Gérard V. La Forest

The appellant, a regional legal aid corporation, requested a business tax exemption for its legal aid bureau under the Act respecting Municipal Taxation.

The municipal commission refused the exemption, finding that professional legal services did not fall under the exemption for activities carried on mainly for social purposes.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the commission's decision was patently unreasonable.

The Court found that the professional legal services offered by a legal aid bureau to economically underprivileged persons are inherently social in nature and clearly qualify for the business tax exemption under s. 236(5) of the Act.

The appellants challenged Ontario's education development charge regime, which required payments tied to new development to fund growth-related school capital costs.

The Court held that the regime was constitutionally valid and dismissed the appeal.

In the leading reasons, the charges were characterized as indirect taxes but upheld as ancillary to a comprehensive provincial land-use planning and regulatory scheme under ss. 92(9), (13) and (16) of the Constitution Act, 1867; concurring reasons would have upheld them instead as direct land taxes under s. 92(2).

The Court further held that the scheme did not prejudicially affect denominational school rights under s. 93(1), and that legislation falling within s. 93 was immune from Charter scrutiny.

In a family law appeal arising from separation under a regime of separation of property, the court considered competing claims for compensatory allowance where one spouse had provided extensive unpaid administrative and domestic services to support the other spouse's business and properties had been placed in the contributing spouse's name.

The court reaffirmed that compensatory allowance analysis must be overall, flexible, and generous, and that courts must assess enrichment, impoverishment, causal link, proportion, and absence of justification in the context of the whole marriage.

A transfer of property between spouses bars a compensatory allowance claim only where the evidence shows an intention to benefit the receiving spouse, not merely a formal transfer.

The Court held that the appellate court improperly treated a foreign ownership judgment as new evidence discharging the award and improperly interfered with the trial judge's discretionary global assessment.

The trial judgment awarding the appellant a compensatory allowance and rejecting the respondent's claim was restored.

The individual appellant, a 50 percent shareholder in the corporate appellant autobody shop, was injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by the respondents.

The individual appellant could no longer perform heavy physical labour, causing the corporate appellant to hire replacement labour and suffer a loss of profits.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the corporate appellant could not recover its pure economic loss, as it was a contractual relational economic loss that lacked sufficient proximity and foreseeability.

However, the Court restored the trial judge's award of $290,000 to the individual appellant for loss of earning capacity, finding no palpable and overriding error to justify the Court of Appeal's interference.

The respondent logging company obtained an interim injunction prohibiting named defendants and 'John Doe, Jane Doe and Persons Unknown' from blocking roads to its logging operations.

The appellants, environmental protesters, appealed the order, arguing that courts lack jurisdiction to grant injunctions against non-parties or the general public in private civil litigation.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that courts of inherent jurisdiction have the power to make orders binding on non-parties to protect private rights from mass obstruction.

Non-parties who violate such orders with notice may be found guilty of contempt of court.

The appellant, an elected member of the New Brunswick Legislative Assembly, was convicted of an illegal practice under the Elections Act for inducing a minor to vote.

Consequently, he was expelled from the legislature and disqualified from seeking electoral office for five years pursuant to s. 119(c) of the Act.

He challenged the constitutionality of these provisions under ss. 3 and 12 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the disqualification infringed the right to be qualified for membership in a legislative assembly under s. 3, it was a reasonable limit demonstrably justified under s. 1 to maintain the integrity of the electoral process.

The Court also found no violation of s. 12.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, members of the Shawanaga and Eagle Lake First Nations, were convicted of gambling-related offences under the Criminal Code for conducting high stakes bingo and other gambling activities on their reserves.

They appealed, arguing that their activities were protected by an inherent aboriginal right to self-government under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which included the right to regulate gambling.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the Van der Peet test and held that the claimed right must be characterized as the right to participate in and regulate gambling activities.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence that gambling or its regulation was an integral part of the distinctive cultures of the First Nations at the time of contact.

The appellant challenged a conviction for selling salmon caught under an Indian food fish licence, arguing that the prohibition on sale infringed an aboriginal right protected by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The majority held that aboriginal rights are identified by asking whether the claimed activity is an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the specific aboriginal group prior to contact with Europeans.

Applying that framework, the Court held that exchange of fish for money or other goods was incidental rather than integral to the Sto:lo’s distinctive culture and therefore not constitutionally protected.

The appeal was dismissed, with important dissents proposing broader approaches grounded in livelihood, continuity, and historical use of resources.

The appellants were convicted of attempting to sell herring spawn on kelp without the required licence and argued that the prohibition infringed an aboriginal right protected by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The majority held that the conduct amounted to an attempt to sell and that the Heiltsuk had established an aboriginal right to trade herring spawn on kelp on a commercial basis, grounded in pre-contact practices integral to their distinctive culture.

The majority further held that the right had not been extinguished and that the regulatory scheme prima facie infringed it.

However, the evidentiary record was insufficient to determine whether the infringement was justified, so a new trial was ordered on guilt or innocence and on justification.

A dissent would have found either no applicable aboriginal right in the circumstances or that any such right had been extinguished.

The appellant, a food processing company, was convicted of purchasing and selling salmon caught by members of the Sheshaht and Opetchesaht bands under Indian food fish licences, contrary to the British Columbia Fishery (General) Regulations.

The appellant argued that the regulations infringed the aboriginal rights of the bands to sell fish, protected under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the exchange of fish for money or other goods was not an integral part of the distinctive cultures of the Sheshaht and Opetchesaht prior to contact with Europeans.

Therefore, no aboriginal right to sell fish was established, and the regulations were validly applied.

The employer changed the work schedule of its employees, resulting in the loss of Sunday rest days.

The union filed a grievance and sought an interim injunction from the British Columbia Supreme Court to postpone the implementation of the new schedule pending arbitration.

The employer appealed the court's jurisdiction to issue the injunction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that courts retain a residual discretionary power to grant interlocutory relief where no adequate alternative remedy exists under the statutory labour scheme, even in the absence of a cause of action claiming final relief.

The accused was convicted of narcotics offences based on the viva voce evidence of a co-accused who had been arrested during an illegal search of a marijuana-growing operation.

The co-accused had pleaded guilty and volunteered to testify.

The Court of Appeal excluded the testimony under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that the connection between the illegal search and the witness's decision to testify was too remote.

The Court distinguished between the discovery of inanimate objects and live witness testimony, noting that the witness's voluntary decision to cooperate severed the temporal and causal links to the Charter breach.

The appellant alleged workplace and sexual harassment, obtained workers’ compensation benefits for an employment injury under Quebec’s no-fault compensation regime, and also sought compensatory and exemplary damages under the Quebec Charter.

The majority held that the remedy in s. 49 of the Charter is a civil liability remedy, including the exemplary damages component, and that s. 438 of the Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases bars such actions against the employer once the same events have been compensated as an employment injury.

The Court emphasized that the statutory compensation scheme is a final compromise replacing fault-based civil recourse with fixed-sum benefits and employer immunity.

The appeal and the respondents’ cross-appeal were dismissed, with La Forest and L'Heureux‑Dubé JJ. dissenting in part on the availability of exemplary damages and arbitral forum.

The respondent purchaser agreed to buy a house from the appellant vendor.

The vendor reneged on the agreement before the closing date.

The purchaser sued for specific performance or damages in lieu thereof.

At trial, the purchaser elected to take damages.

The property value had increased significantly by the time of trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that damages in lieu of specific performance should be assessed as of the date of trial, not the date of breach, to provide a true substitute for specific performance.

The Court also held that the increase in value of the purchaser's own unsold residence should not be deducted from the damages award.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and related offences, arguing that the police search of his car violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the appellant had freely and voluntarily consented to the search before he was detained.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that set aside a stay of proceedings ordered after a lengthy pre-trial delay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal for the reasons given by the Court of Appeal, finding that a stay could not be ordered absent proof of impairment of the ability to present a full answer and defence or proof of oppressive or vexatious behaviour by the Crown or police.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada to quash his guilty pleas, arguing they resulted from the undue influence of his counsel.

The Court allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Bisson J.A. in the Court of Appeal, and quashed the guilty pleas.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after stabbing his wife while severely intoxicated.

He appealed on the basis that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the effect of drunkenness on his ability to form the requisite intent for murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and directed a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to properly link the common sense inference that a person intends the natural consequences of their actions to the evidence of the appellant's intoxication.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder under the constructive murder provisions of the Criminal Code, which were subsequently struck down as unconstitutional.

After exhausting his appeals, the appellant applied for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing his continued detention violated the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that habeas corpus cannot be used as a collateral attack on a conviction by a superior court once the accused is no longer in the judicial system, and that the doctrine of res judicata applies.

The appellant, charged with murder in Canada, fled to the United States where he was arrested by American police on an extradition warrant.

The American police obtained a statement from the appellant without advising him of his right to counsel forthwith, as required by the Charter, though they complied with American law.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Charter does not apply to foreign police gathering evidence in their own jurisdiction.

Consequently, there was no Charter breach, and the evidence could not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The appeal was dismissed.