Gérard V. La Forest

The Crown appealed a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal that set aside the accused's conviction for second degree murder and ordered a new trial.

The issue was the admissibility of an overheard statement by the accused saying 'I killed David'.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the meaning of the evidence was so speculative and its probative value so tenuous that the trial judge ought to have excluded it because its prejudicial effect overbore its probative value.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of sections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the Income Tax Act, arguing that the provisions for seizing funds owing by a tax debtor and giving priority over provincial security interests infringed on the provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, and held that the provisions were not ultra vires the Parliament of Canada.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal regarding the constitutionality of s. 85 of the Criminal Code, which imposes a mandatory minimum consecutive sentence for using a firearm during an indictable offence.

The respondent had committed three armed robberies using a shotgun.

Applying the two-stage test from R. v. Goltz, the Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 85 does not violate s. 12 of the Charter when the underlying offence is robbery.

The appeal was allowed and the trial judge's sentence was restored.

The appellant sought an upward variation of child support after a separation agreement had been incorporated into a divorce judgment and the payor's income rose dramatically.

The Supreme Court held that under s. 17(4) of the Divorce Act, a material change in either the condition, means, needs or other circumstances of either former spouse or any child is sufficient to trigger variation; a change in both parental and child circumstances is not required.

The Court further held that once the threshold for variation is met, the judge may reassess child support in light of the present circumstances of the parties and children, while recognizing that child support is the right of the child and that children may benefit from improvements in a parent's standard of living.

The Court restored the chambers judge's increased child support order and held the Court of Appeal had no basis to intervene.

During constitutional reform discussions, the federal government provided funding to four national Aboriginal organizations but not to the Native Women's Association of Canada (NWAC).

NWAC sought an order of prohibition, arguing that the failure to provide equal funding and participation violated their freedom of expression and equality rights under the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the government's decision did not violate ss. 2(b), 15(1), or 28 of the Charter, as freedom of expression does not generally place a positive obligation on the government to fund or consult anyone.

The Court also found no violation of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and concluded that the Federal Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his niece.

During deliberations, the jury asked for an explanation of the guideline on evidence and reasonable doubt.

The trial judge's recharge suggested the jury had to choose between the credibility of the complainant and the accused.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that this either/or approach was incorrect as it excluded the third alternative: that the jury might not believe the accused but still have a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant mother, who had been granted interim custody of her child in Scotland with a non-removal clause, removed the child to Manitoba.

The respondent father obtained a final custody order in Scotland and applied under the Hague Convention and the Manitoba Child Custody Enforcement Act for the child's return.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the removal was wrongful under Article 3 of the Convention because it breached the Scottish court's custody rights (the right to determine the child's residence).

The Court found no grave risk of psychological harm under Article 13(b) that would justify refusing the return.

The Court ordered the child's return forthwith, accepting the father's undertakings not to take physical custody upon return until a Scottish court permits it.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding damages for wrongful dismissal, specifically concerning the significance of pensions in determining reasonable notice.

After leave to appeal was granted, the appellant died.

Subsequent legislation compelled the payment of a death benefit of $161,325, which approximated the trial court's award for the loss of pension benefits.

Given these radically altered circumstances, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal without commenting on the substantive legal issues raised in the courts below.

The appellant was convicted of incest.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge misdirected the jury regarding reasonable doubt and credibility.

The Manitoba Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, with the majority agreeing with the dissenting reasons of Twaddle J.A. at the Court of Appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury on the application of reasonable doubt to the issue of credibility, particularly where the Crown's case hinged on an accomplice's testimony and the accused denied participation.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, adopting the dissenting reasons of Fish J.A. at the Quebec Court of Appeal.

L'Heureux-Dubé J. dissented, finding no error in the jury charge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the included offence of manslaughter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, applying the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The Court held that the jury, by convicting of murder, must have found subjective foresight of death, and it was impossible to conclude they did so merely because they were unable to find subjective foresight of bodily harm for manslaughter.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, applied for a reduction in his parole ineligibility period under s. 745 of the Criminal Code after serving 15 years.

At the hearing, the jury refused to reduce the period.

The appellant appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Canada, arguing the hearing was unfair due to inflammatory remarks by Crown counsel and errors in the judge's charge.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new hearing, finding that Crown counsel's remarks, which discredited the s. 745 process and improperly referenced the death penalty and unrelated crimes, seriously compromised the fairness of the hearing.

The Court also held that victim impact statements may be admissible at a s. 745 hearing at the discretion of the presiding judge.

The appeal concerned whether an accountant providing tax planning and investment advice owed fiduciary duties to a client where the advisor fostered trust and reliance while failing to disclose a financial relationship with the developers of the recommended tax shelter investments.

The majority held that a fact-based fiduciary relationship arose because the client reasonably expected independent advice given solely in his best interests, and the undisclosed conflict breached both fiduciary and contractual duties.

The Court restored the trial judgment awarding restitutionary damages equal to the client's net losses, holding the breaching advisor bore the market risk once the client proved he would not have entered the investments but for the non-disclosure.

The dissent would have confined fiduciary duties to relationships of total dependency and would have limited contract damages because the market collapse, not the non-disclosure, caused the devaluation.

The accused was arrested for a sexual assault and advised of his right to counsel.

While detained, the police requested a blood sample, ostensibly for the investigation of the assault for which he was arrested, but primarily to compare against DNA evidence from an earlier, unrelated sexual assault.

The accused consented to the blood sample without being informed of the police's dual investigative purpose or being re-advised of his right to counsel regarding the earlier assault.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the accused's rights under sections 8, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter were violated because his consent was not fully informed.

The Court upheld the exclusion of the DNA evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, concluding its admission would render the trial unfair.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of keeping gambling devices after the trial judge found insufficient evidence that the seized video machines were actually used for gambling.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal, ruling the trial judge erred in law by requiring proof of actual use.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the trial judge's refusal to infer the machines were gambling devices was a finding of fact based on evidentiary sufficiency, not an error of law, and therefore the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to intervene.

The accused, a chronic alcoholic, sexually assaulted a 65-year-old woman who was confined to a wheelchair.

At trial, he argued that he was in a state of extreme intoxication akin to automatism and lacked the minimal intent required for the general intent offence of sexual assault.

The trial judge acquitted him, but the Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal based on the Leary rule, which precluded intoxication as a defence to general intent offences.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the strict application of the Leary rule violates sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The Court established that evidence of extreme intoxication akin to automatism or insanity can be considered to negate the minimal intent required for general intent offences, though the burden of proof rests on the accused on a balance of probabilities.

The appellant, a non-profit corporation providing laundry and group purchasing services to public establishments, sought tax exemptions under the Act respecting Municipal Taxation.

The Bureau de révision de l'évaluation foncière du Québec dismissed the complaint, but the Court of Québec set it aside.

The Court of Appeal restored the Bureau's decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, applying the reasoning from a companion case to hold that the appellant should not be treated differently from its member establishments for tax purposes and is entitled to the exemptions.

The appellants challenged municipal real estate and business tax assessments imposed after public hospital laundries were consolidated into a non-profit community laundry structure overseen by a regional council.

Applying the ordinary and teleological rules of tax interpretation, the Court held that tax exemptions are not automatically subject to strict construction and that substance may prevail over form where consistent with legislative purpose.

Although the appellants were not direct alter egos of the public establishments because the requisite control element was absent, the Court found an almost complete identity of patrimony between them and the member institutions.

The community laundry and the regional council were therefore entitled to the relevant exemptions under the municipal taxation statute, except that the regional council's 1987 claim was prescribed under the one-year limitation period.

The appellant non-profit corporation operated a large low-rental residence for indigent elderly persons and sought a full municipal real estate tax exemption as a reception centre.

The Court held that tax legislation is interpreted under the ordinary rules of interpretation, with the applicable degree of strictness or liberality determined by legislative purpose, substance prevailing over form where consistent with statutory text and purpose, and only residual unresolved doubt favouring the taxpayer.

Applying that approach, the Court concluded the entire facility qualified as a reception centre under the health services legislation and was used for the statutory purposes contemplated by the municipal taxation statute.

The exemption was not conditional on holding a permit for the whole facility, and the specialized tribunal's decision restoring full exemption was reinstated.

The appellant was arrested for impaired driving and informed of his right to counsel, but was not advised of the availability of free and immediate duty counsel.

He refused to comply with a breathalyser demand and was convicted.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the failure to inform the appellant of the existence and availability of duty counsel violated his rights under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The Court excluded the evidence of his refusal under s. 24(2) of the Charter and entered an acquittal.