Gérard V. La Forest

The accused, a senator, was charged with accepting a benefit in consideration for exercising influence in connection with government business, contrary to s. 121(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding that the Crown failed to prove a 'corrupt' state of mind.

The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that s. 121(1)(a) does not require a 'corrupt' state of mind.

The Crown need only prove that the accused intentionally committed the prohibited act with knowledge of the relevant circumstances.

The appellant assisted an undercover police officer in purchasing cocaine by locating a seller, negotiating the price, and passing the money and drugs between the parties.

He was acquitted of trafficking at trial, but the Court of Appeal entered a conviction.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the issue was whether a person who assists a purchaser of narcotics can be convicted of trafficking as a party under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court held that while a mere purchaser cannot be convicted of trafficking, a person who acts as an agent for the purchaser or assists the purchaser in buying drugs aids and abets the seller by facilitating the transaction.

The appeal was dismissed and the conviction upheld.

The Crown applied for a rehearing on the issue of whether there should be a transition period for the operation of the Court's prior judgment requiring a warrant to effect an arrest in a dwelling.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted the application and stayed the operation of that aspect of the judgment for six months from May 22, 1997, with national effect, though it did not apply to the disposition of the present case.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding the issuance of search warrants under the Competition Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the Federal Court of Appeal which held that the Act does not provide for an appeal from the issuance of search warrants.

The appellant Indian band surrendered a portion of its reserve to the Federal Crown in 1966 for full market value to be used as a municipal airport, with a stipulation that the land would revert to the band if it ceased to be used for public purposes.

Following 1988 amendments to the Indian Act that brought lands surrendered 'otherwise than absolutely' into the definition of 'reserve' for taxation purposes, the band levied property taxes on the respondent municipality.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that despite the sui generis nature of native land rights, the true intention of the parties was an absolute surrender for sale.

The Court concluded that the lands were not 'designated lands' under the Indian Act and thus not subject to the band's property tax jurisdiction.

The appellants, the owner and manager of a tavern, were charged with allowing indecent performances under s. 167(1) of the Criminal Code after undercover police observed lap dancing involving sexual contact between nude dancers and patrons.

The trial judge acquitted both, finding the performances were not indecent and the owner lacked mens rea.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittals.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the performances were indecent as they exceeded the community standard of tolerance due to the degrading nature of the sexual contact in a public tavern.

The manager's conviction was upheld.

However, the Court restored the owner's acquittal, finding the Court of Appeal erred in overturning the trial judge's factual finding that the owner lacked the requisite mens rea because he had reasonably delegated entertainment responsibilities to the manager.

The appellant arrested the respondent's cargo following a breach of contract dispute.

The arrest was later set aside, and the respondent counterclaimed for damages for wrongful arrest, including loss of interest on security and loss of working capital.

The Federal Court of Appeal awarded damages for both.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, upholding the award for loss of interest as a valid exercise of discretion over costs, but overturning the damages for loss of working capital because damages for wrongful arrest require a finding of bad faith or gross negligence, which was absent.

The appellant airlines purchased liquor abroad and stored it in customs bonded warehouses in Ontario for use on domestic and international flights.

The provincial liquor authorities charged markups and gallonage fees on the liquor.

The airlines sought restitution of the fees and a declaration that the provincial liquor monopoly was constitutionally inapplicable to their federal aeronautical undertaking.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the liquor was subject to the federal Importation of Intoxicating Liquors Act and that the provincial monopoly applied, as providing liquor is not an integral part of an aeronautical undertaking.

However, the Court ordered the provincial authorities to make full restitution of the gallonage fees wrongfully collected under an inapplicable licensing regime.

The plaintiff sued her physician for the costs of raising her daughter, who was born with congenital injuries caused by maternal chickenpox.

The plaintiff alleged that had the physician properly advised her of the risks, she would have terminated the pregnancy.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding that the plaintiff would not have aborted the pregnancy even if fully informed.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, holding the trial judge applied the wrong test for causation.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge's decision, affirming the modified objective test for causation in medical malpractice cases.

The United States requested the extradition of the respondent, a Canadian citizen, on charges of attempting to launder money and conspiracy to launder money following a failed FBI sting operation.

The respondent argued his conduct would not constitute an offence in Canada because the money was not actually the proceeds of crime, making the offence impossible.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondent's conduct would amount to a criminal attempt and a criminal conspiracy under Canadian law, as factual impossibility is not a defence to these inchoate offences.

The Court also dismissed the respondent's cross-appeal regarding disclosure, finding that the limited disclosure provided was adequate for an extradition hearing.

The appellant filed an access to information request for copies of weekend sign-in logs for employees of the Department of Finance.

The Minister disclosed the logs but deleted the employees' names, identification numbers, and signatures, claiming they constituted personal information.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the names prima facie constituted personal information, they fell within the exception in s. 3(j) of the Privacy Act because the number of hours spent at the workplace relates to the position or functions of the individual.

The Court ordered the disclosure of the requested information.

The appellant, Hickman Motors Ltd., acquired depreciable property from its subsidiary upon the subsidiary's winding-up.

The appellant held the assets for five days, during which they produced leasing revenue, before transferring them to a newly incorporated subsidiary.

The Minister of National Revenue disallowed the appellant's claim for capital cost allowance (CCA) on the basis that the assets were not acquired for the purpose of producing income.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the assets produced revenue and were therefore acquired for the purpose of producing income.

The Court distinguished the 'purpose of producing income' test for CCA from the 'reasonable expectation of profit' test, finding that the appellant satisfied the requirements of s. 20(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act and the relevant regulations.

The appellant was charged with sexual assault.

During the investigation, a police officer made a tape recording of an initial interview with the complainant but subsequently lost it.

The trial judge entered a stay of proceedings due to the Crown's failure to disclose the tape.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that where the Crown loses evidence, it must provide a satisfactory explanation.

If the explanation satisfies the court that the evidence was not destroyed or lost due to unacceptable negligence, the disclosure obligation is discharged, provided there is no abuse of process or actual prejudice to the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

The respondent, a government employee, was terminated while receiving short-term disability benefits.

He sued for wrongful dismissal and was awarded damages representing his salary for a 20-month notice period, with the Court of Appeal holding that disability benefits received during that period should not be deducted.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the employer's appeal, holding that the employment contract did not intend for the employee to receive both disability benefits and damages for wrongful dismissal simultaneously.

Consequently, the disability benefits received during the notice period must be deducted from the wrongful dismissal damages.

The appellant failed to serve and file its factum within the prescribed time, resulting in its appeal being deemed abandoned under article 503.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The appellant filed a motion to be relieved from default, citing counsel's ignorance of the new provision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding it could only grant special leave to appeal, which it declined to do.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal has the jurisdiction under its general power in article 523 to rectify an administrative abandonment to safeguard the rights of the parties, and that an error by counsel should not deprive a party of its rights where no injustice to the opposing party results.

The respondent failed to serve and file its factum within the prescribed time, resulting in its appeal being deemed abandoned under the Code of Civil Procedure.

The respondent applied to the Court of Appeal to rectify the abandonment, citing a technical error by counsel.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court held, following its concurrent decision in Construction Gilles Paquette ltée, that the Court of Appeal has the general power to rectify such an abandonment to safeguard the parties' rights where the error is technical and causes no prejudice.

The appeal was allowed solely to amend the Court of Appeal's order, finding that special leave to appeal was unnecessary to reinstate the appeal.

The appellant provided funds to a director of the respondent company to invest in the company.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that, based on the trial judge's findings, the appellant was entitled to the protection of the indoor management rule under section 19 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The respondent was therefore bound by its director's representations.

The appeal was allowed and the trial judgment restored.

The appellant appealed against sentences involving the imposition of consecutive sentences.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the unusual circumstances of the case distinguished it from previous jurisprudence, and agreed with the conclusion of the Court of Appeal of Alberta.

The accused was convicted of three counts of sexual assault and declared a dangerous offender, receiving an indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal overturned the designation, finding the trial judge failed to consider the gravity of the predicate offences in isolation.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that under s. 753(b) of the Criminal Code, a trial judge need not focus on the objective seriousness of a predicate offence to justify a dangerous offender designation, provided the offender's past conduct demonstrates a present likelihood of inflicting future harm.

The trial judge's findings were reasonable and supported by psychiatric evidence.

The respondent was a client of the appellant, a real estate broker.

The appellant negotiated to purchase a commercial building on behalf of the respondent.

The vendor rejected the offer and made a counteroffer.

The appellant rejected the counteroffer but signed it back.

The vendor advised the appellant of the amount it would accept.

Instead of conveying this information to the respondent, the appellant arranged for his wife to purchase the property, which was then transferred to the appellant and his wife.

The respondent sued for breach of fiduciary duty and sought a constructive trust over the property, abandoning his claim for damages because the property's market value had decreased.

The trial judge found a breach of duty but refused a constructive trust because there was no unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal reversed and ordered the property conveyed to the respondent.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a constructive trust can be imposed for a breach of fiduciary duty even without unjust enrichment, based on good conscience, to ensure fiduciaries remain faithful.