Constance Olsheski

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action for defamation and intentional interference with economic relations against the respondents under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The motion judge had found the pleadings lacked sufficient material facts to establish that the respondents acted in concert with the author of the defamatory emails.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that when the amended statement of claim was read generously alongside the particulars and the incorporated emails, sufficient material facts were pleaded to disclose reasonable causes of action.

The order dismissing the action was set aside, and the appellants were granted leave to amend their pleadings.

Following a successful motion by certain defendants, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The court exercised its discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and considered the principles governing reasonable costs, including the factors in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the guidance from appellate jurisprudence.

Although the successful defendants sought recovery based on extensive hours claimed for research and preparation, the court found portions of the time claimed excessive.

Considering the moderate complexity of the issues, the conduct of the parties, and prior settlement offers, the court fixed a reduced but reasonable partial indemnity costs award.

The moving defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the amended statement of claim for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiffs alleged defamation and intentional interference with economic relations arising primarily from emails authored by another defendant.

The court held that the pleadings contained no material facts linking the moving defendants to the allegedly defamatory statements or establishing that they acted in concert or through an agency relationship with the author of the emails.

The pleadings also failed to properly particularize the alleged tort of intentional interference with economic relations or inducement of breach of contract.

The action against the moving defendants was dismissed.

The applicant alleged discrimination in employment on the basis of disability after his fixed-term contract was not renewed.

He claimed the non-renewal was due to a slip and fall injury he sustained at work.

The Tribunal found that the respondents had initiated the process to not renew the applicant's contract for performance-related reasons before they were aware of any ongoing disability issues.

The application was dismissed as the disability was not a factor in the decision.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging termination based on disability and age.

The applicant had also commenced a civil action for wrongful dismissal, seeking damages for bad faith and explicitly pleading the Human Rights Code.

The respondents argued the application was barred under section 34(11) of the Code.

The Tribunal found that the civil action raised the same allegations of Code infringements based on the same facts and sought remedies for those infringements.

The Tribunal held that section 34(11) applied and dismissed the application to prevent duplicative proceedings.

The appellants were dismissed without cause from their employment.

Their employment contracts contained termination clauses providing for notice periods less than the minimum required by the Employment Standards Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that because the contractual notice provisions violated the statutory minimums, they were null and void for all purposes.

Consequently, the contracts were treated as being silent on the issue of notice, and the common law presumption of reasonable notice applied.

The employer could not rely on the void clauses as evidence of the parties' intention to limit notice to the statutory minimum.

Counsel for the appellants failed to appear at the scheduled hearing of the appeal, and the Court proceeded to hear oral argument from the respondent only.

The appellants subsequently brought a motion for a re-hearing, claiming they were not notified of the hearing date.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that it is counsel's duty to ascertain inscribed hearing dates, not the Court's duty to inform them.

However, as a matter of indulgence and noting the unusual circumstances, the Court granted the re-hearing, ordering costs of the missed hearing and the motion to be paid personally by the appellants' counsel.