Gérard V. La Forest

The appellant appealed a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal that affirmed the dismissal of his application for certiorari.

The appellant sought to quash his committal to stand trial on a charge of possession of marijuana for the purposes of trafficking.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal orally, holding that there was sufficient evidence to justify the committal.

The appellants conceded that their appeal was moot.

The Supreme Court of Canada declined to exercise its discretion to hear the appeal notwithstanding its mootness and quashed the appeal.

However, because the Crown failed to move to quash with due diligence, the Court awarded costs of the appeal to the appellants on a party to party basis.

The appellant appealed from a decision of the Court of Appeal setting aside a stay of proceedings.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that while there was a breach of the appellant's right to make full answer and defence, an adjournment was the appropriate remedy rather than a stay of proceedings.

The Court also noted that the test for determining the degree of relevance required for Crown production is set out in Stinchcombe and O'Connor, and the phrase 'an air of reality' should be avoided.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following the death of his severely disabled daughter by carbon monoxide poisoning.

He appealed on the basis that his Charter rights under ss. 9, 10(a), and 10(b) were violated during his arrest and interrogation, arguing he was arbitrarily detained, not properly informed of his jeopardy, and not provided a toll-free number for duty counsel.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Charter arguments, finding a lawful de facto arrest, adequate understanding of jeopardy, and sufficient information regarding local duty counsel.

However, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial due to fresh evidence revealing that Crown counsel and the RCMP had improperly administered a questionnaire to prospective jurors, constituting a flagrant abuse of process.

The appellant brought a civil action against the respondent, a psychiatrist who sexually assaulted her when she was a patient.

The respondent sought production of the clinical notes and records of the appellant's subsequent treating psychiatrist.

The Supreme Court of Canada recognized a partial privilege for psychiatric records in civil cases, applying the Wigmore criteria.

The Court upheld the Court of Appeal's order requiring limited disclosure of the records subject to stringent conditions protecting the appellant's privacy.

Criminal appeal concerning destruction by a third-party sexual assault crisis centre of counselling notes made during the complainant’s initial disclosure before charges were laid.

The majority held that where destroyed material met the disclosure or production threshold, the accused’s right to make full answer and defence under s. 7 was breached without any additional requirement to prove actual prejudice at the breach stage.

Applying both the Stinchcombe and O’Connor frameworks, the Court found the notes were likely relevant to credibility and cross-examination and would have been producible.

A stay of proceedings was restored because the deliberate destruction of the only independent contemporaneous written account caused irremediable prejudice and continuing the prosecution would damage the integrity of the justice system.

The police received an anonymous Crime Stoppers tip that the accused was growing marijuana.

Based on the tip and subsequent police observations, a search warrant was obtained and executed, leading to drug charges.

At trial, the accused sought disclosure of the tip sheet, which the trial judge ordered produced after editing out identifying details.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the tip sheet was protected by informer privilege, which is absolute subject only to the 'innocence at stake' exception.

The Court concluded that the trial judge erred in editing and disclosing the document, as it is impossible to know what details might reveal an anonymous informer's identity.

The respondents' child, who has cerebral palsy, was placed in a special education class by a Tribunal contrary to the parents' wishes.

The Court of Appeal held this violated section 15 of the Charter and read in a presumption of integration into the Education Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal erred in deciding the constitutional validity of the Act without the required statutory notice.

Furthermore, the Tribunal's decision did not violate section 15 of the Charter, as it was based on the child's best interests and actual needs, and did not impose a burden or disadvantage.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that overturned a stay of proceedings.

The trial judge had ordered the stay due to a 20-month delay between the issuance of an arrest warrant and the actual arrest, finding a breach of the right to be informed of the specific offence without unreasonable delay under section 11(a) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that there was no proof of prejudice to the accused.

In an addendum, the Chief Justice noted that an infringement of section 11(a) could potentially be established based on economic prejudice, rather than solely on prejudice to the right to a fair trial.

The appellant land developer suffered financial losses due to a two-year delay by the respondent transit authority in determining the precise location and acreage required for a new transit station on the appellant's land.

The municipality withheld development approvals during this period.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the damages resulting from the delay were the natural and reasonable consequences of the expropriation and were compensable as disturbance damages under the Expropriations Act.

The Court emphasized that the Act is a remedial statute that must be given a broad and liberal interpretation to adequately compensate those whose lands are taken.

The Minister of Fisheries and Oceans authorized the issuance of offshore lobster licences to the appellant but later revoked the authorization before the licences were issued, citing government policy and lobbying by inshore fishermen.

The appellant sued the Crown in negligence for economic loss incurred in preparing its vessels.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that under section 7 of the Fisheries Act, the Minister's power to authorize the issuance of a licence is a continuing power, allowing revocation at any time prior to actual issuance.

Consequently, the Minister acted within his statutory authority and was not liable in negligence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal from the British Columbia Court of Appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Cumming J.A. The Court set aside the Court of Appeal's judgment and restored the trial judge's order staying the court action in favour of arbitration.

The appellant was awarded costs in both courts.

The appellant appealed a stay of proceedings order rendered by the Quebec Court of Appeal proprio motu, which set aside his conviction for armed robbery but deprived him of an acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the evidence could not allow a reasonable jury properly instructed to find the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The stay of proceedings was set aside and an acquittal was entered.

Criminal appeal concerning a public corruption conviction under s. 121(1)(c) arising from a provincial employee’s wife being placed on a contractor’s payroll without performing work.

The Court held that the appeal had to be allowed because the trial judge’s persistent interference, jury charge errors, and failure to properly address character evidence deprived the accused of a fair trial.

The Court also provided extensive reasons on the elements of s. 121(1)(c), including the scope of “dealings with the government”, “benefit”, and the required mens rea.

The curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) was held unavailable.

The accused was charged with robbing a convenience store.

The only evidence identifying the accused as the robber was a security camera videotape, as the store clerk could not positively identify him.

The trial judge convicted the accused based solely on her own comparison of the videotape and the accused in court.

The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction, finding it unreasonable without corroborating testimony.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that a trier of fact may identify an accused based solely on clear and convincing videotape evidence without the need for corroborating witness testimony.

Criminal appeals from an order setting aside directed acquittals and directing a new trial on charges including conspiracy to obstruct justice, obstruction of justice, and corruptly accepting money.

A key prosecution witness testified at the preliminary inquiry, later recanted significant portions of her evidence, and then married one appellant before trial, rendering her incompetent for the Crown under the common law spousal incompetency rule preserved by s. 4 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Court held that the common law rule should not be modified on these facts and that s. 715 of the Criminal Code did not authorize admission of the preliminary inquiry transcript.

However, the majority held that the former testimony was admissible at common law under the principled hearsay exception because necessity and threshold reliability were established, and the resulting unfairness or prejudice did not outweigh its probative value.

The appeals were dismissed and the new trial order was affirmed.

The appellants challenged judgments that had found constitutional defects in the institutional structure of a liquor licensing tribunal after it revoked the respondent's liquor permits for disturbance of public tranquility.

The majority held that the permit cancellation process was quasi-judicial and attracted the protections of s. 23 of Quebec's Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, but concluded the defect lay in the tribunal's operations rather than in the enabling legislation itself.

The court found a reasonable apprehension of institutional bias because the tribunal's lawyers and directors could participate at multiple stages from investigation and file preparation to advocacy and adjudication without sufficient separation of functions.

Although the tribunal's security of tenure and institutional independence were adequate, its failure to ensure impartiality required the impugned revocation decision to be quashed.

The appeal was allowed only to the extent that no statutory invalidity declaration was necessary, while the respondent retained the remedy setting aside the tribunal's decision.

Parents who, for religious reasons, sent their children to private Jewish and Christian schools challenged Ontario’s refusal to fund those schools and to extend school health support services to students attending them.

The appeal raised Charter claims under ss. 2(a) and 15(1), together with the constitutional significance of s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and s. 29 of the Charter.

The majority held that the non-funding of dissentient religious schools did not violate the appellants’ Charter rights, emphasizing the constitutional structure governing denominational school rights and the absence of any positive entitlement to state support for religious education.

The majority also held that the School Health Support Services Program was properly characterized as an education service linked to the public system and therefore did not infringe the Charter.

The appeal was dismissed, with partial dissents on the equality and school health support issues.

The appellants, airline pilots forced to retire at age 60, filed complaints with the Canadian Human Rights Commission alleging age discrimination.

The Commission dismissed the complaints because the Canadian Human Rights Act provided an exception for mandatory retirement at the normal industry age.

The appellants sought judicial review, arguing the exception violated the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that neither the Commission nor a tribunal appointed by it has the jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of its enabling statute, as Parliament did not grant them the power to determine general questions of law.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting a two-and-a-half-year-old child.

At trial, the Crown did not call the child to testify, but instead introduced out-of-court statements made by the child to others.

The trial judge admitted the statements without conducting a formal inquiry into whether it was necessary to rely on hearsay rather than calling the child.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the trial judge erred in failing to make a formal finding of necessity, the error did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The uncontradicted expert evidence established that the child would have been traumatized by testifying and lacked testimonial competence, meaning a trial judge would inevitably have found the necessity requirement met.

The appeal was dismissed.