Giovanna Roccamo

The respondents were injured in a motor vehicle accident in California and claimed statutory accident benefits from the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The Fund denied the claim, arguing it was not responsible for out-of-province accidents, and later challenged the arbitrator's jurisdiction to decide the issue.

The arbitrator ruled she had jurisdiction, and the Fund sought leave to appeal this preliminary order before the remaining issues were decided.

The Director's Delegate denied the motion for leave to appeal, finding that proceeding with the appeal could lead to multiple appeal proceedings and unnecessary delay, and deferred the appeal until the remaining issues, including the existence of a potential insurer, were resolved.

The applicants were injured in a motor vehicle accident in California and sought statutory accident benefits from the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The Fund brought a motion arguing that a FSCO arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to interpret section 6 of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act and section 268 of the Insurance Act, and that the arbitration duplicated a Superior Court action.

The arbitrator dismissed the motion, finding that section 20(2) of the Insurance Act grants arbitrators exclusive jurisdiction to determine all questions of fact or law in proceedings before them, including interpreting the relevant statutes.

The arbitrator also found that the arbitration for accident benefits did not duplicate the tort action in the Superior Court.

At a pre-hearing conference, the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund, supported by the applicant, moved to admit transcripts from examinations for discovery in a related tort action into evidence at the upcoming arbitration hearing in lieu of viva voce evidence.

Royal Insurance Company of Canada objected.

The pre-hearing arbitrator dismissed the motion, finding that the hearing arbitrator is in a better position to determine what documentary and viva voce evidence should be heard and to exercise the evidentiary powers under section 15 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

On a preliminary insurance coverage issue arising from a motor vehicle accident, the appellants challenged the exclusion of unmarried common law partners from accident benefits under the standard automobile policy mandated by provincial legislation.

The majority held that the 1980 policy definition of "spouse" did not include unmarried partners, but that the exclusion violated s. 15(1) of the Charter because marital status is an analogous ground of discrimination and the denial of benefits perpetuated disadvantage against non-marital family units.

The infringement was not justified under s. 1 because marital status was not a reasonably relevant marker of stable economic interdependence and less impairing alternatives were available.

The Court retroactively read in the broader 1990 statutory definition of "spouse" and remitted the action for trial.