Clark

Following a guilty verdict for first-degree murder, the applicants sought a factual inquiry and a mistrial after discovering that a juror had cycled past the murder scene and posted about it on a fitness app during deliberations.

The court declined to conduct the inquiry, finding that the evidence was sufficiently preserved for an appeal and that questioning the juror about the impact of the visit would violate the secrecy of jury deliberations.

The court also dismissed the mistrial application, concluding that the physical layout of the scene was not central to the main issue of identity, was already well-documented in evidence, and did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought pre-trial applications alleging abuse of process and seeking to adduce hearsay and alternate suspect evidence.

They argued the Crown preferred a direct indictment for an oblique purpose to shield a key witness from discovery, and sought disclosure of the materials provided to the Attorney General.

The court dismissed the abuse of process application, finding no evidence of bad faith or improper motive to displace the presumption that prosecutorial discretion was exercised properly.

The court also dismissed the hearsay application and provisionally dismissed the alternate suspect application, finding the proposed evidence lacked a sufficient connection to the crime and its prejudicial effect vastly outweighed any probative value.

During a trial for first degree murder, the applicant sought to preclude the Crown from asking the principal witness to identify him in the dock.

The applicant argued the identification had trifling probative value and was dangerously prejudicial because the witness was intoxicated and the prior photo identification was flawed.

The court dismissed the application, holding that in-dock identifications are presumptively admissible and that any frailties in the evidence are matters of weight for the jury to assess following cross-examination and proper jury instructions.

The applicants were found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to murder and first-degree murder.

Prior to sentencing, they applied for a stay of the conspiracy count, arguing that entering convictions for both offences would violate the rule against multiple convictions for the same delict.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the offences lacked both the factual and legal nexus required to engage the rule.

The conspiracy was complete weeks before the murder, and the legal elements of the offences protect different societal interests.

The offenders, both youthful members of a street gang, were convicted of second-degree murder following a planned, gang-related shooting that resulted in the death of an unarmed victim.

The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period near the 25-year maximum, while the defence sought 12 to 15 years, arguing systemic discrimination should mitigate the sentence.

The court rejected the systemic discrimination argument, finding the gravity of the offence eclipsed such factors.

Weighing the egregious nature of the planned shooting against the offenders' youth, the court sentenced both offenders to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 15 years.

The accused was tried for robbery, wearing a disguise with intent, and possession of property obtained by crime following the robbery of a Bell store by two masked men.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including surveillance video, clothing comparisons, footprint impressions, and the accused's flight from police.

During the trial, the court permitted the Crown to reopen its case to admit clothing exhibits due to an oversight.

The court found that the cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence, including the accused's presence with the other perpetrators before and after the robbery, the purchase of the bag used in the robbery, and his flight from police, established his identity as one of the robbers beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

During a criminal trial for firearms and criminal organization offences, the court ruled on several evidentiary and procedural applications.

The court denied the accused's requests to sit at counsel table rather than the prisoner's dock, citing security concerns and courtroom configuration.

The court admitted voice messages retrieved from an accused's phone that demonstrated a willingness to commit robbery, finding them highly probative of gang association.

The court also delivered mixed rulings on the admissibility of intercepted communications used for voice identification, admitting one as circumstantial evidence of state of mind while excluding others.

In a first-degree murder trial involving alleged street gang members, the Crown sought to clarify and maintain the admissibility of certain evidence following a pre-trial ruling.

The court reconsidered the admissibility of a YouTube video after correcting a factual misapprehension about its contents, ruling it remained highly probative of gang affiliation and motive.

The court also permitted the Crown to adduce a composite audio recording for voice identification, provided no visual component was shown.

Finally, the court held that numerous handwritten documents and rap lyrics seized from the respondents' apartment were admissible without further redaction, as their probative value regarding gang membership and animus toward rival gangs significantly outweighed their prejudicial effect as bad character evidence.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, challenged the admissibility of two statements made to police and sought the exclusion of derivative evidence (cell phone records and a witness) under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found the first statement involuntary due to the Crown's failure to account for a significant period of the accused's custody, but ruled the second statement voluntary.

The court also found breaches of the accused's s. 8 and s. 10(b) Charter rights during his initial investigative detention.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court declined to exclude the derivative evidence, finding the breaches were not serious, the impact on the accused's rights was minimal, and the evidence would have been inevitably discovered.

The Crown applied to call a police detective as an expert witness on street gangs in a first-degree murder trial.

The accused opposed the application, arguing the expert was biased and the proposed evidence, including rap videos, letters, and graffiti, was highly prejudicial.

The court found the expert evidence necessary and the detective qualified.

The court admitted most of the videos, letters, and graffiti, finding their probative value in establishing motive and the existence of a criminal organization outweighed their prejudicial effect, but excluded evidence of the accused's prior convictions and certain letters.

The Crown applied to remove defence counsel on the basis that counsel had a realistic prospect of becoming a witness at the accused's upcoming murder trial.

Counsel had interviewed a potential alternate suspect alone and was personally involved in discovering a piece of physical evidence (a crutch) allegedly linked to the murder.

The court granted the application, finding a realistic risk that counsel would need to testify to rehabilitate the witness or explain the discovery of the evidence, which would compromise his role as an advocate.

Consequently, the court granted the defence's application to adjourn the trial.

The court denied the accused's application for bail, finding detention necessary on primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds given his extensive criminal record and history of failing to appear.

The accused, charged with second degree murder of his wife, sought to exclude statements made to police on the basis that they were involuntary and obtained in breach of his ss. 10(a) and 10(b) Charter rights.

The accused argued that the police failed to provide a Dari interpreter promptly, delaying his ability to consult counsel.

The court found the statements voluntary despite a recording failure, as the officers' notes and an interpreter's statement provided a sufficient record.

The court also dismissed the Charter applications, finding the accused understood the reason for his arrest and his right to counsel in Hindi, and that the delay in securing a Dari interpreter was reasonable in the circumstances.

The statements were ruled admissible.

In a murder trial where the accused admitted to cutting his wife's throat, the Crown sought to adduce a graphic autopsy photograph of the wound to assist the jury in determining the accused's intent.

The accused opposed the admission, arguing the photograph was highly prejudicial and had minimal probative value.

The court found that the photograph had considerable probative value in illustrating the force required to inflict the injury, which was central to the issue of intent.

The court concluded that the probative value outweighed any potential prejudicial effect and ruled the photograph admissible.

The accused, Jermaine Gager, brought an application for a mistrial during his joint trial for first-degree murder with co-accused Corey Smelie.

The application was based on the closing address of counsel for the co-accused, who improperly commented on his client's failure to testify and suggested he was afraid of retribution from the moving party.

The court found the remarks were improper but concluded that the resulting prejudice was not irremediable.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, holding that a specific curative instruction to the jury would be sufficient to ensure trial fairness.

In a first-degree murder trial involving alleged street gang members, the Crown applied to qualify a police detective as an expert on Toronto street gangs.

The defence brought parallel applications seeking further disclosure of police records, including confidential informant databases, debriefing notes, training presentations, and wiretap intercepts from other investigations.

The court ordered redacted disclosure of the debriefing notes and presentations but denied access to the informant database and the massive wiretap files, finding the latter to be third-party records that did not meet the threshold for likely relevance.

The court qualified the detective as an expert but strictly limited the scope of his permissible opinion evidence to prevent him from usurping the jury's fact-finding function, particularly regarding whether specific individuals were gang members or whether a 'gang war' existed.