Gérard V. La Forest

The appellant appealed a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal which held that a federal statutory provision conferring a professional title was unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Marceau J.A. from the court below.

The Court held that the mere conferring and holding of a title is a neutral act unconstrained by the division of powers, provided it is not directly linked to the regulation of the profession.

The appellant filed an appearance and declaration of incidental appeal in the office of the Provincial Court instead of the Court of Appeal.

Over two years later, the appellant sought special leave from the Court of Appeal to file the documents properly, arguing the trial court clerk failed to forward them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding it lacked jurisdiction to extend the time limit beyond six months under art. 523 C.C.P. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that while the documents were filed in the wrong office, the time limit for an incidental appeal is not strict like a principal appeal.

The Court held that the Court of Appeal had broad discretionary power under art. 523 C.C.P. to correct the procedural error and should have exercised it to prevent the loss of the appellant's right of appeal, as the respondents suffered no prejudice.

The respondent was offered a public service position subject to obtaining a security clearance.

CSIS advised against granting the clearance, and the Deputy Minister denied it.

The respondent complained to the Security Intelligence Review Committee, which recommended granting the clearance.

The Deputy Minister refused to follow the recommendation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the word 'recommendations' in section 52(2) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act should be given its ordinary meaning of offering advice, and does not constitute a binding decision.

The Deputy Minister retains the ultimate authority and responsibility to grant or deny security clearances.

The appellant, a commissioned officer in the Canadian Armed Forces, was charged with being absent without leave after failing to report to a new posting.

She argued that she honestly believed she had resigned from the Armed Forces and therefore lacked the requisite mens rea.

She also challenged the constitutionality of the General Court Martial under s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the structure of the General Court Martial infringed s. 11(d) of the Charter, applying its concurrent decision in R. v. Généreux.

The Court also noted that an honest mistake about the legal consequences of one's actions does not constitute a defence to the charge.

The appellant, a member of the Canadian Armed Forces, challenged convictions entered by a General Court Martial on the basis that the military tribunal lacked the independence required by s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court held that s. 11 applies to General Court Martial proceedings and that a separate military justice system is constitutionally permissible, but found that the tribunal's structure at the time lacked sufficient security of tenure, financial security, and institutional independence.

The court further held that the infringement was not justified under s. 1.

The appellant's ss. 7 and 15 arguments failed, and evidence obtained through a constitutionally defective search was nevertheless admissible under s. 24(2).

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that reversed in part a Superior Court judgment dismissing a claim for a compensatory allowance regarding a jointly purchased family residence paid for by the husband.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the Superior Court's judgment, finding no reason to vary the trial judge's finding and agreeing with the dissenting reasons in the Court of Appeal.

The accused was acquitted at trial of dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm after a fatal collision at an intersection.

The trial judge found the accused negligent but lacking the necessary criminal element.

The Crown appealed, and the Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal, finding the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider all relevant evidence and the totality of the driving.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the accused's appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the trial judge's assessment of the facts and evidence did not constitute an error of law, and the Court of Appeal improperly interfered with factual findings.

A public interest group sought standing to challenge the constitutionality of amendments to the Immigration Act, 1976, which altered the refugee determination process.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the group raised serious issues of invalidity and had a genuine interest, it failed the third branch of the public interest standing test.

The Court found that individual refugee claimants directly affected by the legislation could and were already challenging the provisions, meaning there was another reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the courts.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the cross-appeal to strike the claim was allowed.

Following the 1985 Reference re Manitoba Language Rights decision, a dispute arose regarding which instruments had to be translated to comply with s. 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 23 applies to orders in council of a legislative nature, determined by their form, content, and effect.

The Court also held that documents incorporated by reference in legislation must be translated if the primary instrument is legislative, the incorporation is true, and the document was generated by the government, unless there is a bona fide reason for incorporation without translation.

The period of temporary validity for unilingual Acts was extended.

The parties were married under the separation of property regime.

The appellant wife owned the family residence, which was financed by a loan from her father.

The respondent husband repaid the loan and paid for taxes, insurance, and maintenance.

Upon divorce, the respondent claimed a $40,000 compensatory allowance for his contributions to the property.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding the contributions equivalent to rent and a choice of lifestyle.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision and awarded the allowance.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, restoring the trial judge's decision.

The Court held that the trial judge reasonably exercised his discretion under art. 559 of the Civil Code of Quebec by considering the overall matrimonial situation, including the wife's withdrawal from the labour market and the father's favourable loan terms, which justified the enrichment.

Criminal appeal from an order setting aside an acquittal and directing a new trial after the trial judge limited both sides to four peremptory challenges and denied the Crown any stand bys.

The Supreme Court held, by majority, that the Crown's substantially greater ability to shape the jury through stand bys and peremptory challenges created a reasonable apprehension of partiality and infringed the accused's right to a fair hearing by an impartial tribunal under s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The infringement was not justified under s. 1.

The Court also held that statements made after counsel had been retained were properly excluded because the police response to the accused's inquiry about contact from his father was misleading in the circumstances.

The appeal was allowed and the acquittal restored.

Environmental group judicial review arising from a provincially constructed dam affecting navigable waters, fisheries, and Indigenous interests.

The Supreme Court held that the federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order was valid, mandatory subordinate legislation under s. 6 of the Department of the Environment Act, and constitutionally intra vires because it regulated the manner in which federal decision makers exercised federal powers.

The court further held that the Navigable Waters Protection Act bound the Crown in right of Alberta by necessary implication, and that the Minister of Transport was required to comply with the Guidelines Order when exercising approval powers under that Act.

However, the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans was not subject to mandamus because the Fisheries Act did not impose the requisite affirmative regulatory duty for a decision-making responsibility under the Order.

The appeal was dismissed except to remove the mandamus order against the fisheries minister, with solicitor-client costs to the respondent.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that had entered an acquittal on a charge related to a prohibited weapon.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the conviction for the reasons given by the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal, finding that a knife with a blade opening automatically through centrifugal force is a prohibited weapon.

The Canadian Human Rights Commission issued a search warrant against Sun Life Assurance Company, a provincially regulated entity, in relation to a discrimination complaint against the Bank of Montreal, a federally regulated entity.

Sun Life appealed the validity of the warrant.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the warrant was properly issued because the complaint was directed solely at the Bank of Montreal and the matter was merely investigatory, not directed at Sun Life itself.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal from the Quebec Court of Appeal, granting the employers' association standing to challenge the constitutionality of the anti-strike-breaking provisions of the Labour Code.

The Court adopted the reasons of Chouinard J.A. of the Quebec Court of Appeal, setting aside the lower court judgments and dismissing the motion to dismiss.

The appellant insurers issued an aviation insurance policy to a commercial air carrier.

The carrier misrepresented its accident record and the number of passenger seats on the aircraft.

The aircraft subsequently crashed, killing all passengers.

The families of the deceased passengers sought to recover from the insurers under a statutory right of action.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the insurers were entitled to rely on the carrier's representation regarding the number of passenger seats.

Because the carrier violated this term, the policy was void ab initio against the carrier.

As the families' statutory right of action was subject to the same equities as the insurers could assert against the carrier, the families could not recover.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder based on circumstantial evidence and a recorded conversation with a friend who visited him in custody.

The friend, acting at the behest of the police and wearing a body pack, elicited statements from the appellant that undermined his lawyer's advice to remain silent.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the friend was acting as a state agent and that the elicitation of the statements violated the appellant's right to silence under section 7 of the Charter.

The Court concluded that the admission of the conscripted evidence would render the trial unfair and bring the administration of justice into disrepute under section 24(2), and declined to apply the curative proviso, ordering a new trial.

The appellant successfully appealed a municipal tax assessment and received a refund for the overpayment of taxes.

The appellant then claimed interest allegedly earned by the city on the overpayment, relying on the doctrine of unjust enrichment.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the doctrine of unjust enrichment was not applicable because section 6(1) of the Municipal Interest and Discount Rates Act, 1982 gave the municipality the discretion to pass a by-law authorizing interest payments, which the city had not done.

The appellants purchased property and entered into a joint venture, unaware that a third party was making a secret profit.

The solicitor acting for the purchasers knew of the secret profit but failed to disclose it, breaching his fiduciary duty.

The purchasers subsequently suffered massive losses when a warehouse built on the property subsided due to the negligence of soils engineers and pile-drivers.

Unable to recover fully from the negligent parties, the purchasers sued the solicitor for the shortfall.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the solicitor breached his fiduciary duty, equitable compensation does not extend to losses caused by the independent and unrelated negligence of third parties.

The appellant media organization challenged a warrant authorizing police seizure of videotapes depicting a protest during which a guardhouse was destroyed.

The Supreme Court held that freedom of the press under s. 2(b) of the Charter does not impose additional constitutional preconditions on the issuance of search warrants for media premises, though it informs the reasonableness analysis under s. 8.

The court applied a contextual balancing approach requiring consideration of the media's role as an innocent third party, the effect of the search on news gathering and dissemination, the existence of alternative sources, and the possibility of tailored conditions.

On the facts, the warrant met the statutory requirements and the search was reasonable notwithstanding deficiencies in the affidavit concerning alternative sources.

The appeal was dismissed, with one judge dissenting.