S. Wayne Morris

Following the release of reasons on an earlier motion, the court determined the appropriate costs awards among insurers involved in a dispute regarding indemnity exposure.

The court applied s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing the significance of the motion’s outcome and the potential insurance liability implications.

After reviewing the bills of costs and submissions, the court reduced certain claimed hours and adjusted the hourly rate for one party before fixing partial indemnity costs.

Costs were awarded in favour of two defendants against the proposed statutory third party.

The proposed statutory third party was ordered to pay the costs within 60 days.

The court considered a motion seeking determination of issues arising from pleadings alleging both intentional and negligent acts in a motor vehicle incident.

The moving party relied on the framework from prior Supreme Court authority addressing the characterization of intentional versus negligent conduct.

The court held that the pleadings and the driver’s guilty plea to dangerous driving did not permit a definitive characterization of the conduct at this early stage of the action.

Determining the issue without further evidentiary development risked injustice to the parties.

The motion was therefore dismissed as premature, without prejudice to renewal at a later stage.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict dismissing their action against the respondent.

They argued the trial judge erred in the jury charge regarding the Occupiers' Liability Act, improperly excluded them from the courtroom, and that the respondent's jury address was inflammatory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury charge, noting the exclusion was on agreement of counsel, and holding that the jury address was not inappropriate.

The plaintiffs sued their insurer for terminating statutory accident benefits based on reports from health care professionals retained by the insurer under s. 42 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

On discovery, the plaintiffs sought to ask questions that amounted to cross-examining these experts.

The motion judge held that the experts were not 'experts' within the meaning of Rule 31.06(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and thus the prohibition against cross-examination did not apply.

The Divisional Court allowed the insurer's appeal, holding that the clear wording of Rule 31.06(3) covers experts engaged by a party for a purpose other than litigation, including s. 42 assessors.

The defendant insurer sought leave to appeal a decision upholding a Master's order that required a claims examiner to answer certain questions on discovery.

The questions related to whether health professionals who assessed the plaintiffs under s. 42 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule had requested certain records.

The appeal judge had found that these professionals were 'assessors' rather than 'experts' under rule 31.06(3), and thus the prohibition against cross-examining experts on discovery did not apply.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the issue of whether rule 31.06(3) applies to s. 42 assessors is open to serious debate and raises a new question of principle.

The appellant brought a proposed class action against Health Canada, alleging negligent regulation of temporomandibular joint (TMJ) implants.

The motion judge struck the claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, holding that it was plain and obvious that Health Canada did not owe a private law duty of care to individual consumers of medical devices.

The statutory scheme did not create a proximate relationship, and the pleadings failed to allege specific representations or reliance that would establish proximity under the Anns/Cooper test.

The Crown breached its fiduciary duty in 1886 by making an improvident sale of the appellant's timber rights.

The trial judge valued the timber rights at $31,600 and awarded simple interest adjusted for inflation, denying the appellant's claim for equitable compensation including compound interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the valuation but allowed the appeal on compensation, finding that the trial judge erred in failing to compensate the appellant in equity for its lost opportunity to have the funds invested.

The Court held that an award of equitable compensation including compound interest is not barred by the Crown's historic immunity from paying interest, and ordered a new hearing to determine the appropriate compensation.

The appellant onion growers suffered significant crop losses due to onion maggots and sued the manufacturer and seller of the insecticide Dyfonate for breach of warranty and negligence.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that the crop failure was caused by unusually cool and dry environmental conditions that delayed the emergence of the maggots, rather than a defect in the insecticide.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's factual findings and concluded that the respondents provided no express or implied warranties regarding the insecticide's effectiveness under those unusual conditions, nor were they negligent.

Three separate appeals were brought challenging a motions judge's order regarding claims related to defective breast implants.

OHIP appealed the striking of its subrogated claim, which the court dismissed, finding the claim was fully satisfied by the Dow Settlement Agreement.

The Attorney General and Dow appealed the dismissal of their motions to strike the plaintiffs' action for regulatory negligence, arguing the settlement agreements barred the claims and constituted an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, holding that the plaintiffs' several liability claims against the government regulator were different in nature and kind from the settled claims and were not barred by the prior agreements.

The appellant employer appealed a motion judge's order regarding the plaintiff employee's claim for long-term disability benefits.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in finding the collective agreement's benefits terms fell within Brown & Beatty's third category.

The language of the collective agreement and Letter of Understanding clearly incorporated the benefits plan into the collective agreement, meaning disputes over entitlement must be submitted to arbitration.

The appeal was allowed and the civil action against the employer was dismissed.