John P. Nelligan

In an intended class proceeding arising from a union seniority integration dispute following an airline merger declaration, the appellants sought damages personally against other union members for alleged breach of the union constitution.

The court held that although union constitutions may be analyzed contractually, the contractual bond runs between each member and the membership as a whole, not as one-on-one contracts supporting damages claims against individual members.

The appeal from summary judgment dismissing the contract claim was therefore dismissed.

The cross-appeal was also dismissed because the pleaded conspiracy and unlawful interference claims remained legally distinct and disclosed a genuine issue for trial.

These consolidated appeals concerned the constitutionality of a federal statutory prohibition on partisan political work by public servants.

The Court held that legislation implementing a constitutional convention of public service neutrality remains ordinary legislation and is subject to Charter review.

The impugned provision infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b), was sufficiently precise to be a limit prescribed by law, but failed the s. 1 proportionality analysis because it applied overbroadly to all public servants regardless of role or level.

The Court declined to preserve the provision through case-by-case reading down and left standing the declaration that the impugned provision was of no force or effect except as it applied to deputy heads.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by the negligence of her husband, who was driving a car owned by her father.

At the time of the accident, the Married Woman's Property Act barred spouses from suing each other in tort, and the Insurance Act excluded insurer liability for bodily injury to a spouse.

These provisions were repealed by the Family Law Reform Act, 1975 before the action was commenced.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the repeals affected substantive rights, not merely procedural rules, and therefore did not operate retrospectively.

The appeal by the insurance company was allowed, and the actions against the husband and the insurer were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Federal Court of Appeal decision setting aside a Public Service Staff Relations Board order regarding designated employees in the Air Traffic Control Group.

The Board had assumed authority under s. 79 of the Public Service Staff Relations Act to determine the level of air services necessary for public safety in the event of a strike.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's task under s. 79 is solely to determine whether the performance of stipulated duties by designated employees is necessary for public safety, not to determine the level of service to be provided.

The appellant, an air traffic controller, sought to appeal the appointment of another candidate to a position he had applied for.

The Public Service Commission determined under s. 21(b) of the Public Service Employment Act that the appellant's opportunity for advancement had not been prejudicially affected, denying him the right to appeal the appointment.

The appellant applied to the Federal Court of Appeal to review this decision under s. 28 of the Federal Court Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Federal Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction because the Commission's opinion was administrative in nature and not required by law to be made on a judicial or quasi-judicial basis.

The appellant, a unilingual air traffic controller, was involuntarily transferred from Montreal to Cornwall after his position was designated bilingual.

He accepted the transfer under protest to avoid dismissal and sought a declaration that he was entitled to remain in his former position.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Public Service Official Languages Exclusion Order protected the appellant from being removed from his position solely for lacking bilingual capacity.

The Court further held that the appellant's rights were not extinguished by accepting the transfer under protest, as employees should not be forced to risk disciplinary action to preserve their legal rights.