Gérard V. La Forest

The appellant was discharged at a preliminary inquiry after the judge applied a 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard to the identification evidence.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari to quash the discharge, which was upheld by the Court of Appeal.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court held that certiorari is available to review a discharge at a preliminary inquiry only for jurisdictional error.

The Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by applying the wrong standard of proof, thereby arrogating to himself the function of the trial court to determine guilt or innocence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was charged with second-degree murder and convicted by a jury of the included offence of manslaughter.

The appellant appealed the conviction, but the Crown did not appeal the acquittal for murder.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the original charge of second-degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Court of Appeal exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering a new trial on the murder charge without a Crown appeal.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered on the charge of manslaughter.

The accused, a 16-year-old male, was convicted of second degree murder after fatally stabbing a man who allegedly made uninvited homosexual advances.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury that the 'ordinary person' in the objective test for provocation must be of the same age and sex as the accused.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that while age and sex may be relevant contextual factors for the jury to consider, it is not a mandatory requirement of law for the trial judge to specifically instruct the jury to ascribe the accused's age and sex to the ordinary person.

The parties, members of an Indian Band, separated.

The appellant wife was granted interim possession of the matrimonial home situated on the Band Reserve under section 77 of the provincial Family Relations Act.

The respondent husband had acquired the land by way of a Certificate of Possession under section 20 of the federal Indian Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that section 77 of the Family Relations Act is not applicable to a family residence located on Indian reserved lands, as it conflicts with the provisions of the Indian Act.

The appellant and respondent, members of an Indian Band, divorced.

The appellant sought a division of family assets under the provincial Family Relations Act, specifically claiming an interest in properties on the reserve for which the respondent held Certificates of Possession under the Indian Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that provincial laws regarding the right of ownership and possession of immovable property cannot apply to Indian reserve lands, as this falls under exclusive federal jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the provincial provisions were not referentially incorporated by section 88 of the Indian Act due to actual conflict with the federal statute.

However, the Court affirmed that the appellant could be awarded compensation in lieu of a division of the reserve properties, as a compensation order does not conflict with the Indian Act.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder by a judge sitting without a jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal by a majority.

One of the majority judges stated that 'The jury did not believe him', raising the possibility that the judge mistakenly believed it was a jury trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and directed that the appeal be heard de novo by the Court of Appeal in the interests of the proper administration of justice.

The respondents sold a plot of land containing apartment buildings for $5,850,000, allocating $5,100,000 to the land and $750,000 to the buildings and equipment.

The Minister of National Revenue reassessed the allocation under section 68 of the Income Tax Act, adding recaptured capital cost allowances to the respondents' incomes.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that section 68 does not apply to a transaction involving only the disposition of property, as it requires the disposition of property and 'something else' other than property.

The appeal was dismissed, and the parties' original allocation was upheld.

Bell Canada appealed a taxation order confirming costs awarded by the CRTC to public interest interveners in a rate hearing.

Bell argued that because the interveners received government funding or were represented by retained counsel, they did not actually incur expenses, and thus the award violated the principle of indemnification.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the word 'costs' carries a general connotation of indemnification, the CRTC is not bound by the strict rules applicable in courts and may take a broad view to encourage informed public participation.

The respondent was charged with assaulting a peace officer in the execution of his duty after an altercation occurred when a police officer entered an apartment without a warrant to arrest him for attempted car theft.

The trial judge directed a verdict of acquittal, finding the arrest unlawful, which was upheld by the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that a police officer may make an arrest on private premises without a warrant if the criteria of the Criminal Code and the common law standards enunciated in Eccles v. Bourque are met.

A real estate broker appealed from a judgment denying commission after a purchaser entered into an agreement of purchase and sale, paid a deposit, and then refused to close.

The majority held that the listing agreement governed the broker's entitlement and required a completed sale, absent vendor default, before commission became payable.

Because the purchaser was unwilling to complete the transaction and the vendor had not reneged, the broker failed to establish entitlement to commission or to the deposit.

The appeal was dismissed, with a dissent concluding that procurement of a valid offer was sufficient to trigger commission.

The appellants were convicted of assaulting peace officers after being tried jointly on separate informations.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, quashed the convictions, and ordered a new trial, holding that a trial judge lacks jurisdiction to try separate informations simultaneously.

The Court also ordered that no civil proceedings be taken against the trial judge.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal that allowed the respondent's motion to dismiss the appellant's appeal from an order of the Expropriation Tribunal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, adopting the reasoning of Mayrand J. without expressing an opinion on section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal was set aside and the motion to dismiss the appeal was disallowed.

The appellant physician performed surgery on the respondent in 1969.

In 1979, a retained suture was discovered and removed.

The respondent brought a medical malpractice action.

Under the legislation in force in 1969, the limitation period expired one year after the termination of medical services.

In 1974, new legislation introduced a discoverability rule.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the new limitation period did not apply retrospectively to revive a claim that was already statute-barred under the previous legislation.

The appeal was allowed and the action was declared barred.

The appellants, members of the Commission de police du Québec, conducted an inquiry and submitted a report censuring the respondent's conduct.

The respondent sued for exemplary damages, alleging the appellants acted without jurisdiction and breached natural justice by failing to give him an opportunity to be heard.

The appellants moved to dismiss the action, claiming absolute immunity under the Police Act and the Act respecting public inquiry commissions.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the commissioners enjoy the same absolute immunity as superior court judges for acts done in the execution of their duty, which includes holding an inquiry and submitting a report.

The appeal was allowed and the action for damages dismissed.

The appellant was acquitted at trial on charges of rape and robbery.

The Ontario Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge misdirected the jury by applying the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to individual items of evidence rather than the totality of the evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal's conclusion and order for a new trial.

The appellant was found guilty of both impaired driving and driving over .08, but the trial judge only registered a conviction for driving over .08.

After an acquittal at the Court of Queen's Bench, the Court of Appeal remitted the matter to determine if an impaired driving conviction should be entered.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that not registering a conviction is equivalent to entering a stay, and remitted the matter to the Provincial Court judge to consider whether to register a conviction and impose a sentence.

An application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed.

The appellant, a federal public servant, was discharged after engaging in a sustained and highly visible public campaign criticizing major government policies, including metric conversion and the Charter of Rights.

He grieved his discharge, but an adjudicator upheld it, finding his conduct impaired his ability to perform his duties and violated his duty of loyalty.

The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed his application for judicial review.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while public servants have some freedom of speech, it is not absolute and must be balanced against the need for an impartial and effective public service.

The Court found the adjudicator did not err in inferring impairment of effectiveness from the extreme nature of the appellant's public criticisms.

The Crown appealed a decision regarding the applicable tax rate for the respondent corporation, which depended on whether it was controlled by another company, Validor Limited, under s. 39(4) of the Income Tax Act.

Following a corporate reorganization, voting rights were split equally between Validor and a minority shareholder group, but Validor retained the right to wind up the company and receive the majority of the assets.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that control in the real sense was not surrendered by Validor, as it retained the critical right to terminate the corporate existence and distribute the assets in its favour.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal which allowed the Crown's appeal from the acquittal of the accused on a charge of fraud.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the conclusion and reasons of the Court of Appeal for Ontario regarding the admissibility of computer-produced bank statements under the Canada Evidence Act.