S. Wayne Morris

The appellant appealed two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board finding her incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medications and incapable of managing property.

The appellant argued the Board erred by relying on collateral evidence, misinterpreting her guardedness as lack of insight, and conflating capacity with best interests.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed both appeals, finding ample evidence supported the Board's conclusions that the appellant's mental disorder prevented her from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment and failing to manage her property.

A vacant land condominium corporation sought damages and disgorgement of profits against its former directors and various defendants, alleging breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the release of easements burdening adjacent land.

The plaintiff claimed the directors received secret benefits in exchange for facilitating the release of easements valued at approximately $31.5 million.

The court found that the corporation was contractually obligated to release the easements pursuant to easement release provisions in registered agreements, and that the plaintiff failed to prove the directors received secret benefits or breached their fiduciary duties.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's claim and the counterclaim.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal an interlocutory order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the amount of $5,000.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for case management of 43 individual negligence actions against the defendants, operators of long-term care homes.

These actions originated from a proposed class action that was discontinued in 2018 and replaced with individual claims.

On consent, the parties agreed to withdraw the case management motion without costs, subject to terms including scheduling discoveries in designated actions and requiring the plaintiffs to bring motions to discontinue 25 of the actions.

The applicants, 2235209 Ontario Inc. and Guy Salt, brought motions seeking interim orders including holding sale proceeds in trust, an injunction prohibiting dealings with Lot 5, a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) on Lot 5, and a Mareva Order.

The motions were based on allegations of fraud regarding mortgage amounts, which the applicants claimed vitiated prior settlements where they had terminated their agreements of purchase and sale.

The court dismissed the motions, finding that the applicants failed to establish a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favored granting the injunctions.

The court also noted the applicants' lack of clean hands, delay, and insufficient undertakings.

The plaintiffs requested a chambers appointment to establish a timetable in a negligence claim arising from a death at a long-term care facility.

The plaintiffs sought to amend their statement of claim to include punitive damages after discovering care providers allegedly falsified notes.

The court ordered a timetable for the motion to amend, production of medical records, and examinations for discovery.

The moving parties sought summary judgment to validate Joan Cavanagh's 2014 will and dismiss Carolynn Sutherland's objection, which alleged the will was invalid due to a material mistake of fact regarding a $65,000 payment.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, concluding that the testator was not mistaken about the payment, which was consideration for relinquishing an interest in a cottage, not repayment of a loan.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, validating the 2014 and 2011 wills and dismissing the objection.

This decision provides supplementary reasons for judgment, finalizing damage assessments and costs following a prior trial decision (K.M. v. Marson, 2018 ONSC 3493).

The court determined the plaintiff's past and future income loss, future loss of interdependent relationship, and management fees based on agreed-upon expert calculations and applied a 15% negative contingency.

Prejudgment interest was calculated, and a $50,000 advance payment by one defendant was credited against the total liability of both defendants, including associated prejudgment interest.

The total damages and prejudgment interest awarded to the plaintiff amounted to $2,748,513.09, with an additional $400,000 in costs.

A cross-claim for contribution and indemnity by the School Board against the individual defendant was also granted.

The defendant insurer, Compagnie d'Assurance Traders Generale ("Traders"), brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that Justin Gough operated Nancy Gough's vehicle with implied consent, thereby making Nancy vicariously liable under the Highway Traffic Act and negating the plaintiff's uninsured automobile claim against Traders.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that "consent" under s. 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act requires a positive conferral of permission to possess the vehicle, not merely a failure to prevent unauthorized use.

The evidence showed no express or implied consent for Justin to drive the vehicle, as his license was suspended, and he took the keys without permission.

The plaintiff brought an action in negligence against his former teacher and the school board for childhood sexual abuse.

The school board admitted liability in negligence for failing to monitor the teacher, and the trial proceeded as a contested assessment of damages.

The court found that the sexual abuse was a major cause of the plaintiff's severe psychiatric injuries, including major depression with dysthymia, post-traumatic stress disorder, and personality disorders.

The court rejected the school board's argument that the 'crumbling skull' principle should reduce damages by 50%, finding no measurable risk that the plaintiff's pre-existing learning disability would have caused his mental disorders.

The court awarded $250,000 in general and aggravated damages, $1,955,000 for past and future income loss, $135,587 for future loss of interdependent relationship, and other special damages, for a total of $2,413,442.11.

The applicants sought a temporary injunction to prevent a power of sale, an order to assign a first mortgage, and a vesting order for three lots, aiming to extinguish a second mortgage held by one of the respondents.

The court dismissed all requests, finding the applicants' attempt to "cut out" the second mortgage was not bona fide.

The court held that the assignment, even if granted, would not extinguish the second mortgage due to contractual subordination and the subsequent mortgagee's right to redeem.

The court also found no serious issue to be tried for the injunction, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favored the respondents, noting the applicants did not come with clean hands.

The plaintiff moved for an order to permit counsel to refer to audio transcription files and summaries from the court reporting system in closing arguments at trial, and to provide copies to opposing counsel and the trial judge, instead of using certified transcripts.

The motion was dismissed.

The court held that certified transcripts by an authorized transcriptionist are required, citing significant difficulties in deciphering audio, time-consuming review, increased costs, and potential issues on appeal if uncertified audio recordings were used.

The court emphasized the importance of certified transcripts for the integrity of the court record and efficiency.

The respondents were wholly successful on the appeal and sought partial indemnity costs totaling over $111,000.

The appellants conceded the respondents were entitled to costs but argued the amounts sought were excessive, proposing a total of $30,000.

The Court of Appeal fixed the costs payable by the appellants at $20,000 for Vicentini, $10,000 for Ford Credit, and $10,000 for Personal Insurance, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellants sought a new trial arising from a jury verdict in a child pedestrian personal injury action, challenging evidentiary rulings on vehicle brakes, expert human factors evidence, and the fairness of the defence conducted by counsel appointed by an insurer reserving rights.

The court held the trial judge properly excluded late-disclosed participant expert opinion evidence extending beyond the contemporaneous inspection form, properly admitted unobjected-to accident reconstruction and human factors evidence, and committed no error in charging the jury.

The court also held that any alleged insurer-insured conflict had to be raised promptly before trial and that no unfairness in the defence was demonstrated.

The appeal was dismissed on liability and damages, but the costs order was varied so that trial costs payable to successful defendants were payable only by the litigation guardian personally and in that capacity, not by the minor appellants personally.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an order requiring him to post security for costs.

The plaintiff, a citizen of India who returned there after his permanent resident card expired, argued the motion judge erred by not accepting an after-the-event legal protection insurance policy as adequate security and by failing to consider the merits of his slip and fall claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no conflicting decisions on principle and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, as the judge properly applied the test for security for costs and reasonably assessed the evidence.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an order requiring him to post security for costs.

The plaintiff, a citizen of India who had returned there after his permanent resident card expired, argued that a Legal Protection Certificate and Indemnity Agreement he purchased constituted sufficient security.

The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decision on a matter of principle and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to compel the defendant insurer to deliver an Affidavit of Documents and submit to an Examination for Discovery in an action seeking indemnity under section 258 of the Insurance Act.

The underlying tort action, in which the infant plaintiff obtained a judgment against his father, was under appeal.

The Master dismissed the motion, finding it premature because the tort judgment was stayed pending appeal and the requested discovery amounted to a fishing expedition that went beyond the current pleadings.

During a continued pretrial in a civil action involving multiple defendants in an equipment-related dispute, the parties were unable to reach resolution.

The court addressed scheduling concerns for an anticipated lengthy jury trial estimated to take six to eight weeks.

The matter was removed from the May 2016 blitz sittings, and the case management judge indicated that a trial date would be fixed, potentially in another judicial region to accommodate the extended duration.

Directions were also provided regarding pretrial motions, preparation of joint document books, and submission of proposed jury questions in advance of the pretrial motions.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside a registrar’s dismissal of their action for delay after failing to meet a court‑ordered deadline to set the action down for trial.

The dispute concerned contribution between insurers following a fire loss exceeding $27 million.

The court considered whether the delay was adequately explained, whether the failure to meet the deadline was inadvertent, whether the motion was brought promptly, and whether the defendant would suffer prejudice.

Although the action had previously been dismissed for delay, the court found the delay imperfect but reasonably explained, partly attributable to counsel’s health issues and shared litigation delays by both parties.

Given the absence of actual prejudice and the document‑driven nature of the coverage dispute, the interests of justice favoured setting aside the dismissal and establishing a new peremptory timetable.

Following a jury verdict finding a former teacher liable for sexual assault and the school board negligent, the plaintiff sought a ruling that the school board was vicariously liable for the teacher's actions.

The court applied the Salmond test as articulated in Bazley v. Curry, finding that the school board's enterprise and empowerment of the teacher materially increased the risk of harm.

The school board had sanctioned the teacher's operation of a mini-zoo in his classroom and provided him with a key, creating special opportunities for wrongdoing.

The court held the school board vicariously liable for the teacher's intentional torts.