding on s. 42 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.Q., c. I‑16, and on the transitional provision of s. 148 of the Expropriation Act of 1973, supra, as amended by 1973 (Que.), c. 39, s. 5.

[13] The first paragraph of s. 42 of the Interpretation Act provides:

42. No statute shall affect the rights of the Crown, unless they are specially included.

[14] The relevant portions of s. 148 of the Expropriation Act of 1973 read as follows:

148. Expropriations begun before the bodies mentioned in section 147 shall be continued, from September 26 1973, before the Superior Court or, as the case may be, before the tribunal, in accordance with this act, to the extent that it is applicable to them.

The expropriated party may in respect of any such expropriation apply to the tribunal in accordance with article 793 of the Code of Civil Procedure as if such article had not been replaced.

The Superior Court judge wrote:

[TRANSLATION] The Court must determine whether the Crown had special rights here not enjoyed by other expropriating parties, or to use the phrase of Louis‑Philippe Pigeon [Rédaction et interprétation des lois, Québec, éditeur officiel du Québec, 1965, p. 31], whether it enjoyed a special status.

Article 797 is to be found in Section VI, titled "Expropriation by the Crown". The actual wording of art. 797 makes it clear that the Crown enjoys a special status, which may be exercised by the Minister responsible for the expropriation. No other similar article gives such a right to any expropriating party but the Crown.

Accordingly, when the provincial government deposited the notice of expropriation in 1970, art. 797 gave it, and it alone, the right to subsequently discontinue the expropriation by a unilateral act.

Section 55 of the Expropriation Act requires the expropriating party to obtain the Tribunal's authorization for discontinuing an expropriation. If that section applied to an expropriation begun by the Crown before the new statute came into effect, a right of the Crown would be infringed without any express provision. Section 42 of the Interpretation Act does not permit such a construction. The Court finds no specific indication in s. 148 that the new rule will henceforth be applicable to the Crown. At page 32 of his text, Louis‑Philippe Pigeon writes: "When the rule applies, any intention to depart from it must be expressly stated to be applicable to Her Majesty, by referring to her specifically".

The Court accordingly concludes, taking the allegations of the motion as proven, that the Expropriation Tribunal has no jurisdiction to set an indemnity for an expropriation by the Crown when the latter has discontinued the expropriation under the right conferred on it by art. 797 C.C.P.

[15] In a unanimous judgment, 1983 QCCA 2701, [1983] R.D.J. 432, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of the Superior Court and dismissed the motion in evocation. The Court of Appeal considered that s. 55 of the Expropriation Act was applicable to the Crown, which had itself undertaken to comply with the Act. The only question was whether the government had a vested right in the unilateral discontinuance authorized by art. 797 C.C.P., and so whether the discontinuance was simply a matter of procedure as opposed to a substantive right. Jacques J.A. wrote for the Court at p. 434:

[TRANSLATION] A discontinuance before judgment, whether in an expropriation proceeding or otherwise, is a relinquishment of the exercise of a right but it does not entail relinquishing the right itself. Its effect is to return matters to the state they were in before the action. It is part of the procedure governing the exercise of rights. It is not a right which exists independently of the proceedings used to exercise a right, such as the right to expropriate itself, or any other right of action.

A discontinuance is therefore simply a matter of procedure, not a substantive right.

The new Act regulates the way in which the plaintiff, or the expropriating party, may use this procedure. It requires certain formalities to be complied with to prevent the injustices which may sometimes result from discontinuance.

As it is now well established (Pigeon L.‑P., Rédaction et interprétation des lois, Québec, 1965, p. 49) that a new rule of procedure applies to cases pending when it comes into effect, it follows that the discontinuance which the Attorney General of the province wished to make had to be authorized by the Expropriation Tribunal pursuant to s. 55.

[16] From the factums and arguments of the parties, it appears that in order to dispose of this appeal the Court must consider the following four points, which in my opinion cover all the principal arguments made by appellant and respondents:

(1)‑‑whether the Expropriation Act, and in particular s. 55, applies to the Crown;

(2)‑‑the presumption that vested rights may not be adversely affected;

(3)‑‑the presumption against retroactive legislation;

(4)‑‑the finding by the Expropriation Tribunal that the 1979 deed of reconveyance is invalid because it is contrary to the provisions of s. 55.

1‑‑ Applicability of the Expropriation Act, in Particular s. 55, to the Crown

[17] The argument accepted by the Superior Court judge was based on s. 42 of the Interpretation Act, which provides that no statute shall affect the rights of the Crown unless they are specially included.

[18] In the submission of the appellant, the Crown's right is a "right of ownership". Under art. 792 C.C.P., merely depositing a plan and description made the Crown owner of the expropriated property. Under art. 797 C.C.P., the Crown was entitled in its discretion to convey the property back to the expropriated party simply by registering a notice. If the Crown was under a duty to obtain authorization from the Tribunal, its "right of ownership" would be affected.

[19] It is true that s. 55 of the Expropriation Act does not expressly mention the Crown, nor does s. 148.

[20] In addition to this silence, appellant relied on the final words of the first paragraph of s. 148: "to the extent that it is applicable to them".

[21] To weigh the merits of this argument more adequately, I again quote the paragraph in question:

148. Expropriations begun before the bodies mentioned in section 147 shall be continued, from September 26 1973, before the Superior Court or, as the case may be, before the tribunal, in accordance with this act, to the extent that it is applicable to them.

[22] In appellant's submission the words in question clearly show that the legislator did not intend to alter existing rights. Appellant submitted that, in deciding whether the new statute is applicable to expropriations begun before it came into effect, this Court should consider the judgments which the Superior Court and the Expropriation Tribunal can make. If those judgments have an effect retroactive to the time when the new statute was not in effect, and have the consequence of denying rights and creating jurisdiction, the new statute cannot be applied.

[23] Alternatively, s. 55 of the Act makes it a condition of jurisdiction that the discontinuance should be made before the expropriating party pays the provisional indemnity and so before it takes possession and acquires the right of ownership. Appellant submitted that the Code of Civil Procedure does not impose on the Crown an obligation to pay a provisional indemnity before taking possession. The Crown became owner immediately by filing the plan and description of the property to be expropriated. In strictly functional terms, therefore, appellant submitted, s. 55 cannot apply to an expropriation done by the Crown before the legislator passed the new statute.

[24] With respect, this reasoning does not appear to be persuasive. Since the Crown did not have to pay a provisional indemnity, merely a final indemnity, the condition imposed by s. 55 was not broken so long as the final indemnity had not been paid. I see no inconsistency in this which could make s. 55 impossible to apply. The same is true for possession. As the Crown proceeded validly under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and was in possession, s. 55 can still be applied: the only result is that if the Crown was authorized to discontinue it would have to hand over possession as well as ownership.

[25] Respondents gave the words "to the extent that it is applicable to them" a completely different meaning. It appears from reading the first paragraph of s. 148 that the powers in an expropriation proceeding are divided between the Tribunal and the Superior Court. This division differs from that under the Code of Civil Procedure. The way the matter proceeds is also dealt with differently. Respondents simply concluded:

[TRANSLATION] ... what s. 148 means is that the provisions of the new Act are immediately applicable and that an expropriation proceeding will be conducted in the Superior Court or before the Expropriation Tribunal depending on which one has jurisdiction over the stage in question.

[26] Whatever the meaning of these words, and without deciding although I am inclined to think that respondents are correct, I do not believe that they are conclusive.

[27] In my opinion what is conclusive is that the Expropriation Act of 1973 is clearly applicable as a whole to expropriations by the Crown.

[28] Section 88 provides:

88. This act replaces Chapter Three of Title Two of Book Five of the Code of Civil Procedure, comprising articles 773 to 797.

[29] Expropriation by the Crown is included in the articles replaced by the new Act.

[30] Section 34 provides that the Act applies to all expropriations authorized by the laws of the Province of Quebec. These provisions are quite adequate and it was not in any way necessary, in order to comply with s. 42 of the Interpretation Act, to make a special reference to the Crown in s. 55 or s. 148.

[31] I concur with Jacques J.A. of the Court of Appeal, who wrote at p. 434:

[TRANSLATION] It is thus clear that the Crown in right of the province itself undertook to comply with the expropriation procedure of the ordinary law, and that inter alia it undertook to be governed by the provisions of s. 55 of the Act.

[32] Further, appellant did not argue that the new Act, including s. 55, does not apply to an expropriation begun after the Act had come into effect. That at least is what I understand when he writes: [TRANSLATION] "We do not maintain that for ... an expropriation begun on April 1, 1976 the Crown should not follow the new Act". Rather, he argued that the new Act does not apply to expropriations begun before the Act was passed. For the reasons given above, I dismiss this argument in so far as it is based on s. 42 of the Interpretation Act. The fact that the Crown is not specifically mentioned in s. 55 and s. 148 should not have different effects depending on whether the expropriation was begun before or after the new Act came into effect.

2‑‑Presumption that Vested Rights Not Affected

[33] Appellant argued that the right which the government had under the Code of Civil Procedure to unilaterally discontinue was a vested right which could only be abolished by an express provision of the law.

[34] In disposing of this argument, the Court of Appeal considered the question of whether the right was a substantive or merely a procedural one. The Court of Appeal concluded that the discontinuance was merely a matter of procedure. It held that since a rule of procedure applies to pending cases as soon as it comes into effect, the discontinuance had to be authorized by the Tribunal pursuant to s. 55.

[35] With respect, I will examine this question differently because that is not the position taken by the respondents, in this Court at least. Respondents did not argue that the discontinuance was merely a matter of procedure as against a substantive right. Their submission stated:

[TRANSLATION] The Court of Appeal took the position that the discontinuance was merely a matter of procedure. Under the old law, the Crown had the right to discontinue if it saw fit to do so. This right was abolished by the new Act and, like any other expropriated party, the Crown must first obtain the authorization of the Expropriation Tribunal. We submit that this was more than merely a readjustment of procedure. It ceases to be a question of form when the Expropriation Tribunal can reject a discontinuance.

In the past the Crown had an unlimited right. That right is now subject to authorization being given. To the extent that the Tribunal can reject a discontinuance or allow it subject to conditions, the legislative amendment in our view ceases to be purely a matter of form.

[36] In my opinion the right which the Crown had to unilaterally discontinue, and which it had not exercised at the time the new Act came into effect, is not a vested right.

[37] A vested right is one which exists and produces effects. That does not include a right which could have been exercised but was not, and which is no longer available under the law. The courts and scholarly commentators distinguish between a vested right and what they call either a possibility or an option.

[38] Respondents submitted:

[TRANSLATION] In 1970 the Crown acquired only the right to expropriate the land of the mis en cause. As regards the option which it then had to unilaterally discontinue its expropriation, nothing was done to exercise such a right: the option remained merely a possibility.

[39] I consider that the judgment of this Court in Gustavson Drilling (1964) Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, 1975 SCC 4, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 271, supports their argument.

[40] In that case a business wished to deduct from its income for tax purposes expenses which it had incurred earlier, at a time when they could be legally deducted. The amended legislation no longer allowed this.

[41] Dickson J., as he then was, wrote for the majority at p. 282:

The rule is that a statute should not be given a construction that would impair existing rights as regards person or property unless the language in which it is couched requires such a construction: Spooner Oils Ltd. v. Turner Valley Gas Conservation Board, 1933 SCC 86, [1933] S.C.R. 629, at p. 638. The presumption that vested rights are not affected unless the intention of the legislature is clear applies whether the legislation is retrospective or prospective in operation.

[42] Dickson J. went on, at pp. 282‑83:

The burden of the argument on behalf of appellant is that appellant has a continuing and vested right to deduct exploration and drilling expenses incurred by it, yet it must be patent that the Income Tax Acts of 1960 and earlier years conferred no rights in respect of the 1965 and later taxation years .

The mere right existing in the members of the community or any class of them at the date of the repeal of a statute to take advantage of the repealed statute is not a right accrued: Abbott v. Minister of Lands, [1895] A.C. 425, at p. 431; Western Leaseholds Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, 1961 CA EXC 774, [1961] C.T.C. 490 (Exch.); Director of Public Works v. Ho Po Sang, [1961] 2 All E.R. 721 (P.C.).

[43] Applying these principles to the case before the Court, it follows that appellant had no vested right to a unilateral discontinuance. After 1970 and until the new Act came into effect, he could have unilaterally discontinued. At the time appellant wished to discontinue, he had to seek the Tribunal's authorization.

[44] This interpretation of the new Act must still not give it a retroactive effect not expressly authorized by the Act itself, and this leads me to the third point.

3‑‑Presumption Against Retroactive Legislation

[45] The presumption against retroactive legislation is stated as follows in Gustavson Drilling, supra, in which Dickson J. wrote at p. 279:

The general rule is that statutes are not to be construed as having retrospective operation unless such a construction is expressly or by necessary implication required by the language of the Act. An amending enactment may provide that it shall be deemed to have come into force on a date prior to its enactment or it may provide that it is to be operative with respect to transactions occurring prior to its enactment. In those instances the statute operates retrospectively.

[46] Section 50 of the Interpretation Act reflects this principle:

50. No provision of law shall be declaratory or have a retroactive effect, by reason alone of its being enacted in the present tense.

[47] A distinction must be made between the retroactivity of legislation and its immediate effect.

[48] In Les aspects généraux du droit public dans la province de Québec, Paris, Dalloz, 1965, Louis Baudouin writes at p. 197:

[TRANSLATION] New legislation cannot be applied either to immediate effects already produced or to those which, though occurring over an extended period of time since the legal situation was created, yet occurred before the date the legislation came into effect. Allowing this would give a clear retroactive effect to the new legislation.

On the other hand, the new legislation will apply to future effects arising out of these legal situations, which have not yet occurred at the time it came into effect.

[49] In The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, (1984), Pierre‑André Côté writes at pp. 132‑33:

A statute operates in the present when it governs events occurring after its commencement and before its death. According to Roubier, Le droit transitoire (conflit des lois dans le temps), 2d ed., Paris, Dalloz et Sirey, 1960, "immediate and prospective application of the statute should be the rule: from the day of its commencement, the new statute applies to all future effects of both pending and future legal relations".

As a rule, a statute produces its effect in the present, governing events that take place between its commencement and its death. Saying that it produces its effect in the present and is of prospective application amounts to saying that it does not operate prior to its enactment, that is, that it is not retroactive. A second corollary is that the statute applying immediately in the present does not allow for the survival of previous legislation.

This principle is so obvious and self‑explanatory that it rarely appears as such in the case law, but there are numerous examples of its application ...

[50] In Gustavson Drilling, supra, it was held that applying the new provisions of the Income Tax Act to the appellant in respect of expenses incurred before they came into effect was not giving them retroactive effect. Dickson J. wrote at pp. 279‑80:

The effect, so far as appellant is concerned, is to deny for the future a right to deduct enjoyed in the past but the right is not affected as of a time prior to enactment of the amending statute.

[51] Similarly, respondents submitted, s. 55 of the Expropriation Act is intended to remove for the future the right to file a unilateral discontinuance previously enjoyed by appellant. That section has no effect on the right in so far as it was exercised before s. 55 came into effect.

[52] Respondents further cited ss. 41 and 49 of the Interpretation Act:

41. Every provision of a statute, whether such provision be mandatory, prohibitive or penal, shall be deemed to have for its object the remedying of some evil or the promotion of some good.

Such statute shall receive such fair, large and liberal construction as will ensure the attainment of its object and the carrying out of its provisions, according to their true intent, meaning and spirit.

49. The law is ever commanding; and whatever be the tense of the verb or verbs contained in a provision, such provision shall be deemed to be in force at all times and under all circumstances to which it may apply.

[53] Respondents submitted that the purpose of the new Act was to abolish the extraordinary privilege of the Crown to discontinue unilaterally. They wrote:

[TRANSLATION] The abuse which the new Act remedies is the fact that the Crown will now no longer be able to unilaterally discontinue an expropriation. Conversely, the advantage it confers on the expropriated party is that the Expropriation Tribunal will be able to protect his interests by controlling the cases in which the Crown discontinues an expropriation.

[54] Thus, respondents argued, the new Act takes effect immediately.

[55] Respondents' position is supported inter alia by the following two judgments of this Court: Acme Village School District (Board of Trustees of) v. Steele‑Smith, 1932 SCC 40, [1933] S.C.R. 47, and Bellechasse Hospital v. Pilotte, 1974 SCC 176, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 454.

[56] Acme Village School involved s. 157 of the Alberta School Act of 1931 which stated that, except in June of each year, no notice terminating the employment of a teacher could be given by a school board without the prior approval of an inspector. It was held that this provision applied to a notice given after the new Act came into effect with respect to a contract of employment entered into before it.

[57] In Bellechasse Hospital, a board of directors refused to renew the appointment of Dr. Pilotte as a member of the medical staff as of July 31, 1969. The Board was in compliance with internal regulations and private agreements concluded between the parties which expired on July 31, 1969. However, it had not acted in accordance with the new government Regulations adopted pursuant to the Hospitals Act, R.S.Q. 1964, c. 164, which became effective on April 1, 1969. It was held that the new Regulations applied to all contracts, even those entered into before the Regulations came into effect, that the hospital's decision was a breach of those Regulations and that Dr. Pilotte had a good cause of action for damages. De Grandpré J. wrote for the Court at pp. 460‑61:

As Lajoie J.A. points out, the objective of the Hospitals Act and the Regulations is clearly to "unify and standardize organization, administration and operations of hospitals". That objective would not be attained if, after the Order in Council of April 1, 1969 came into effect, different dates were to apply to contractual relations between doctors and hospitals. On the contrary, after that date it was necessary, from the standpoint of discipline as much as of renewal of status, for a single, uniform rule to apply, namely that prescribed by the Regulations. Any other conclusion would necessarily result in recognizing the existence of variations which for an indefinite period would largely render inoperative the legislator's express decision to standardize this whole area of health services. This necessarily leads to two conclusions:

(1) after April 1, 1969 all suspension proceedings had to be in accordance with the provisions of the Regulations;

(2) also after that date, all contracts between doctors and hospitals were to be automatically extended to December 31, 1969, thus enabling the appointment procedure prescribed by the Regulations to be carried out.

[58] I consider that as in Gustavson Drilling, Acme Village School and Bellechasse Hospital the case at bar is one in which the statute applies immediately and not retroactively and that s. 55 of the Expropriation Act required that, in order to discontinue, appellant should obtain the Tribunal's authorization.

4‑‑ Finding by Tribunal that 1979 Deed of Reconveyance is Invalid Because Contrary to Provisions of s. 55

[59] Appellant raised a new ground in this Court. He objected particularly to the following passage from the Tribunal's decision:

[TRANSLATION] For all these reasons, the Tribunal concludes that the reconveyance deed filed with the Richelieu Registry Division at Sorel as No. 178745 and dated March 2, 1979 is invalid because it is contrary to the provisions of s. 55 of the Expropriation Act.

[60] Appellant contended that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the registration of reconveyance notices, and that so long as these remained in the registry office the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to determine indemnities. It is true to say that the Tribunal's finding can have no effect on registrations: that is not within its jurisdiction; but the Tribunal did not purport to exercise such jurisdiction. It did not direct that the deed should be struck out, and this will have to be done if necessary at the request of appellant or by an order of a competent tribunal. The passage cited above is only a means of expressing the finding of the Expropriation Tribunal. It simply held, correctly, that s. 55 was applicable to an expropriation dating from before it came into effect.

[61] I would dismiss the appeal with costs.

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Solicitors for the appellant: Roy, Poulin & Associés, Montréal.

Solicitors for the respondents: Martineau, Walker, Montréal.