Josée Ferrari

The appellant operated a club where members and guests engaged in consensual group sex.

He was convicted of keeping a common bawdy-house for the practice of acts of indecency under s. 210(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction, establishing a new harm-based test for criminal indecency.

The Court held that the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct causes harm or presents a significant risk of harm to individuals or society, and that the harm is of a degree incompatible with the proper functioning of society.

The Court found no evidence that the consensual acts behind closed doors caused such harm.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the trial judge committed no error in finding the necessary criminal intent.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

At his trial, the Crown cross-examined him extensively on incriminating statements he had made while testifying at his brother's separate trial for the same murder, where he had invoked section 5 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the cross-examination violated section 13 of the Charter because there was a realistic danger that the prior testimony could be used to incriminate him, not merely to test his credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, co-owner of a bar, was charged with keeping a common bawdy-house after nude dancers allowed patrons to touch their breasts and buttocks in a cubicle.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant, finding the acts were not indecent.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court restored the acquittal, holding that the trial judge did not err in law in his assessment of the standard of tolerance regarding the nature of the touching and the circumstances in the cubicle.

The appellant appealed his convictions for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder, challenging the admissibility of the murder weapon found after statements he made following prolonged detention.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as of right, substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal of Quebec.

The appellant appealed a stay of proceedings order rendered by the Quebec Court of Appeal proprio motu, which set aside his conviction for armed robbery but deprived him of an acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the evidence could not allow a reasonable jury properly instructed to find the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The stay of proceedings was set aside and an acquittal was entered.

The applicant sought reconsideration of an order refusing leave to appeal after a provincial court of appeal set aside his conviction on fresh evidence but entered a stay of proceedings for abuse of process rather than an acquittal or new trial.

The majority held that, in exceptional circumstances, the Court may reconsider a leave refusal under Rule 7 despite Rule 51(12).

It further held that a stay order made under s. 686(8) of the Criminal Code is ancillary and divisible from the judgment setting aside the conviction, and is therefore appealable by leave under s. 40(1) of the Supreme Court Act notwithstanding s. 40(3).

Leave to appeal was granted.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that allowed the accused's appeal and quashed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's decision.

As the Crown did not request a new trial in the event of a dismissal, the acquittal was upheld.

The accused was charged with second degree murder after shooting two men involved in drug trafficking who had repeatedly threatened her.

At trial, the judge instructed the jury on self-defence but, in answering a jury question, limited the relevance of previous threats to determining whether an assault occurred on the night of the shooting.

The accused was convicted, but the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that previous threats were also highly relevant to the accused's reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm and her belief that she could not otherwise preserve herself.

The appellants were charged with keeping a common bawdy-house for the purpose of the practice of indecent acts.

Nude dancers performed in individual cubicles for clients, who were permitted to undress and masturbate during the performance, subject to a strict 'no touching' rule.

The trial judge acquitted the appellants, finding the acts did not exceed the community standard of tolerance.

The Court of Appeal reversed the acquittals and entered convictions after allowing the Crown to amend the charge to include prostitution.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittals, holding that the late amendment caused irreparable prejudice and that the acts, performed in a relatively private setting between consenting adults with no physical contact, did not exceed the contemporary community standard of tolerance.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the sentencing for the use of a firearm during the commission of an offence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that there is no ambiguity in section 83 of the Criminal Code and agreeing with the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in R. v. MacLean that penalties imposed under this section must be served consecutively.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder by a judge sitting without a jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal by a majority.

One of the majority judges stated that 'The jury did not believe him', raising the possibility that the judge mistakenly believed it was a jury trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and directed that the appeal be heard de novo by the Court of Appeal in the interests of the proper administration of justice.

The applicant, convicted of murder, filed a motion for a rehearing of an application for leave to appeal that had been previously denied.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the motion, holding that it does not entertain successive applications for leave to appeal.

Furthermore, the Court clarified that Rule 61 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada only grants discretionary authority to order a rehearing in an appeal, not in an application for leave to appeal.