Douglas J. A. Rutherford

The Governor in Council referred questions to the Supreme Court of Canada regarding whether the Minister of Justice's decision to extradite a fugitive to the United States without seeking assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed violated sections 7 or 12 of the Charter.

The fugitive was facing multiple murder charges in California.

The Court held that the extradition without such assurances did not violate the Charter, answering both reference questions in the negative.

The appellant challenged his extradition to the United States after a murder conviction and exposure to the death penalty, arguing that surrender without assurances under Article 6 of the Canada-U.S. Extradition Treaty violated ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The majority held that s. 12 did not directly apply to extradition because any punishment would be imposed by the foreign state, and that the proper inquiry under s. 7 was whether surrender would sufficiently shock the Canadian conscience or be fundamentally unacceptable.

Applying that framework, the Court concluded that extradition to a U.S. jurisdiction with substantial procedural protections for brutal murder offences did not violate fundamental justice, and that s. 25 of the Extradition Act validly left the matter to ministerial discretion.

The Court also held that natural justice did not require an oral hearing before the Minister.

The appeal was dismissed and the extradition order confirmed.

The appellant, a Canadian citizen, fled to Canada after being acquitted of a federal kidnapping charge in the United States.

She faced extradition to Ohio on a state charge of child stealing arising from the same incident.

She argued that extradition would violate her rights against double jeopardy under sections 7 and 11(h) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, ruling that section 11(h) does not apply to extradition hearings because the Charter cannot govern foreign criminal proceedings.

While section 7 applies to the Canadian executive's decision to surrender a fugitive, the surrender in this case did not violate the principles of fundamental justice because the federal and state offences contained different elements.

The Republic of Argentina appealed a decision discharging the respondent from extradition proceedings due to a 17-month delay.

The extradition judge had found the delay violated the respondent's right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 11(b) does not apply to extradition hearings, which are not trials but proceedings to determine if there is sufficient evidence to surrender a fugitive.

The Court also found no abuse of process or violation of s. 7 of the Charter, noting the delay was largely due to the foreign authorities and not attributable to Canadian officials.

Furthermore, the Court held that an extradition judge is not a court of competent jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies.

The appellants were convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine based on evidence obtained from a room monitoring device.

Police officers had entered the residence of one of the appellants without consent to install the device, acting under an authorization that did not explicitly permit trespass.

The appellants argued the trespass rendered the interceptions not 'lawfully made' under the Criminal Code, making the evidence inadmissible.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the statutory scheme for electronic surveillance implicitly authorizes covert entry to install such devices when a judge grants an authorization.

The evidence was therefore lawfully obtained and admissible, and the appeals were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to import and traffic heroin.

At trial, a newspaper clipping about the heroin trade in Pakistan found in his bedroom was admitted into evidence.

The appellant appealed, arguing the clipping was irrelevant and highly prejudicial, merely showing a disposition to commit the offence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the unexplained presence of the clipping supported a logical inference that the appellant had an interest in heroin sources, which was relevant to the charge of importing.

The Court found the trial judge did not err in exercising his discretion to admit the evidence despite its low probative value.