COURT FILE NO.: 348/16 DATE: 2019-04-05 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Angela Joan Cavanagh, Katharine Bork and Diane Mather Moving parties – and – Carolynn Sutherland, Christine Caissie and Ruth Snider Responding parties
S. Morris, for the Moving parties H. Agnew-Pople, for the Responding parties
HEARD: November 30, 2018
J. Speyer J.
A. Introduction
[1] Joan Katherine Cavanagh died on July 31, 2016. She is survived by six daughters, the parties to this motion for summary judgment. Her will, dated June 14, 2014, left her estate to five of her daughters. The will excludes Carolynn Sutherland as a beneficiary, because, as stated by Joan Cavanagh in the will, “I wish it to be recorded in this my last will that I have intentionally omitted my daughter Carolynn Sutherland for whom I have made, in my view, adequate provision while I was alive”.
[2] The moving parties seek an order that the 2014 will is valid, and an order dismissing Carolynn Sutherland’s objection to the issuing of a certificate of appointment of an estate trustee to Angela Cavanagh, Katharine Bork and Diane Mather. Carolynn Sutherland argues that her mother’s 2014 will is invalid, because the deceased’s decision to disinherit her was contingent on a material mistake of fact.
[3] The moving parties, the three sisters who were appointed in the 2014 will to be the estate trustees, move for summary judgment. Carolyynn Sutherland has brought a cross-motion, seeking dismissal of the moving parties’ motion, and for an order extending the time for mediation provided in an order giving directions.
B. The history of the litigation
[4] This matter began as an application by Katharine Bork, Angela Cavanagh and Diane Mather for a certificate of appointment of estate trustees with a will for the estate of their mother, the late Joan Cavanagh. They were appointed by Joan Cavanagh in her 2014 will as estate trustees.
[5] Carolynn Sutherland filed an objection to the issuance of a certificate of appointment of an estate trustee, on the basis that the preparation of the 2014 will occurred in suspicious circumstances, that the dispositions made resulted from undue influence, and that the deceased lacked testamentary capacity at the time that the 2014 will was prepared and executed. Her objection now, as articulated in her factum and in oral argument, is not based on these complaints. She accepts that the will was properly executed. Rather, Ms. Sutherland pursues an argument that her mother’s decision to disinherit her was based on a material mistake of fact, and that as a result, that will, and an earlier will executed in 2011, are invalid.
[6] A motion for directions as to the procedure for bringing the matter before the court was made pursuant to Rule 75.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and was heard by Glass J. on August 8, 2017. The Order Giving Directions was made on consent of the parties, except Christine Caissie and Ruth Snider, who did not oppose the making of the Order, and have taken no position on any aspect of this litigation. The Order directed that the parties attempt to mediate their dispute, but failing a successful mediation, described the issues to be tried, and the manner in which the litigation of the disputed issues was to proceed.
[7] The essential issue to be determined is the validity of the 2014 will, and if it is found to be invalid, the validity of the 2011 will. The Order Giving Direction describes the issues to be tried in this proceeding as follows:
(1) Whether Joan Cavanagh knew and approved of the 2014 Will; (2) Whether the 2014 Will was procured by undue influence; (3) Whether the 2014 Will was made under suspicious circumstances; and, (4) Whether the 2014 Will was based on a mistake as to material facts.
Since the order was made, Ms. Sutherland has clarified her position, and limited her challenge to the validity of the will to the latter issue. The Order Giving Directions further requires that if the 2014 Will is found to be invalid, then it is to be determined which, if any, of Joan Cavanagh’s previous Wills, which are dated February 14, 2011 (the 2011 Will), August 30, 2006 (the 2006 Will), and July 11, 2001 (the 2001 Will) is valid. The 2011 Will also left nothing to Ms. Sutherland, and she challenges the validity of that will as well.
[8] The Order giving Directions provided, in the event that a trial of the issues was necessary, that they were to be tried by a judge without a jury, following the exchange of affidavits of documents, examinations for discovery or cross-examinations, and answers to undertakings. The Order giving directions designated Angela Cavanagh, Katherine Bork, and Diane Mather as the “Moving Parties”. The Order designated Carolynn Sutherland as the “Defending Respondent”.
[9] The Moving Parties have brought a motion for summary judgment under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion is supported by a record that includes affidavits from each of the moving parties, and from Joan Cavanagh’s lawyer. The Responding Party, Carolynn Sutherland, has also filed a record that contains two affidavits from her. None of the affidavits has been the subject of cross-examination.
[10] Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary judgment. Motions for summary judgment may be made by a plaintiff or a defendant in an action. In the instant case there is no action. There is no plaintiff. And there is no defendant. The jurisprudence is clear that summary judgment motions are available only in actions, and not in applications. See: Maurice v. Alles, 2016 ONCA 287, at paras. 26-32.
[11] The issues that were argued on the motion for summary judgment could have been raised on an application made pursuant to Rule 14.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The materials that would have been before the court on a Rule 14.05 application would have been no different than were filed by the parties on the summary judgment motion. The Order Giving Directions directs that any disputed issues in this matter be resolved at a trial, and thus is effectively a direction in accordance with Rule 38.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure that the proceeding be treated as an action.
[12] Given the history of this matter, and the fact that none of the parties expressed any concern about the nature of the proceedings, I will proceed on the basis that the proceedings initiated to resolve the disputed issues between the parties are to be treated as an action, and that a motion for summary judgment is an available procedure by which the issues described by Glass J. may be litigated. The situation in this case is indistinguishable from that considered by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Maurice v. Alles, where the court concluded that use of the summary judgment procedure where the parties both fully participated in the motion, in circumstances where a judge’s order did not explicitly direct that the application proceed to trial, although such an order could have been made pursuant to Rule 38.10(1)(b), was merely a procedural defect that caused no prejudice to the parties.
[13] The Order Giving Directions required the parties to participate in mediation. That has not happened. The responding party does not expressly argue that the motion for summary judgment cannot proceed in the face of the requirement in the Order Giving Directions that mediation occur, but she does seek an extension of the time prescribed in the Order Giving Directions for the mediation to occur. By necessary implication, such an extension of time would have required that the motion for summary judgment be postponed. It is agreed by the parties that when counsel for the moving parties made efforts to arrange a mediation in July, 2018, counsel for Carolynn Sutherland responded that he had no instructions to mediate. In the circumstances of this case, where Ms. Sutherland has previously resisted efforts to mediate, I concluded that it was appropriate to hear and determine the motion for summary judgment.
C. The test to be applied
(a) The nature of a motion for summary judgment
[14] In Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87, at para. 66, the Supreme Court described the approach that a trial judge must take on a motion for summary judgment.
On a motion for summary judgment under Rule 20.04, the judge should first determine if there is a genuine issue requiring trial based only on the evidence before her, without using the new fact-finding powers. There will be no genuine issue requiring a trial if the summary judgment process provides her with the evidence required to fairly and justly adjudicate the dispute and is a timely, affordable and proportionate procedure, under Rule 20.04(2)(a). If there appears to be a genuine issue requiring a trial, she should then determine if the need for a trial can be avoided by using the new powers under Rules 20.04(2.1) and (2.2). She may, at her discretion, use those powers, provided that their use is not against the interest of justice. Their use will not be against the interest of justice if they will lead to a fair and just result and will serve the goals of timeliness, affordability and proportionality in light of the litigation as a whole.
[15] Notwithstanding the expanded fact-finding powers of a motions judge hearing a motion for summary judgment, summary judgment is appropriate only if the material provided on the motion "gives the judge confidence that she can find the necessary facts and apply the relevant legal principles so as to resolve the dispute": Hryniak, at para. 50. In Hryniak the Supreme Court held, at para. 49, that there will be no genuine issue for trial when the summary judgment process "(1) allows the judge to make the necessary findings of fact, (2) allows the judge to apply the law to the facts, and (3) is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result."
(b) Is there a genuine issue requiring a trial?
[16] Ms. Sutherland takes the position that her mother’s decision to omit her from the 2014 and 2011 wills was based on a material mistake of fact. Ms. Sutherland alleges that her mother mistakenly believed that a payment that she and her husband made to Ms. Sutherland in February, 2014 in the amount of $65,000 was extorted by Ms. Sutherland from her parents, when in fact it represented a repayment to her of money that she had loaned to her father many years earlier.
[17] The sparse jurisprudence relied on by Ms. Sutherland to support her proposition of law that a testator’s disposition is ineffective if it is contingent upon the testator’s mistake about a material fact, does not include any resort to this concept by an Ontario court. Counsel for Ms. Sutherland has advised that he is aware of no Ontario case in which this proposition has been applied.
[18] It is not necessary to examine the contours of the legal principle upon which Ms. Sutherland relies, or to consider its application to the facts of this case, because the evidence that the parties have provided on this motion demonstrates overwhelmingly that Joan Cavanagh was not mistaken about a material fact when she revised her will in 2011, and when she revised it again in 2014. To the extent that the affidavit of Ms. Sutherland raises a genuine issue for trial, the totality of the evidence permits me to fairly and justly adjudicate this dispute, and the summary judgment process provides a timely, affordable and proportionate procedure by which to adjudicate this dispute. It is in the interests of justice in this case to employ the fact-finding tools made available to me by Rule 20.04(2.1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
D. The evidence
[19] Joan Cavanagh executed four wills, in 2014, 2011, 2006, and 2001. In the 2001 and 2006 wills, Joan Cavanagh left her estate to her husband, Richard Cavanagh. In the event that he pre-deceased her, her estate was to be divided equally between her six daughters.
[20] In the 2011 will, Joan Cavanagh left her estate to her husband, and in the event that he pre-deceased her, her estate was to be divided equally between five daughters: Katherine Bork, Diane Mather, Angela Cavanagh, Christine Caissie and Ruth Snider. Notably absent from this bequest is the sixth daughter, Carolynn Sutherland.
[21] In her 2014 will, made after her husband died on April 13, 2012, Joan Cavanagh directed her trustee “to deliver the residue of my estate to my daughters Katherine Bork, Diane Mather, Angela Cavanagh, Christine Caissie and Ruth Snider, per stirpes.” She went on to say: “I wish it to be recorded in this my last will that I have intentionally omitted my daughter Carolynn Sutherland for whom I have made, in my view, adequate provision while I was alive.”
[22] To support her claim that she is entitled to a share of her mother’s estate, Ms. Sutherland alleges that both the 2011 and 2014 wills were based on a material mistake of fact. There is no dispute that, weeks before the 2011 will was executed, Ms. Sutherland’s parents gave her $65,000. Ms. Sutherland alleges that the payment represented repayment for monies she had loaned to her father many years earlier, a state of affairs that her mother knew nothing about. The evidence establishes otherwise.
[23] In 1996, Richard Cavanagh needed money. Joan Cavanagh owned a cottage in Buckhorn. In order to obtain financing secured by the cottage that she could not obtain alone, Joan Cavanagh transferred title to the cottage to herself and Carolynn Sutherland jointly, and obtained a mortgage on the cottage. In her affidavit sworn July 6, 2017, Angela Cavanagh states that the sisters had done this sort of thing other times to assist their parents. There was never any intention that the sister involved would receive any beneficial interest in the transferred property. Ms. Sutherland never contributed to the mortgage payments, property taxes, or the maintenance of the cottage.
[24] In 2011, Richard and Joan Cavanagh, then financially secure, paid off the mortgage on the cottage. They wanted Ms. Sutherland to transfer her interest in the cottage back to her mother. The materials filed on this motion, including the affidavits of Angela Cavanagh and Carolynn Sutherland, and documentary evidence created contemporaneously with the events, provide convincing evidence of the circumstances in which Ms. Sutherland agreed to transfer her interest in the cottage.
[25] On January 14, 2011, Mr. Joel Moldaver, the lawyer for Mr. and Mrs. Cavanagh, wrote to Ms. Sutherland. That letter included the following:
I met with your mother and father January 12, 2011, with whom you have been speaking.
My review of the file back in 1996 would clearly indicate that there was never an intention to provide you with legal title to the property. The transfer was done for the purpose of obtaining a mortgage. You have not made any mortgage payments, nor paid any taxes, nor provided any funds for upkeep and maintenance of the cottage and accordingly, a court of law would no doubt interpret your position as a bare trustee.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, your mother and father are prepared, through this office, to pay you $25,000 to have you execute a Deed, which I will prepare and which will transfer the property back to your mother.
[26] This offer was not acceptable to Ms. Sutherland. She responded to Mr. Moldaver by letter on January 18, 2011. Her letter included the following:
In 1996, I provided my 50% interest in the above stated property as mortgagor so as to accommodate the mortgage for my mother. I did this for her because she needed the mortgage funds: all of the mortgage funds went to her.
At no time was I a bare trustee or did I agree to be one. Rather, by helping my parents I received a 50% interest transfer in the property for so doing, and have treated it as such since 1996.
Being aware of the present market conditions and approximating the market value of the property, my 50% interest would be worth $200,000. That being said, I would certainly entertain a more realistic offer and sincerely hope that we can finalize this in the spirit of family.
[27] On January 19, 2011, Ms. Sutherland sent a lengthy email to her sisters to “inform [them] of the facts of the matters at hand”. The email confirms that Ms. Sutherland, in 1996, was “asked to co-sign a $142,000 mortgage for the cottage”. She also states that she “gave [her parents] $40,000 (a loan I had taken from the bank)”. She describes funds loaned to her parents by others, but does not state that they borrowed any other money from her. In relation to her $40,000 she says: “Dad repaid the loan to me with a second mortgage from Rhonda and Steve McMillan. They declared bankruptcy and I lost $25,000.” Mr. Cavanagh was in the business of investing in mortgages, and I interpret Ms. Sutherland’s email to mean that he assigned his interest in a second mortgage to her, to repay her loan to him. I note that nowhere in her 2011 email to her sisters describing the facts does Ms. Sutherland make any reference to the two $10,000 loans that she says, in her affidavit sworn April 12, 2018, she made to her father in 1994 and 1995. Her affidavit also neglects to mention that her father repaid her $40,000, albeit with a poor investment, resulting in a loss to Ms. Sutherland of $25,000, if her email to her sisters is correct. I further note that the email to the sisters indicates that Ms. Sutherland advanced the $40,000 loan to “them”, a reference to both parents, and that is inconsistent with her affidavit evidence that her assistance to her father was “a dark secret that he kept from Mom”. It also strains credulity that Ms. Sutherland would share such a “dark secret” with five sisters in 2011, and not expect that her mother would then become aware of it.
[28] In the email to her sisters, Ms. Sutherland states:
Two weeks into January 2011, I had heard mom and dad’s financial situation had changed. I called mom and asked her to co-sign a loan based on the equity in the cottage and I would make all the payments. All I needed from her was her signature. Ironically enough, exactly what I had done for them back in 1996. Of course, she tried to justify her not wanting to help…”
In this passage, Ms. Sutherland confirmed her understanding that the 1996 transfer of the cottage to her and her mother jointly occurred to enable Ms. Sutherland to provide “her signature”, so that her mother could obtain financing, rather than to provide Ms. Sutherland with a gift of a 50% beneficial interest in the cottage.
[29] Ms. Sutherland was also offended that her parents had consulted Mr. Moldaver. She wrote to her sisters:
I am a mother and never would I treat my own flesh and blood like this, and NEVER under any circumstances would I involve lawyers. It is disgusting the lack of respect and maturity they have shown here. This is not parenting and is unforgivable.
Clearly, Ms. Sutherland’s relationship with her parents on January 19, 2011 was strained. When Ms. Sutherland wrote this email, she was 42 years old.
[30] On January 22, 2011, Joan Cavanagh emailed Ms. Sutherland:
Carolynn,
Understanding your current financial position, and our mutual desire to keep this matter from a very lengthy and extremely expensive legal battle for both parties we would like to propose the following:
A one time payment to you of $50,000 on the condition of signing the deed negating any and all rights to the property.
We would be willing to direct or schedule the payment(s) as you see fit.
Your father and I believe this is fair for both parties.
Please let us know your intentions by Tuesday the 25 th .
Joan and Dick
[31] Ms. Sutherland continued to hold out for more. In an email sent to her parents on January 25, 2011, she wrote:
Mom & Dad,
I am confused why you didn’t call me back to discuss this and why you felt the need to involve your lawyer.
Anyway, as I explained to you, in order for me to get back on my feet, I need $75,000. All I needed for you to do was to help me get a loan based on my co-ownership in the cottage. I didn’t want you to give me your well-deserved money you just got on the properties you sold. I would have much preferred taking out my own loan with the help from my parents.
This email expresses Ms. Sutherland’s hope, in January 2011, to borrow $75,000 which she intended to repay. She disavowed any interest in receiving money from her parents. The email does not contain a hint that she felt they owed money to her.
[32] Ms. Sutherland followed up in an email to her parents on January 27, 2011:
Hi Mom and Dad:
I haven’t heard from you regarding my last note.
I can only assume you do not want to pay the $75,000. I would sign the deed for the $50,000 paid now plus a $25,000 loan/line of credit that Mom could easily secure based on the equity in the cottage. I would make the monthly payments.
Again, no mention is made of any belief on the part of Ms. Sutherland that the money she seeks from her parents is to compensate her for loans she previously provided to them. Rather, the email clearly sets out a quid pro quo . Money in exchange for relinquishing her interest in the cottage.
[33] On February 1, 2011, Mr. and Mrs. Cavanagh wrote a cheque in the amount of $65,000, payable to Carolynn Sutherland. Ms. Sutherland signed a receipt for those funds. The terms of that receipt are significant. The receipt is dated February 3, 2011, and reads: “Rec’d from J.S. Moldaver in consideration for executing conveyance of [the cottage property] to my parents .” [Emphasis added.]
[34] On February 3, 2011, the cottage property was transferred by Carolynn Sutherland and Joan Cavanagh to Joan Cavanagh and Richard Cavanagh as joint tenants. The consideration given was $2.00. The nominal consideration was explained: “Mother and Daughter to Mother and Father for natural love and affection”.
[35] A hand-written telephone message left for Mr. Moldaver on February 7, 2011 documents a call received from Joan Cavanagh. The message states “she wants added in the will that ‘Carolyn [sic] received $65,000 on Feb 3/11 and that is her inheritance”.
[36] Joan Cavanagh executed a will on February 14, 2011. It was in all material respects the same as her August 30, 2006 will, except that Carolynn Sutherland was deleted as a residual beneficiary. The 2011 will does not contain an explanation for that change, but the reasons for Mrs. Cavanagh’s decision are clear given the documented events of January and February, 2011, including the statement of her intention contained in the telephone message, which undoubtedly relates to the money in exchange for interest in the cottage transaction.
[37] Joan Cavanagh executed her last will and testament on June 24, 2014. That will reflects the fact that Richard Cavanagh had died. As in her 2011 will, she appointed Katherine Bork, Diane Mather and Angela Cavanagh as her estate trustees. As in her 2011 will, she directed that the residue of her estate be left to her daughters, with the exception of Carolynn Sutherland. In her 2014 will, she explained her reason for disinheriting Ms. Sutherland. The will states: “I wish it to be recorded in this my last will that I have intentionally omitted my daughter Carolynn Sutherland for whom I have made, in my view, adequate provision while I was alive.”
[38] Notwithstanding what occurred in 2011, Joan Cavanagh assisted Ms. Sutherland financially in March, 2016 by loaning her $15,000, in return for which Ms. Sutherland signed a promissory note, stating that she would pay back the loan in monthly installments of $1,000. This is further evidence that Ms. Sutherland did not feel that she was owed any money by her mother. If she felt she was owed money, she would surely have requested repayment of monies due to her, rather than borrowing money from her mother.
[39] I have considered the documentary evidence provided by Ms. Sutherland in support of her position that she loaned $65,000 to her father in the 1990’s. A personal diary entry on October 1, 1994, “give cheque $10,000 to mum to give to dad”, says nothing about who wrote the cheque or why, and puts the lie to Ms. Sutherland’s April 12, 2018 affidavit when she says that her mother did not know about what she says was a $10,000 loan to her father. The documents support her evidence that she provided her father with $40,000, but her email to her sisters says that her father repaid that loan by assigning to her his interest in a mortgage, which was not fully repaid by the borrower, leaving her with a shortfall of $25,000. Ms. Sutherland’s evidence that she gave a further $10,000 to her father in 1995 is unsupported by any documentary evidence. Ms. Sutherland has provided a letter from her father in which he offers to sell her a first mortgage, and asks her to send him a cheque for $10,000. There is no documentary evidence to corroborate Ms. Sutherland’s evidence that she provided those funds to her father.
[40] Whatever the financial dealings between Ms. Sutherland and her father in the mid-1990’s, I conclude that they had nothing to do with her efforts in 2011 to obtain money from her parents in exchange for transferring her interest in the cottage to them, except perhaps to fuel Ms. Sutherland’s sense of entitlement. Her opening position in 2011 ($200,000, being one half of the value of the cottage, or something more reasonable) had nothing to do with the amount she says she was owed. Her position in 2011 was clearly stated by her to be related to her need for money. At no time in her emails or letters, written as she negotiated with her parents about transferring title to the cottage, did she even hint that what she wanted from them had anything to do with what she felt she was owed.
[41] Notably, Carolynn Sutherland’s notice of objection to the issuing of a certificate of appointment of an estate trustee makes no mention of any concern that her mother made her will while under a misapprehension as to the facts. The notice of objection is based on concerns that her mother was unduly influenced by one or more of her sisters when the 2014 will was executed, that she was pressured to make changes to her will that she did not appreciate or understand, and which she executed in suspicious circumstances. None of these claims have been pursued.
[42] Ms. Sutherland also argues that her mother did not have an accurate understanding of the extent of her assets. She bases this on a statement she says was made to her by Mr. Moldaver, which he, in his affidavit, denies having made. Ms. Sutherland, in her affidavit, describes her relationship with her mother since 2014 in very positive terms, and notes that her mother, on two occasions when she sold property, made substantial gifts to Ms. Sutherland and to her sisters, thus evidencing her appreciation of her financial circumstances. Ms. Sutherland’s hearsay assertion in her affidavit, denied by Mr. Moldaver, who allegedly made the statement, is the only evidence that Joan Cavanagh lacked an understanding of the extent of her assets. Hearsay evidence on a motion for summary judgment is admissible, but an adverse inference may be drawn from a party’s failure to provide the evidence of the person having personal knowledge of the facts. See: Rule 20.02(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. In the circumstances of this case, that adverse inference is easily drawn. All of the other evidence points ineluctably to the conclusion that Mrs. Cavanagh was actively involved in the management of her assets, and managed them responsibly.
E. Conclusion
[43] Joan Cavanagh’s intentions in relation to her daughter, Ms. Sutherland, could not be clearer. Her 2014 will records “that I have intentionally omitted my daughter Carolynn Sutherland for whom I have made, in my view, adequate provision while I was alive”. The timing of her changed testamentary intention, as reflected in her 2011 will, made two weeks after she signed a cheque payable to Ms. Sutherland for a substantial amount of money, establishes a direct connection between that payment and her conclusion that she made adequate provision for Ms. Sutherland when she was alive.
[44] For the reasons I have expressed, having employed the fact-finding powers conferred by Rule 20.04(2.1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, because their use in this case is in the interests of justice, I conclude that Ms. Sutherland’s position that her mother’s decision was contingent on a material mistake of fact raises no genuine issue requiring a trial. The evidentiary record on the motion for summary judgment permits me to (1) make the necessary findings of fact, (2) to apply the law to the facts, and (3) is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result in this case. The evidence clearly establishes that the dispositions made in Joan Cavanagh’s 2014 and 2011 wills were not contingent on any material mistake as to the facts.
[45] In the result, an order will issue as follows:
(1) The motion for summary judgment succeeds. (2) Carolynn Sutherland’s objection to the appointment of Katharine Bork, Diane Mather and Angela Cavanagh as estate trustees for the estate of Joan Katherine Cavanagh is dismissed. (3) The 2014 and 2011 wills of Joan Katherine Cavanagh are valid.
[46] The moving parties are entitled to their costs. Submissions as to costs are to be made in writing and delivered to Judge’s Reception on the 6 th floor at the Oshawa courthouse. The moving parties are to submit a single submission as to costs, not exceeding two pages in addition to a bill of costs, within two weeks of the release of this judgment. The responding party is to submit her submissions, of an equivalent length, within three weeks of the release of this judgment.
The Honourable Justice J. Speyer
Released: April 5, 2019