Éric Simard

Two appellants — a religious congregation and a religious institution managed by its members — sought to overturn authorization of a class action brought by victims of alleged sexual assaults committed by members of the congregation decades ago.

The majority held that the Superior Court had made numerous errors of fact and law in denying authorization under the four conditions of art. 575 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the Court of Appeal was entitled to substitute its own assessment on all conditions.

The majority further held that the three-year period under art. 2926.1 para. 2 C.C.Q., which applies upon the death of the victim or the author of the act, does not create a term for forfeiture but remains a prescriptive period, with the starting point continuing to be when the victim becomes aware of the connection between the assault and the injury.

The minority would have allowed the appeal against the religious institution for lack of sufficient factual allegations, while dismissing the appeal as to the congregation.

The respondent applied for authorization to institute a class action against the appellant regarding roaming charges.

The service agreement contained an arbitration clause prohibiting class actions.

The Superior Court referred the matter to arbitration.

The Court of Appeal reversed, ordering the Superior Court to assess the validity of the arbitration clause first.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that under the principles in Dell Computer Corp., the arbitrator has exclusive jurisdiction to determine if the arbitration clause is abusive, as it requires a detailed factual inquiry on a mixed question of law and fact.

The Crown appealed from an acquittal entered after the court below held that an employee masseuse at a massage parlour could not be convicted of keeping a common bawdy-house absent evidence of care and management of the premises.

The Supreme Court majority held that, although the statutory definition of "keeper" is broad, the indictable offence in s. 210(1) requires both some degree of control over the care and management of the premises and participation in the illicit activities of the bawdy-house.

The accused's participation in the operation of the premises did not satisfy the required management element on the facts.

The appeal was dismissed and the acquittal upheld, with a dissent that would have adopted a broader active-participation test.