Gérard V. La Forest

The appellants were charged with counselling bingo licensees to violate the terms and conditions of their licences, contrary to the Criminal Code.

They challenged the constitutionality of the Code provisions, arguing they constituted an improper delegation of criminal law power to the provinces and created an invalid discretionary regulatory regime.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions were not an improper delegation of legislative power, but rather a valid exercise of the criminal law power that incorporated provincial legislation by reference or limited the reach of the criminal law.

The Court also found that the non-publication of the licence terms and conditions did not violate the Charter.

The appellant wrote anonymous letters to three cheerleaders threatening to rape them.

He was acquitted at trial on the basis that a threat to rape did not necessarily constitute a threat to cause serious bodily harm under s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal and entered convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that 'serious bodily harm' includes psychological harm and that a threat to rape, viewed objectively in its context, constitutes a threat to cause serious bodily harm.

The appellant railway company appealed a decision upholding a damages award for negligent misrepresentation.

The respondent industrial caterers had entered into a contract based on an inaccurate estimate of the number of meals required, resulting in a substantial loss.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge was not bound by a previous appellate finding regarding whether the respondents would have bid at a higher price.

The Court affirmed that the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that the plaintiff would have entered into a different contract on other terms, and since the appellant failed to prove this, the respondents were entitled to recover their full loss on the contract.

The appellant lawyer was subject to disciplinary proceedings by the provincial law society.

He challenged the constitutionality of a provision in the Law Society Act that allowed the society to award costs of an investigation against a lawyer found guilty of professional misconduct, arguing it created a pecuniary interest and a reasonable apprehension of bias violating section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the costs provision did not contravene the principles of fundamental justice, as the recouped costs were reimbursements for expenses, not profits, and any pecuniary interest of the committee members was too remote to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appeals concerned the constitutionality of the former rape-shield provisions in Criminal Code ss. 276 and 277, which restricted defence use of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct in sexual offence prosecutions.

The Court held that s. 276 violated ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter because its blanket exclusion could bar relevant defence evidence whose probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, and that the provision was not saved by s. 1.

Section 277, which barred sexual reputation evidence to support or attack credibility, was upheld as targeting an illegitimate use of evidence.

The Court also held that preliminary inquiry judges lacked jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of the impugned provisions, so the appeals from the committals nevertheless failed and the matters were to proceed to trial.

The Attorney General for Ontario brought an action against the Bear Island Foundation after cautions were registered against unceded land on behalf of the Temagami Band of Indians.

The Foundation counterclaimed for a declaration of quiet title based on aboriginal rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada found that while the Indians exercised sufficient occupation to establish an aboriginal right, this right was surrendered by subsequent arrangements adhering to the Robinson-Huron Treaty in exchange for annuities and a reserve.

Although the Crown breached its fiduciary obligations under this agreement, the aboriginal right was nonetheless extinguished.

The appeal was dismissed.

The federal government introduced legislation to limit its cost-sharing obligations to certain provinces under the Canada Assistance Plan.

British Columbia referred questions to the Court of Appeal regarding whether the federal government had the authority to unilaterally limit its obligations and whether the doctrine of legitimate expectations prevented the introduction of such legislation without provincial consent.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the federal government had the authority to amend the Plan, as parliamentary sovereignty allows Parliament to amend its statutes.

The Court further held that the doctrine of legitimate expectations does not apply to the legislative process and cannot create substantive rights to veto proposed legislation.

A public sector employee challenged a Rand formula dues check-off clause and related statutory provisions, arguing that compulsory union dues used for political and social causes violated the Charter.

The Court held that the Charter applied because the dues obligation arose through government action involving a Crown-controlled public sector employer.

A majority dismissed the appeal, concluding there was no infringement of freedom of expression and no basis for relief under freedom of association, although the judges differed significantly on whether s. 2(d) included protection against compelled association and whether any prima facie infringement occurred.

The decision is a leading authority on Charter application to public sector labour relations, compelled association, and the constitutional treatment of mandatory union dues.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of dangerous driving simpliciter, having been acquitted of the more serious charges of dangerous driving causing death and bodily injury.

During sentencing, the trial judge considered the deaths and injuries resulting from the collision, and the Court of Appeal upheld the sentence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that a sentencing judge is bound by the express and implied factual implications of a jury's verdict.

Because the jury unambiguously negated the factor of causation by acquitting on the more serious charges, the sentencing judge erred in considering the consequences of death and bodily injury.

The sentence was reduced to six months' imprisonment.

The Director of Soldier Settlement appealed a decision regarding the ownership of mines and minerals in a parcel of land in Alberta.

The land was originally sold by the Soldier Settlement Board in 1928, with the Soldier Settlement Act reserving mines and minerals to the federal Crown.

However, the transfer was registered under the provincial Land Titles Act without the reservation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mines and minerals were transferred to the Province of Alberta under the 1930 Natural Resources Transfer Agreement.

As a result, the respondent executors, as bona fide purchasers for value, held valid title to the mines and minerals under the provincial Land Titles Act, and the appeal was dismissed.

The respondent was seriously injured when he slipped and fell on the icy parking area of a rural farmhouse rented by the appellants.

The parking area had not been salted or sanded, which the appellants argued was consistent with local custom.

The respondent sued for damages under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The trial judge found the appellants liable, and the Court of Appeal dismissed their appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants breached their statutory duty of care under s. 3(1) of the Act by doing nothing to make the premises reasonably safe.

The Court further held that the respondent's mere knowledge of the icy conditions did not mean he willingly assumed the legal risks under s. 4(1) of the Act, which preserves the strict volenti non fit injuria doctrine.

The City of Longueuil negotiated to purchase the appellant's land and accepted an offer of sale for $500,000.

Knowing the appellant could not deliver clear title due to pending litigation, the City expropriated the land instead of executing the sale.

The Expropriation Tribunal awarded $1,714,936 plus an additional indemnity, finding no binding agreement on the expropriation indemnity.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the $500,000 agreement bound the parties.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, restoring the Tribunal's finding that no transaction or agreement governed the expropriation indemnity, but modified the additional indemnity calculation to deduct the provisional indemnity already paid.

The deceased, who had a history of mental illness, executed a trust agreement placing her inherited property in trust for her life, with the remainder to her mother's grandchildren.

Her brothers, who were the trustees, had initiated the legal consultation.

After her death, her son challenged the trust agreement on the basis of undue influence.

The trial judge found no actual undue influence and upheld the agreement.

The Court of Appeal reversed, applying a presumption of undue influence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that while the relationship gave rise to a presumption of undue influence, the trial judge's finding of fact that no influence was actually exerted rebutted the presumption.

The Court also clarified that 'manifest disadvantage' is not required to trigger the presumption in cases of gifts or bequests.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal which dismissed an appeal against conviction.

The issue was whether the Court of Appeal erred in holding that the trial judge's reasons, which were silent as to evidence adduced on the accused's behalf, disclosed that all evidence was considered, and in inferring that the trial judge rejected the credibility of defence witnesses.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal for the reasons of the majority in the Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal regarding the partial expropriation of immovable property.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal from the bench, setting aside the Court of Appeal's judgment and restoring the decision of the Court of Quebec, Expropriation Division, essentially for the reasons given by that court.

These consolidated appeals concerned the constitutionality of a federal statutory prohibition on partisan political work by public servants.

The Court held that legislation implementing a constitutional convention of public service neutrality remains ordinary legislation and is subject to Charter review.

The impugned provision infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b), was sufficiently precise to be a limit prescribed by law, but failed the s. 1 proportionality analysis because it applied overbroadly to all public servants regardless of role or level.

The Court declined to preserve the provision through case-by-case reading down and left standing the declaration that the impugned provision was of no force or effect except as it applied to deputy heads.

The Attorney General for Saskatchewan appealed a decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal which found that proposed changes to provincial electoral boundaries infringed the right to vote under s. 3 of the Charter.

The impugned legislation imposed a strict quota of urban and rural ridings and required urban ridings to coincide with municipal boundaries, resulting in variances in voter populations.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the purpose of s. 3 is not absolute equality of voting power, but effective representation.

The Court found that the deviations from voter parity were justified by factors such as geography, community interests, and population growth patterns, and therefore did not violate s. 3.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident.

The respondents' insurer admitted liability and made a settlement offer, but the appellant issued a statement of claim after the two-year limitation period had expired.

The appellant argued that the respondents were estopped from relying on the limitation period or had waived it due to their admission of liability and ongoing negotiations.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of a promise not to rely on the limitation period or any waiver by the respondents.

The respondent's commercial building was destroyed by fire.

The appellant insurer admitted liability for equipment and stock and paid those amounts into court, but no agreement was reached regarding the building.

The insurer offered to settle the building claim 'without prejudice' to its liability.

The respondent did not reply and commenced an action after the one-year limitation period expired.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the insurer's admission of liability did not amount to a promise not to rely on the limitation period, and therefore promissory estoppel did not apply.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The union filed an application for certification before the Ontario Labour Relations Board relating to employees at the appellant's chicken hatchery.

The appellant argued the employees were agricultural workers excluded from the Labour Relations Act under s. 2(b).

The union gave notice it would challenge s. 2(b) under the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that an administrative tribunal with the power to decide questions of law has the concomitant power to determine whether that law is constitutionally valid under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Board therefore had jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of s. 2(b) of its enabling statute.