3 total
Acquittal entered after miscarriage of justice where Crown would call no evidence.
On an appeal from a conviction quashed for miscarriage of justice arising from Crown non-disclosure, the Court addressed the proper remedy under s. 686(2) of the Criminal Code.
The Court held that where the Crown seeks an acquittal and undertakes to call no evidence at a new trial, an appellate court may enter an acquittal directly rather than require pro forma retrial steps or impose a judicial stay.
The Court emphasized that acquittal remains distinct from a stay and that a stay is a residual remedy considered only after primary remedies are assessed.
Applying those principles, the Court set aside the stay of proceedings and entered an acquittal.
Jury instructions on party liability and active participation did not occasion a miscarriage of justice.
The appellant was charged with multiple counts of first degree murder.
At trial, the Crown argued he was the sole perpetrator, while the defence suggested others were involved.
The trial judge initially instructed the jury that they must acquit if they had a reasonable doubt the appellant was the actual shooter.
Following a jury question, the judge amended the instruction to include liability if the appellant was 'otherwise an active participant'.
The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and appealed, arguing the amended instruction undermined trial fairness.
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the instructions adequately conveyed the alternate routes to liability and no miscarriage of justice occurred.
Parliament cannot deprive provincial superior courts of their inherent jurisdiction to punish for ex facie contempt.
The appellant, a young person, was convicted of ex facie contempt of court for violating an injunction prohibiting protest activities.
He argued that under s. 47(2) of the Young Offenders Act, the youth court had exclusive jurisdiction over the offence.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that while Parliament can confer jurisdiction over ex facie contempt on youth courts, it cannot do so to the exclusion of provincial superior courts.
The power to punish for contempt is part of the core, inherent jurisdiction of superior courts protected by s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, and cannot be removed without a constitutional amendment.