Michael W. Kelly

The defendants, The Corporation of the City of Cambridge and The Cambridge & District Humane Society, successfully had the action dismissed against them and sought costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $25,000 against the plaintiff Inderpal Dhillon, rejecting the defendants' claim for substantial indemnity costs post-offer to settle due to insufficient compromise in their offer.

The court declined to award costs against the Family Law Act claimants (Sarita, Jasmeen, Anisha, Binita, and Krishma Dhillon) given their early abandonment of claims and lack of involvement.

The plaintiff Inderpal Dhillon's impecuniosity was considered but did not eliminate liability for costs.

The plaintiffs sued the City of Cambridge and its Animal Services for negligence following a dog bite incident, alleging failure to properly enforce the animal control by-law regarding prior incidents involving the same owners or premises.

The municipal defendants moved for summary judgment.

The court granted the motion, finding that the animal control officer's exercise of discretion during prior investigations did not fall below the standard of care.

Furthermore, the court held that the plaintiffs could not establish that the alleged negligence caused the injuries, as it was speculative whether further investigation would have prevented the attack.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following an alleged motor vehicle collision.

The insurer denied the claim, alleging the applicant misrepresented the occurrence of the collision.

At arbitration, the arbitrator found significant inconsistencies in the testimony of the applicant and his witnesses regarding the events leading up to the alleged collision.

Furthermore, the arbitrator preferred the evidence of the insurer's accident reconstruction expert, who examined the vehicles firsthand and concluded the physical damage was inconsistent with the reported collision.

The arbitrator concluded the applicant was not involved in an 'accident' as defined in the Schedule and dismissed the application.

The applicant, injured in a 2003 motor vehicle accident, sought a determination of catastrophic impairment at the Financial Services Commission of Ontario.

The insurer argued the arbitration should be stayed because the applicant had a pending 2005 court action for non-earner and medical benefits, and the issues should be joined to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

The arbitrator found that the issues in the arbitration and the civil action were distinct, with different legal tests and relief sought.

The arbitrator concluded there was no risk of undue duplication, delay, or inconsistent results, and allowed the applicant to proceed with the arbitration.

The appellants agreed to purchase a property, but the transaction failed to close after the respondent registered a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) against title, claiming a right of first refusal.

A motion to discharge the CPL was dismissed on the basis that there was a triable issue.

The appellants subsequently sued the respondent for damages under s. 103(4) of the Courts of Justice Act for registering the CPL without a reasonable claim.

The trial judge dismissed the action, holding that the previous order refusing to discharge the CPL was a decision in rem and rendered the issue res judicata.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that a motion to discharge a CPL only determines whether there is a triable issue, not the ultimate merits of the claim, and therefore cannot support a plea of res judicata.

The insurer appealed an arbitration order finding that the insured, a taxi driver, was an employee rather than self-employed at the time of his motor vehicle accident.

The insured paid a flat daily lease rate for his taxi, kept all fares and tips, and reported his earnings as business income.

The Director's Delegate allowed the appeal, holding that the insured was self-employed.

The Delegate found that the arbitrator erred by redefining the employment relationship simply to allow the insured to use the more favourable four-week pre-accident income calculation period available to employees under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident while working as a taxi driver.

He applied for income replacement benefits, and a preliminary issue hearing was held to determine whether he was 'employed' or 'self-employed' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The insurer argued he was an independent contractor, noting he paid a daily lease for the cab and received no T4.

The arbitrator applied common law tests for employment, finding that the taxi company controlled his hours, owned the vehicle and dispatch system, and bore the primary risk of profit and loss.

The arbitrator concluded the applicant was 'employed' and entitled to base his benefits calculation on the four weeks prior to the accident.

The appellant appealed an arbitrator's decision denying his claim for further statutory accident benefits and refusing to award him his arbitration expenses.

The appellant argued that under the McCormick criteria, expenses should only be denied if the application was manifestly frivolous or vexatious, which the arbitrator explicitly found it was not.

The Director's Delegate dismissed the appeal, holding that the McCormick criteria are not rigid rules and that an arbitrator has broad discretion to deny expenses where a claim lacks merit and the applicant's testimony lacks credibility, even if the conduct does not rise to the level of frivolous or vexatious.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received weekly income benefits until he returned to work.

After working for over a year, he left his employment due to chronic pain and substance abuse, and sought reinstatement of his benefits.

The arbitrator held that returning to work for more than 90 days under section 16(2) of the Schedule merely shifts the onus to the insured to re-establish disability, rather than acting as a complete bar.

The arbitrator also interpreted the 156-week period in section 12(5)(b) as 156 weeks of disability, not consecutive weeks from the accident.

Finding that the applicant's poor psychological health and substance abuse rendered him disabled, the arbitrator awarded weekly income benefits for the claimed period.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received statutory accident benefits for eight weeks.

He subsequently sought ongoing weekly income benefits and rehabilitation services, claiming he was disabled by soft tissue injuries and a fractured elbow.

The arbitrator found the applicant's testimony lacked credibility, noting discrepancies in his reported income, his failure to report his return to work, and his regular participation in sports like golf and snooker.

The arbitrator concluded the applicant was not disabled after September 4, 1992, and denied further benefits.

Furthermore, because the applicant had overstated his pre-accident income, the insurer was entitled to repayment of $1,075.20 in overpaid benefits.

Both parties' claims for arbitration expenses were dismissed.

The insurer brought a preliminary issue motion arguing that the insured was precluded from proceeding with his arbitration for ongoing weekly income benefits because he refused to attend a medical examination.

The insured argued that the insurer's right to require a medical examination ended when it terminated his benefits.

The arbitrator held that section 23(2) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule allows an insurer to require a medical examination to evaluate an ongoing claim even after benefits have been terminated.

The arbitrator found the insurer's request for a follow-up examination reasonable and ordered that the insured is precluded from proceeding with the arbitration unless he makes himself reasonably available for the examination.

The appellants, who were minors at the time of their respective motor vehicle accidents, commenced actions for damages more than two years after the accidents but within two years of reaching the age of majority.

The central issue was whether the two-year limitation period in section 180(1) of the Highway Traffic Act excluded the operation of section 47 of the Limitations Act, which postpones the running of limitation periods for persons under legal disability.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions are not inconsistent and that section 47 applies to postpone the limitation period for minors.

The appeals of the minor plaintiffs were allowed.

However, the adult plaintiff's claim, which was commenced after the limitation period expired, was held to be incurably out of time and was dismissed.