ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

COURT FILE NO.: CR-16-91550-0000 DATE: 20170607

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN – and – MARCO MAONE, CARLO FAZZARI and ANTONIO AGRESTA Applicants

COUNSEL: Jeremy Streeter, for the Crown, Respondent Glenn Sandberg and Daniel Santoro, for the Applicant Marco Maone Jaime Stephenson and S. Ford, for the Applicant Carlo Fazzari

HEARD: June 5-6, 2017

SECTION 11(B) APPLICATION

A.J. O’Marra j.

[1] The applicants Marco Maone and Carlo Fazzari seek a stay of proceedings on the basis that their s. 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time has been infringed. Co-accused Antonio Agresta has declined to participate in the application.

[2] Marco Maone is charged with five counts in the indictment of trafficking cocaine contrary to s. 5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and four counts of possession of proceeds of crime contrary to s. 355(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. Carlo Fazzari is charged jointly with Antonio Agresta with one count of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

[3] Their arrest, along with 17 other accused occurred on June 2, 2015. The accused were all arrested at the completion of a large scale joint police services investigation that had commenced in June 2013, initially referred to as Project OBusta, later Project OPhoenix.

[4] Initially, all accused were dealt with collectively in the Ontario Court of Justice. By December 2015 the remaining accused were grouped into 6 separate groups, but with a six week preliminary inquiry set to start for all accused on October 24, 2016. The progress of this matter is set out in the Crown respondent’s summary affixed as Appendix A to these reasons which the applicants accept as accurate, supplemented by the applicant Maone’s summary affixed as Appendix B and applicant Fazzari’s as Appendix C.

[5] On July 8, 2016, the Supreme Court of Canada released R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 which created a new framework for the analysis of whether an accused’s right to be tried within a reasonable time has been breached under s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The framework creates two ceilings beyond which the delay is considered to be presumptively unreasonable. The ceiling in the Provincial Court for a matter “going to trial” is 18 months and 30 months for a case “going to trial” in the Superior Court of Justice.

[6] In this matter, on September 9, 2016, two months following the Jordan decision and almost 2 months before the scheduled start of the preliminary inquiry, the Crown filed separate preferred indictments with respect to remaining grouped accused involved in the Project OPhoenix prosecution, which placed the matter directly in the Superior Court for trial. The applicants’ first appearance in the Superior Court was September 29, 2016.

[7] On October 17, 2016, at the first case management, judicial pre-trial meeting for this group of co-accused, a trial date was set to commence October 16, 2017 with an estimated trial time of four weeks to completion.

[8] The total time from the arrest of these accused, June 2, 2015 to the anticipated completion of the trial is 29 months, and thereby within the 30 month ceiling as set out in R. v. Jordan as being reasonable for matters “going to trial” in the Superior Court.

[9] The applicant Maone raises principally two arguments on the application:

1. The presumptive ceiling that should apply in the circumstances of the Crown preferring an indictment, thereby vitiating a preliminary inquiry should be one of 18 months, beyond which the delay is unreasonable.
2. If 30 months is the presumptive ceiling the delay of 29 months in this instance is still unreasonable.

[10] Counsel for the applicant Fazzari in submissions appears to accept that the 30 month presumptive ceiling applies in this case, however, focused on the second argument that the time to trial completion, 29 months, is still unreasonable in his particular circumstances.

The Applicable Presumptive Ceiling

[11] In R. v. Jordan, Moldaver J. at para. 49 stated the following:

For cases going to trial in Provincial Court, the presumptive ceiling is 18 months from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of the trial. For cases going to trial in the Superior Court, the presumptive ceiling is 30 months to the actual or anticipated end of the trial. We note the 30 month ceiling would also apply to cases going to trial in the Provincial Court after a preliminary inquiry.

[12] In either situation of the matter going to trial in the Superior Court or Provincial Court after a preliminary in provinces where the option exists for re-election for trial in the provincial court the 30 month ceiling applies.

[13] The applicant Maone contends that since no preliminary inquiry was held in this case because the Crown preferred a direct indictment that the presumptive ceiling that should apply is 18 months. The fact that the applicant waited for almost a year for the preliminary inquiry and was deprived of it weeks before it was to start should not be used to penalize him by triggering a higher presumptive ceiling. In effect the applicant argues that in the absence of a preliminary inquiry the 18 months ceiling should be applied. Moreover, much of the time spent in the Ontario Court of Justice before the Crown preferred the indictment was pointless.

[14] Several cases since the release of Jordan have held that regardless of whether a preliminary inquiry is held or not, a matter going to trial in the Superior Court of Justice has a presumptive ceiling of 30 months: see R. v. Bulhosen, 2016 ONSC 7284, paras. 45-49, R. v. Nyznik, 2017 ONSC 69 at paras. 23-26, R. v. Jones, 2016 ABQB 691 at para. 26, R. v. Cabera, 2016 ABQB 707 at paras. 18-28.

[15] The Supreme Court of Canada in Jordan does not equate the conduct of holding a preliminary inquiry in the Provincial Court as being necessary to calculate the 30 month ceiling in a matter going to trial in the Superior Court.

[16] In Nyznik, Nordheimer J. noted at para. 24 “that at no point however has the Supreme Court of Canada ever said that a preliminary inquiry must actually occur in order to create or justify the two stage approach”.

[17] Cases tried in the Superior Court of Justice will attract a longer period of reasonable delay than in the Provincial Court, whether or not a preliminary inquiry is held. Further, in linking the presumptive ceiling to whether a preliminary inquiry actually occurs would create the potential for mischief by an accused who consented to committal prior to the preliminary inquiry in order to invoke the 18 month ceiling.

[18] Further, the Supreme Court does not consider the issue of the effect of a preferred indictment as it applies to the presumptive ceiling, whereas it could readily have done so. Several cases have also considered the issue and have concluded that it does not bear on whether the 30 month or 18 month ceiling applies. As noted in Nyznik at para. 33 several cases have reached the conclusion that the preferring of a direct indictment does not change the presumptive ceiling that applies to a case to be tried in the Superior Court. (See also: R. v. Jones at para. 26, and R. v. Bulhosen at para. 69).

[19] In addition, recently in R. v. Manasseri (2016), 2016 ONCA 703, O.J. No. 5004 (CA) Watt J.A. in a footnote to his reasons stated that more use of the preferred indictment should be considered to ensure the timeliness of trial in light of the decision in Jordan:

Direct indictments under s. 577(a) of the Criminal Code have been infrequent in this province. However, after Jordan, with full disclosure as required by Stinchcombe, the Crown should give very serious consideration to preferring direct indictments to fulfill its mandate under s. 11(b) and to ensure, to the extent reasonably possible, that criminal trial proceedings do not exceed the presumptive ceilings set by Jordan.

[20] The applicant suggests that the Crown should have preferred the indictment earlier and that the time spent waiting for the preliminary inquiry in the Provincial Court was wasted time.

[21] It was not wasted time. While in the provincial court, bail issues were dealt with, voluminous disclosure was prepared and disseminated in an expeditious fashion, the Crown prepared “hyper linked” s. 540(7) documents setting out in a comprehensive fashion the case against each accused. A senior jurist of the Ontario Court undertook the case management of the matter to coordinate the interests of 20 accused, counsel and the prosecution and to expedite the process. In the process, the Crown reduced the total number of accused from 20 to 9 by accepting guilty pleas from three accused, withdrawing charges against four accused and severing proceedings against four accused. With respect to the group of six which included the applicants, it was reduced to three by resolving matters against one and severing two other accused.

[22] I accept that the 30 month presumptive ceiling as set out in Jordan is applicable in this matter as it proceeds to trial in the Superior Court and that at 29 months to the anticipated conclusion of the trial the time period is reasonable.

Is the Delay in this Instance Unreasonable?

[23] However, where the total delay from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of the trial falls below the presumptive ceiling the delay may be still considered unreasonable if the defence can establish:

1. The applicant took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings, and
2. That the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

[24] Moldaver J. in Jordan at para. 48 notes that where the time to trial completion falls below the presumptive ceiling the applicant bears the onus to show that the delay was unreasonable. Further, stays in cases beneath the presumptive ceiling will be rare and limited to clear cases. Absent both factors being established the s. 11(b) application must fail.

1. Has the Applicant taken meaningful and sustained steps to expedite proceedings?

[25] The Court in Jordan states at para. 85 that to establish this criterion it is not enough for the defence to make token efforts such as simply putting on the record that it wanted an early trial date. It falls to the defence to show it attempted to set the earliest possible hearing dates and was co-operative and responsive to the Crown and the Court and by putting on the record timely notice that delay was becoming a problem.

i) Applicant Maone

[26] In this instance, with respect to applicant Maone, counsel submits that as early as December 9, 2015, even though he had yet to retain counsel, he set a date for the preliminary inquiry “with or without counsel”. However, as noted by the respondent Crown, the applicant did not retain counsel until August 17, 2016 more than 14 months after he was arrested and two months before the scheduled commencement of the preliminary inquiry.

[27] At earlier judicial pre-trials in the Ontario Court prior to the setting of the preliminary inquiry date, counsel appeared who had not yet been retained to assist the applicant but did not complete the pre-trial forms and statement of issues and witnesses as required by the case management justice. It was noted on October 26, 2015 by counsel assisting the applicant he would not be able to file a statement of issues and witnesses for the applicant as he had not been retained. Similarly, on December 9, 2015 the preliminary was set with or without counsel, when counsel had not yet been retained and again not in a position to file a statement of issues or witnesses. By the time counsel was retained in August 2016 the applicant had still not provided judicial pre-trial forms or statement of issues and witnesses to the court or the Crown to help define the shape and scope of the anticipated preliminary inquiry set for October 24, 2016.

[28] I accept the submission of the Crown respondent that the failure to retain counsel in a timely manner was an example of non-action by the applicant Maone inconsistent with a desire for a timely trial, and opposite to taking meaningful and sustained steps to expedite proceedings.

[29] Further, the applicant Maone has not pointed to any aspect of prior proceedings where he took issue with the pace of the litigation or the Crown’s plan to hold a single preliminary inquiry for all 20 accused, or the scheduling of the preliminary inquiry.

[30] After the indictment was preferred, the Crown asked in an email dated September 8, 2016, that all counsel turn their minds to completing judicial pre-trial forms in order that the matter proceed without delay in the Superior Court. The Crown sent out a completed judicial pre-trial form on September 12, 2016. On September 29, 2016 when the matter first appeared in the Superior Court, notwithstanding counsel for the applicants having failed to complete the judicial pre-trial form as required prior to setting a trial date, counsel for the applicant Maone by agent stated he was ready to set a trial date. The Court responded that it would be hard to set a trial date if counsel had not complied with the Court’s requirement that a pre-trial form be completed before a trial date could be set.

[31] On the next appearance, October 17, 2016, the first case management, judicial pre-trial resulted in a trial date being set for October, 17, 2017, four weeks required, as agreed to by all counsel.

[32] The applicant Maone has not pointed to any evidence which in my view demonstrates a meaningful and sustained effort to expedite the proceedings. Rather, the record reveals that there is an acceptance by the applicant as to the pace of the litigation. The evidence displays more one of complacency with the progress to trial, rather than any meaningful and sustained effort to expedite it.

ii) Applicant Fazzari

[33] Counsel for the applicant, Fazzari asserted as early as the first Ontario Court of Justice judicial pre-trial appearance, September 8, 2015 that after reviewing the initial disclosure he wanted to proceed directly to trial in the provincial court. As a co-accused with other accused who wanted a preliminary inquiry he was bound to the process. On March 24, 2016, after the preliminary inquiry had been set the applicant waived his right to participate in the preliminary inquiry.

[34] Earlier, on December 9, 2015 when the date had been set, as agreed to by all parties, the applicant raised the question of severance, which the Crown declined. The applicant did not pursue an application for severance.

[35] After the Crown preferred the indictment, counsel for the Fazzari prepared the required judicial pre-trial form to participate in the first case management pre-trial meeting held October, 17, 2016. Counsel took no issue with setting of the trial date in October 2017, and the anticipated trial length of four weeks.

[36] Counsel for the applicant was cooperative with the Crown and Court, and in the circumstances took steps that would be expected to ensure a timely trial date for her client.

2. Has the case taken markedly longer than expected?

[37] The second requirement that the applicants must demonstrate is that the case not just took longer, but “markedly longer” than it reasonably should have to come to completion. Some of the factors for the court to consider include the complexity of the case, local considerations, and whether the Crown took reasonable steps to expedite the proceedings.

[38] Counsel for both applicants submit that this is a simple case rather than a complex one as asserted by the prosecution. Counsel for the applicant Maone submits that it is really just 5 counts of trafficking cocaine. Counsel for applicant Fazzari submits that he is facing only one count of possession for the purpose of trafficking alleged to have occurred while he was a passenger in a motor vehicle where half a kilogram of cocaine was found by police.

[39] However, in this instance in assessing the time to trial and whether in is markedly longer than reasonable one must consider the nature of the case and the whole of the proceedings. It is a case that started with numerous accused and voluminous disclosure.

[40] In the summary of proceedings, Appendix A, it is noted that on July 8, 2015, a little more than one month after arrests, the first wave of disclosure was provided to accused consisting of a hard drive containing 745 gigabytes of data, and 19,364 documents. The documents included 768 intercepted communications, notes from 236 officers and 794 surveillance reports. Further, on August 25, 2015, the second wave of disclosure was provided consisting of 394 files including all judicial authorizations and Informations to Obtain.

[41] The Crown respondent notes that there were 14 one party consent authorizations and 4 Part VI wiretap authorizations, all of which was disclosed in less than three months after charges were laid. The case management judge in the Ontario Court of Justice, Lipson J. described disclosure as “a ton of disclosure” and other counsel described it as being “mammoth”. The fact that six weeks were set aside for the purpose of a preliminary inquiry which would involve all accused speaks to the complexity of the matter.

[42] The Crown set out a plan in order to reduce the complexity and streamline the process. Disclosure was provided within a few months of the arrests. The Crown, in order to proceed with manageable trials broke up the 20 accused into 6 smaller groups with related charges and evidence. The Crown sought to streamline the preliminary inquiry by preparing s. 540(7) synopses and by coordinating schedules of counsel to participation during portions of the preliminary inquiry of interest to their respective clients. Eventually, the 20 original accused was reduced to 9 accused, by guilty pleas, withdrawals and a number of severances.

[43] With respect to these applicants, they were initially placed in a group of six accused however, the number was reduced to three after the Crown resolved a case against one and negotiated severance for two others in the group.

[44] The Crown’s case with respect to the applicant Maone and the two other accused consists of 10 counts with an anticipated 15 Crown witnesses, which will still require four weeks to complete. By any standard, the case qualifies as a complex matter and not a simple one as counsel suggests.

[45] Counsel for the Fazzari submits that his alleged offence is also a simple one, which the Crown should have severed from the other accused in its obligation to protect his right to a timely trial, even though counsel chose not apply for severance.

[46] The Crown respondent notes that although Fazzari is alleged to have been involved in a single transaction it was one in which he is alleged to have been involved with the other two accused. Moreover, it is alleged that he was more than a “found in” as suggested by his counsel. The case involves intercepted communications between Maone and Agresta, which sheds light on his role in their joint enterprise. There is surveillance video tape evidence of a meeting with co-accused and a matter of factual dispute that the applicant carried the illegal substance into the motor vehicle where he was a passenger with Agresta. The applicant is properly a co-accused with Maone and Agresta.

[47] Where there are multiple accused it adds to the complexity of the trial and length. In R. v. Vassell, 2016 SCC 26 at para. 6, it was noted that “delay caused by proceeding against multiple accused must be accepted as a fact of life and must be considered in deciding what constitutes a reasonable time for trial.” Reasonable time will fluctuate within the meaning of s. 11b) depending on whether accused are standing alone or together. Here, the applicant accused are properly being tried together and the matter is proceeding to an anticipated completion within the 30 month ceiling.

[48] There are sound policy reason for proceeding with joint trials. In R. v. Ny and Phan, 2016 ONSC 8031 Fairburn J. observed at para. 42-45:

It is a well-recognized principle of law that the interests of justice are most often best served by having people who are alleged to have committed crimes together, tried together and their guilt or innocence determined together. As Laskin J.A. held in R. v. Whylie (2007), 207 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (O.C.A.) at para. 24: “A single trial for two or more accused generally conserves judicial resources, avoids inconsistent verdicts, and avoids witnesses having to testify more than once.” See also: R. v. L.G., 2007 ONCA 654, at para 62.

The presumption of a joint trial, particularly where individuals are said to have worked in concert, will only be displaced where the interests of justice require separation, as per s. 591(3) …

[49] The comment made by Fairburn J. in Ny and Phan at para 45 is particularly apt in this case where the time to trial completion, 29 months, is just below the ceiling for trials in the Superior Court: “The important policy rationales for keeping joint trials intact must not be lost in the increasing shadow of an approaching ceiling.”

[50] In R. v. Nguyen 2013 ONCA 169 at para. 61 Watt J.A. also observed:

Large, complex prosecutions involving multiple accused and counts require concerted efforts on the part of investigators and prosecutors to ensure timely disclosure and trial. Amongst those charged, the involvement of some will be less than others: peripheral not central, discrete, perhaps disconnected from the principals and the core of the case. In some instances, the minor players can be tried separately, efficiently and more expeditiously. But these decisions about how to proceed, against whom, upon what charges, and on what evidence, for that matter, whether or when to do so or to withdraw charges, are contingent upon interdependent circumstances and factors far removed from the knowledge of presiding judges. Courts should be hesitant to scrutinize the Crown’s decisions, absent clear reason to do so: see Khan, at para 30.

[51] There is no basis proffered by the applicant for the court to question the Crown’s decision to proceed with a joint trial with respect of the applicant Fazzari and the other two. Indeed, there are sound policy reasons to do so, in keeping with conserving judicial resources, avoidance of inconsistent verdicts, and requiring witnesses to testify more than once.

[52] In this jurisdiction, one of the busiest in Canada, a multiple accused trial requiring four weeks trial time, the coordination of the court and counsel availability, unfortunately, has often taken longer than 30 months to come to trial. That this case is to be dealt with within 30 months is due to the efforts of the Crown and the court to ensure that this matter is to be tried within a reasonable time.

[53] The applicants have not established that the case has taken markedly longer than it should have. In the result, the applications are dismissed.

A.J. O’Marra J.

Released: June 7, 2017

APPENDIX A

Date	Summary
June 2, 2015	Information sworn. Applicant is represented by B. Micner. Crown provides counsel with a 43-page Substantive Event Summary. [1] Bail hearing set for June 9, 2015.
June 9, 2015	Applicant is represented by R. Goldman. Counsel requests an adjournment of the bail hearing.
June 23, 2015	Applicant is represented by M. Mirosolin. Counsel requests an adjournment of the bail hearing.
June 26, 2015	Bail hearing commences.
July 2, 2015	Bail hearing is completed. Crown indicates that a hard drive of disclosure will be ready on Monday (July 6), and states an intention to proceed by way of case management to move the case along as quickly as possible.
July 8, 2015	First wave of disclosure sent to counsel M. Mirosolin. It consists of a hard drive containing 745 gigabytes of data, and 19,364 documents. Those documents include 768 intercepts, notes from 236 officers, and 794 surveillance reports.
August 5, 2015	Applicant is represented by an agent for counsel R. Posner. Crown has arranged for a case management meeting with Lipson J. on September 8, 2015.
August 25, 2015	Second wave of disclosure sent to counsel. It consists of 394 files including all judicial authorizations and ITOs.
September 2, 2015	Completed Crown JPT forms are sent out to counsel. Crown asks counsel to fill them out in advance of the case management meeting.
September 8, 2015	First case management meeting before Lipson J. Applicant represented by B. Eberdt as agent for R. Posner, who is “anticipated counsel” for the applicant. Counsel is not yet retained. Counsel did not complete their JPT forms. Crown sets out its plan for proceeding expeditiously. Of the 20 accused, Crown intends to split them up into 6 groups to be prosecuted separately. Maone group includes 6 accused. Rather than have 6 separate preliminary inquiries with overlapping issues, plan is to have a single preliminary inquiry centred around the testimony of the police agent, which is common to all accused, and to set a schedule for each accused to attend to hear from discrete witnesses at their request. Crown to proceed by way of s.540(7) application. Counsel B. Eberdt agrees with plan and says it will be faster than 6 separate prosecutions. Lipson J. is attracted by the plan. Nobody takes issue with outstanding disclosure except for counsel for D’Andrea, who says that Crown has been very diligent in providing it in a timely fashion, and only some discrete notes are missing. Lipson J. puts matter over to October 26, 2015 to give accused a chance to retain counsel. Lipson J. asks counsel to provide the Crown with JPT forms and Statements of Issues and Witnesses by October 12, 2015.
October 9, 2015	Crown sends letter to counsel asking them to send their completed pre-trial forms and statements of issues and witnesses in accordance with Lipson J.’s direction from September 8, 2015.
October 26, 2015	Second case management meeting before Lipson J. Applicant represented by B. Eberdt as agent for R. Posner. Mr. Posner is not retained. The applicant did not file a JPT form or statement of issues and witnesses. Crown has received only 4 out of 20 Statements of Issues and Witnesses. Lipson J. says he appreciates that counsel is wading through “a ton of disclosure”, and asks counsel to file Statements of Issues and Witnesses by December 1, 2015. Mr. Eberdt indicates that Mr. Posner will not be able to file a Statement of Issues and Witnesses for the applicant, as he is not retained. Crown pushes to set aside a block of time for the preliminary inquiry, despite resistance from counsel who are not retained or ready to proceed. The Court targets 6 weeks beginning October 24, 2016. Lipson J. puts matter over to December 9, 2015.
December 9, 2015	Third case management meeting before Lipson J. Applicant represented by B. Eberdt, agent for R. Posner. Mr. Posner is not retained. The applicant has not yet filed a Statement of Issues and Witnesses. Counsel is not in a position to do any planning with respect to the preliminary inquiry for the applicant. Dates set for preliminary inquiry: October 24, 2016 to November 25, 2016.
December 15, 2015	Third wave of disclosure provided to counsel. It consists of 618 files.
March 30, 2016	Letter sent to Lipson J. by Crown. Crown indicates that of the 20 people arrested and charged, 10 remain. Crown intends to proceed by way of s.540(7), but applicant has not consented to that procedure. Applicant has not yet provided a statement of issues and witnesses.
May 24, 2016	Appearance to see if applicant has retained counsel and filed Statement of Issues and Witnesses. Applicant represented by M. Schachter, agent for C. Barry. Mr. Barry has been retained only for the focus hearing and to file the statement of issues, but not fully retained. Statement of issues has not yet been filed.
June 16, 2016	Appearance to see if applicant has retained counsel and filed a Statement of Issues and Witnesses. Applicant represented by C. Barry. Mr. Barry is retained to review disclosure but not for the preliminary inquiry. Statement of issues has not yet been filed.
June 22, 2016	Completed, hyperlinked s.540(7) application provided to counsel C. Barry for the applicant.
June 23, 2016	Focus hearing conducted (Transcript not provided by the applicant). Applicant still had not retained counsel.
July 8, 2016	R. v. Jordan is released.
August 17, 2016	Appearance to confirm if applicant has retained counsel. Applicant represented by D. Bygrave, agent for G. Sandberg. Counsel has been retained and prepared to go on record.
September 4, 2016	Fourth wave of disclosure provided to counsel. It consists of 119 files.
September 9, 2016	Direct Indictment filed.
September 12, 2016	Crown forwards completed JPT forms and asks that counsel complete JPT forms now. Crown in process of securing case management to move matters forward as quickly as possible.
September 21, 2016	Crown sends an email to counsel confirming intention to proceed with case management and indicating a desire to meet with counsel in advance to facilitate the timely progress of matters in superior court.
September 29, 2016	First appearance in superior court before McMahon J. Applicant represented by J. Fernendes, agent for counsel G. Sandberg. Crown requests case management. Disclosure described by other counsel as “mammoth”. Counsel for applicant says they are ready to set trial date, but they have not yet filed their JPT forms as mandated by the rules.
October 17, 2016	First case management meeting before O’Marra J. Trial date set for October 16, 2017 for 4 weeks. All counsel agreed to the dates. First time that all three counsel are available for anticipated pretrial motions is July, 2017.
December 7, 2016	Three days set aside for s.11(b) motion stating June 5, 2017.
March 27, 2017	Fifth wave of disclosure provided to counsel. It consists of 2,010 files, 1,952 of which are bulk surveillance photographs.
October 16 – November 10, 2017	Trial dates.

APPENDIX B

Date	Summary
June 2, 2015	Information sworn Special bail hearing set for June 9.
June 9, 2015	Bail hearing remanded to June 16.
June 16, 2015	Bail hearing remanded to June 23.
June 23, 2015	Bail hearing remanded to June 26.
June 26, 2015	Show Cause Hearing – to continue on July 2.
July 2, 2015	Show Cause Hearing concluded. Bail granted. Remanded to August 5, 2015, co-accused’s return date.
July 6, 2015	First wave of disclosure received.
August 5, 2015	Disclosure of judicial authorizations still outstanding, “and we expect that should be able to provide the remainder of disclosure within the next week or two weeks.”
ca. August 19	Further disclosure received
September 8, 1015	Transcript partially missing. Adjourned to October 26.
October 26, 2015	Case management meeting then remanded to December 9 for another case management meeting.
December 9, 2015	Dates starting October 24, 2016 set for preliminary hearing. Maone has not yet retained counsel so dates set with or without counsel.
May 24, 2016	Focus hearing set for June 23, but matter remanded to June 16 to provide update on retainer. Preliminary hearing confirmed for October 2016, with or without counsel.
June 16, 2016	Counsel now retained on the matter for the focus hearing to take place on June 23.
June 23, 2016	Focus Hearing conducted
August 17, 2016	Counsel G. Sandberg now retained. Further focus hearing scheduled for September 13.
September 9, 2016	Direct Indictment filed
September 13, 2016	Counsel for co-accused (adopted by Maone) notes with respect to a preferred indictment “ … it would have been nice that it happened a little bit before, certainly an inconvenience of not only counsel but accused. In this spirit of moving this case along we’ll do whatever we can to assist.” Counsel notes there is substantive disclosure still outstanding of an expert report from Italian authority, described as “a major part of the disclosure that I require.”
September 29, 2016 (Superior Court)	Counsel states he is ready to set a trial date today. JPT is required and is set for October 17th.
October 17, 2016	JPT occurs and trial dates set from October 16 to November 10 2017. Continuing pre-trial set for December 7, 2016.
October 24, 2016 (OCJ Transcript)	Preliminary hearing was set to begin today but information is withdrawn.
December 7, 2016	Charter 11(b) motion set for three days starting on June 5, 2017. Further judicial pretrial was set for February 6th.
October 16, 2017 – November 10, 2017	Trial Dates

APPENDIX C

Date	Summary
September 8, 2015	Judicial Pre-Trial I: Counsel for the Applicant advises that the Applicant would elect to proceed directly to trial at the Ontario Court of Justice. As a Preliminary Hearing was being held at the request of the co-accused, the Applicant took no position on the issues to be canvassed.
December 9, 2015	Judicial Pre-Trial III: The issue of severance of the Applicant’s charge is canvassed with the Crown in recognition of potential delay issues.
March 24, 2016	Judicial Pre-Trial V: The Applicant formally waives his right to participate in the Preliminary Hearing.

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN – and – MARCO MAONE, CARLO FAZZARI and ANTONIO AGRESTA Applicants

section 11(b) application A.J. O’Marra J.

Released: June 7, 2017

[1] A Substantive Event Summary (“SES”) is a detailed summary of the evidence complete with reference to the source documents that support each of the charges against the accused.