Brian G. Morgan

The appellant municipality sought to enforce Ontario's building code and development charge regime against a massive redevelopment project at a federally owned international airport operated under long-term leases.

The court held that the entire redevelopment, including terminals, runways, utilities, and air navigation facilities, fell within Parliament's exclusive jurisdiction over aeronautics and also formed part of a federal undertaking, such that provincial laws directly regulating building design, permits, and development charges were constitutionally inapplicable under interjurisdictional immunity.

The court further held that provincial land and property development legislation could not apply to the federal Crown's continuing property interest in leased airport lands.

Ancillary claims based on the ground lease, common law compensation, and refusal of fire services were rejected, with the municipality directed to pursue the statutory grant-in-lieu regime instead.

The appellant appealed an order striking part of its statement of claim that sought a declaration that the respondent airport authority lacked jurisdiction to impose fees and charges on airport users.

The court held it was unnecessary to resolve the pleaded delegation and Crown-operation issues because the respondent's authority arose from its leasehold interest and corporate capacity, as recognized by the applicable federal legislation and regulations.

The court further held Parliament did not intend to create a complete code restricting airport user charges to those set by ministerial regulation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

On an appeal from an application judgment concerning a non-profit airport authority's refusal to appoint a municipal nominee as member and director, the court upheld the declaration that the board acted contrary to its by-law.

The appeal turned on whether the board had clear and unambiguous evidence that the nominee would not at all times act in the authority's best interests.

The court held that neither the nominee's cautious interview answers nor the board's adverse credibility finding based on his subsequent letter could reasonably satisfy that stringent anticipatory standard.

The board's rejection of the nomination therefore fell outside the scope of its authority under the by-law, and the appeal was dismissed with costs.