D. Fletcher Dawson

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following an incident where the complainant allegedly passed out after consuming alcohol, Ecstasy, and GHB.

The Crown's case relied on a witness who observed the appellant and the complainant in a bedroom.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in his charge to the jury on the elements of consent and knowledge of lack of consent, and in his answers to jury questions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the jury was not properly instructed on the crucial issues of the complainant's lack of consent and the appellant's knowledge of her lack of consent, and that the trial judge's answers to the jury's questions were incorrect and unresponsive.

The appellant police officer appealed findings of discreditable conduct and corrupt practice arising from guilty pleas entered at a disciplinary hearing.

He sought to withdraw the pleas, arguing they were the result of undue pressure and incompetent representation by his agent, who admitted facts the appellant did not accept.

The Commission admitted the appellant's affidavit as new evidence to assess the validity of the hearing process.

Finding that the agent had admitted key facts without the appellant's agreement and that the Hearing Officer would not have accepted the pleas had this been known, the Commission concluded the appellant was inadequately represented.

The appeal was allowed and the matters remitted for a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting a two-and-a-half-year-old child.

At trial, the Crown did not call the child to testify, but instead introduced out-of-court statements made by the child to others.

The trial judge admitted the statements without conducting a formal inquiry into whether it was necessary to rely on hearsay rather than calling the child.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the trial judge erred in failing to make a formal finding of necessity, the error did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The uncontradicted expert evidence established that the child would have been traumatized by testifying and lacked testimonial competence, meaning a trial judge would inevitably have found the necessity requirement met.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with murder.

At trial, the Crown relied on hearsay evidence of telephone calls made by the deceased to her mother on the night of her death, as well as character evidence suggesting the accused was a drug smuggler.

The accused was convicted, but the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding the hearsay and character evidence inadmissible.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal.

The Court held that while the first two telephone calls were admissible under the principled approach to hearsay based on necessity and reliability, the third call lacked a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness.

Furthermore, the character evidence was highly prejudicial and irrelevant to the murder charge, warranting a new trial.

The appellants appealed from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal that allowed the Crown's appeal, set aside their acquittals, and ordered new trials on charges of conspiracy to traffic in narcotics.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's decision.

The appellant sought a stay of proceedings on the basis of alleged unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, raising foundational questions about which criminal courts may grant remedies under s. 24(1).

The Supreme Court held, by majority, that a preliminary inquiry judge is not a court of competent jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies because that tribunal's authority is confined by the Criminal Code and does not include the remedial powers sought.

The Court further held that Charter remedies in criminal matters must generally fit within the existing procedural structure of the criminal process, with superior courts retaining jurisdiction in appropriate circumstances and appeals remaining governed by statutory routes.

The appeal was dismissed, although strong dissents would have found a s. 11(b) breach and stayed the proceedings.