Peter Martin

The appellant was convicted of robbery and attempted murder.

The Crown introduced statements made by the purchaser of the getaway car to the vendors, which matched characteristics of the appellant (owning a large pregnant dog and working as a chain-link fencer).

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the statements were hearsay if used for their truth, they had probative value regarding identity.

The Court established a two-stage procedure for admitting such statements as admissions, requiring a preliminary determination of authenticity on a balance of probabilities.

Although the trial judge erred by not following this procedure, the Court found no substantial miscarriage of justice given the strength of the other circumstantial evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

At trial, tape recorded conversations between the appellant and an undercover police officer were admitted into evidence without objection.

Shortly after the trial, the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in R. v. Hebert, which held that statements elicited by undercover officers violate the right to silence under s. 7 of the Charter.

The appellant appealed his conviction on this basis.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial solely on the ground of the alleged violation of the appellant's s. 7 Charter rights.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder after a victim was beaten to death with a baseball bat over a bounced cheque.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a first degree murder conviction can be sustained by combining the mens rea of intending to cause bodily harm likely to cause death (s. 212(a)(ii)) with the requirement of planning and deliberation (s. 214(2)).

However, the Court ordered a new trial because the Crown improperly cross-examined a defence alibi witness using intercepted private communications without first proving the interceptions were lawful under s. 178.16 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed a conviction for first degree murder from the Alberta Court of Appeal.

During the course of the trial, the appellant's initial counsel withdrew, and the trial judge denied an adjournment to obtain new counsel.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial, holding that under the particular circumstances of the case, the interests of justice would best be served by ordering a new trial.

The appellant was charged with two counts of robbery and tried separately on each count.

At the first trial, statements made by the appellant were ruled inadmissible following a voir dire, and he was acquitted.

At the second trial before a different judge, the statements were ruled admissible despite the appellant's argument that the Crown was estopped from relitigating the issue.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the doctrine of issue estoppel does not apply to interlocutory findings on a voir dire regarding the admissibility of statements, as such findings lack finality and are not fundamental to the substantive decision of guilt or innocence.

The appellants, operators of sugar refineries in eastern Canada, were charged with conspiracy to enhance the price of sugar unreasonably and to lessen competition unduly under the Combines Investigation Act.

The trial judge acquitted them, finding that while there was a tacit agreement to maintain traditional market shares, it was not intended to lessen competition unduly but rather to avoid a price war.

The Court of Appeal reversed the acquittal on the second count.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittals, holding that the trial judge did not err in law in concluding that the Crown failed to prove an agreement to lessen competition unduly.

The Court affirmed that conscious parallelism or a tacit agreement to maintain market shares does not necessarily amount to an undue lessening of competition.