Gérard V. La Forest

The appellant was convicted of wilfully setting fire to material likely to cause a building to catch fire under s. 434(a) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found the appellant acted recklessly by burning a large package of clothing in a small fireplace using gasoline while intoxicated, and leaving the fire unattended.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant's actions met the standard for wilfulness under either an objective or subjective test.

The appellant elected to be tried by judge and jury for a narcotics offence but failed to appear for jury selection and the commencement of his trial.

The trial judge ruled that under s. 526.1 of the Criminal Code, the appellant lost his right to a jury trial because he did not have a legitimate excuse for his absence.

The appellant was convicted by a judge alone.

He appealed, arguing that s. 526.1 violated his right to a jury trial under s. 11(f) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal.

The majority held that while s. 526.1 infringes s. 11(f), it is a reasonable limit demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter because it protects the administration of justice and public respect for the criminal trial process.

The appellant newspaper challenged Alberta legislation restricting publication of details from matrimonial proceedings and pre-trial civil materials.

The Supreme Court of Canada held, by majority, that s. 30(1) and (2) infringed freedom of expression and were not justified under s. 1 because the restrictions were overly broad and insufficiently tailored to privacy and fair trial objectives.

The court emphasized the constitutional importance of the open court principle and the press's role in informing the public about judicial proceedings.

The majority did not find it necessary to decide the s. 15 issue.

The respondent, a fire fighter, was subjected to mandatory retirement at age 62 pursuant to a collective agreement.

He filed a complaint alleging age discrimination under the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code.

The Board of Inquiry found discrimination, but the Court of Queen's Bench reversed this decision.

The Court of Appeal restored the Board's decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the mandatory retirement policy was a reasonable occupational requirement, applying the principles established in a companion case.

The respondent, a Chief Fire Prevention Officer, was mandatorily retired at age 60 pursuant to a collective agreement.

He filed a human rights complaint alleging age discrimination.

The Board of Inquiry found the mandatory retirement was a reasonable occupational qualification under the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, applying the Etobicoke test.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that individualized testing should have been considered and that the union violated the Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, restoring the Board's decision that the mandatory retirement policy was justified and that the union did not discriminate.

The respondent owners hired contractors to build a retaining wall.

The contractors obtained a building permit from the appellant municipality based on a rudimentary and inadequate sketch.

The municipality issued the permit but relied on on-site inspections to ensure compliance.

The owners and contractors failed to notify the municipality when the project reached the stage requiring inspection.

The wall later cracked and collapsed, causing damage.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the municipality owed a duty of care to the owner-builders, despite their failure to give notice, because the municipality had issued a permit based on an obviously deficient design.

Liability was apportioned 70% to the municipality and 30% to the owners.

The appellant was severely injured and his daughter killed when a boulder fell onto their car on a provincial highway.

He sued the province for negligent highway maintenance.

The trial judge and Court of Appeal dismissed the action, finding the province's system of rock slope inspections was a policy decision immune from tort liability.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the province owed a duty of care to highway users and that the manner and frequency of inspections were operational decisions, not true policy decisions.

A new trial was ordered to determine if the province met the requisite standard of care.

The appellants' basement was flooded and sustained substantial damage due to a blocked storm sewer operated by the respondent municipality.

The trial judge allowed the appellants' claim in nuisance and under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.

The Court of Appeal reversed the decision, finding no negligence and applying the defence of statutory authority.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that while Rylands v. Fletcher did not apply, the flooding constituted an actionable nuisance.

The Court found that the defence of statutory authority was not available to the municipality, as the authorizing legislation was permissive and the municipality failed to establish that the nuisance was the inevitable consequence of its statutory mandate.

The accused was charged with theft and his preliminary inquiry was scheduled 15 months after the charge was laid, largely to accommodate the investigating officer's schedule.

The accused brought an application before a superior court judge seeking a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The superior court granted the stay, but the Court of Appeal set it aside.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the superior court properly exercised its jurisdiction to hear the application and that the 15-month delay was unreasonable, violating the accused's s. 11(b) rights.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, which had allowed the accused's appeal and granted a stay of proceedings due to an 18-month delay between arrest and trial, finding an infringement of section 11(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal in a brief oral judgment, noting that provincial courts of appeal are generally in a better position to assess the reasonableness of institutional limitations and resources.

The Court found no reason to disagree with the result reached by the Court of Appeal based on the particular circumstances of the case.

The appellant appealed as of right from a judgment of the Alberta Court of Appeal that set aside his acquittal on a charge of robbery and ordered a new trial.

The issue was whether the trial judge erred in excluding from evidence the money seized from the accused and his statement to the police under section 24 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error on the part of the Court of Appeal.

The appellant, who was 18 weeks pregnant, decided to terminate her pregnancy after separating from the respondent.

The respondent obtained an interlocutory injunction preventing the abortion, arguing that the foetus had a right to life under the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms and the Civil Code, and that he had a right to veto the abortion as the potential father.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and set aside the injunction, holding that a foetus is not a 'human being' under the Quebec Charter and does not possess juridical personality under the Civil Code.

The Court also found no legal basis for a potential father's right to veto a woman's decision to have an abortion.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder after a victim was beaten to death with a baseball bat over a bounced cheque.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a first degree murder conviction can be sustained by combining the mens rea of intending to cause bodily harm likely to cause death (s. 212(a)(ii)) with the requirement of planning and deliberation (s. 214(2)).

However, the Court ordered a new trial because the Crown improperly cross-examined a defence alibi witness using intercepted private communications without first proving the interceptions were lawful under s. 178.16 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant, an off-duty serviceman in civilian dress, was found in possession of cocaine outside the military base.

He was convicted by a military tribunal for possession of a narcotic under the Narcotic Control Act and the National Defence Act.

He appealed on the basis that the military tribunal lacked jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, agreeing with the Court Martial Appeal Court that there was no error in the result.

Appeal from an order permitting amendment of pleadings in litigation arising from alleged impacts of railway construction on river habitat and asserted Aboriginal and Indian Act rights.

The appellants argued the proposed amended pleadings were defective because the claims were communal in nature and could not be advanced as personal actions by members of Nations.

The Court held that authority to bring the claims and the personal entitlement of members were questions of fact or mixed fact and law best determined by the trial judge.

The appeal was dismissed and the amendments were allowed to stand.

The appellant applied for a re-hearing to vary a previous judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada regarding the Social Service Tax.

The Court granted the application and varied the judgment to include prejudgment interest at the District Registrar's rate from the date of the several remittances to March 15, 1984, and postjudgment interest for the period following March 15, 1984.

The appellant was awarded costs of the re-hearing.

The appellants appealed from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal allowing the Crown's appeal from their acquittal on charges of manslaughter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that under the established rules for directed verdicts, the Court of Appeal did not err in ordering a new trial.

The employer, Paccar, terminated its collective agreement with the union and, after negotiations reached an impasse, unilaterally imposed new terms and conditions of employment.

The union complained to the Labour Relations Board, which held that the employer had the authority to unilaterally alter terms after expiry, subject to the duty to bargain in good faith.

The British Columbia Supreme Court and Court of Appeal quashed the Board's decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Board's decision was not patently unreasonable and that the courts must show curial deference to the specialized tribunal's policy choices.

The Court also held that the Board had standing to make submissions defending the reasonableness of its decision.

The appellant appealed as of right from a British Columbia Court of Appeal decision that allowed a Crown appeal from an acquittal on a charge of criminal negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle causing death and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the trial judge misdirected the jury on causation.

The Court declined to rule on the admissibility of the blood test, leaving that determination to the judge at the new trial in light of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.

The respondent pleaded guilty to having care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

He was subsequently charged with wilfully failing to comply with a probation order requiring him to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.

At trial, he testified he did not know he was breaking the law because he believed the car could not be started.

The trial judge acquitted him of the breach of probation charge, finding he lacked the requisite mens rea.

The Crown appealed.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the offence of wilfully failing to comply with a probation order requires its own mens rea, and an honest belief that one is not committing the underlying offence negates the wilful intent required for a breach.