Dr. Cory

The Children's Aid Society of the Region of Peel sought Crown wardship of two children (Am, age 10, and Az, age 2) following the death of their older sibling M from malnutrition while in the respondents' care.

The respondents were convicted of manslaughter in M's death.

The Society apprehended Am in 2011 after discovering vitamin D and B12 deficiencies, and Az at birth in 2013.

The respondents maintained they had done nothing wrong and resisted the Society's efforts to address nutritional concerns, citing religious beliefs and conspiracy theories.

The court found both children in need of protection due to risk of physical harm from parental neglect and lack of adequate nutrition.

The court ordered Crown wardship for both children with no access to the respondents, finding that the respondents had not changed their dietary practices, profoundly mistrusted the Society, and could not cooperate in a meaningful way to ensure the children's safety.

Parents appealed a child protection decision finding three children in need of protection under the Child and Family Services Act and ordering Crown wardship without access for two children, with the third placed with the biological father under supervision.

The trial judge had concluded that one or both parents inflicted serious injuries on one child but could not determine which parent was responsible, and that the other parent failed to protect the child.

The appellants argued errors in credibility findings, failure to properly assess evidence, and improper consideration of changed circumstances.

The court held that the trial judge’s findings were supported by the evidence and attracted appellate deference absent palpable and overriding error.

Considering the severity of the injuries and the ongoing risk to the children, the court found that the disposition was in the children’s best interests.

In a second‑degree murder prosecution involving the death of an infant following severe brain and retinal injuries, the court conducted a voir dire on the admissibility of opinion evidence from treating clinicians.

The defence argued that only forensic pathologists should be permitted to testify regarding the mechanism of injury and that clinicians lacked forensic expertise.

Applying the principles governing expert evidence, including the Mohan framework and considerations from the Goudge Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology, the court held that the treating neurosurgeon and paediatric ophthalmologist could provide opinion evidence within the limits of their specialized expertise.

The court concluded that their opinions regarding the likely causes of the brain injury and retinal haemorrhages were reliable, highly probative, and did not risk undue prejudice or confusion for the jury.

The clinicians were therefore permitted to testify regarding the likely mechanisms of the observed injuries.